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I. INTRODUCTION
This article comes at a moment of profound questioning as to the
possibility that Israelis and Palestinians will reach a negotiated permanent
resolution to the conflict between them. Similarly, after years of intense
activity and experimentation, the field of international justice and transi-
tional justice also seems engaged in a process of self-critique with the aim
of continuing its evolution. In particular, skepticism has grown regarding
the international community's continued blind-faith preference for estab-
lishing internationalized, individual criminal prosecutions that focus primar-
ily on high-level perpetrators.
This article seizes this critical moment as an opportunity to see what
each of these troubled areas can do for the other by examining whether tran-
sitional justice has a place in the Israeli-Palestinian post-conflict, and if so,
what form it should take. It is hoped that by recasting the former in light of
the latter-i.e., by attempting to fit the Israeli-Palestinian conflict into the
282 [Vol. 38:281
TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE
transitional paradigm-that new challenges to the transitional construct will
reveal themselves and challenges seen elsewhere will appear more pro-
nounced. This thought experiment, which will no doubt be considered by
some to be horribly premature let alone hopelessly idealistic, presents an
opportunity to continue the ceaseless work of scrutinizing the relationships
between justice, peace, truth, and reconciliation in post-conflict situations-
even if only in theory. Such a reconsideration of the Israeli-Palestinian con-
flict may provide insights into what "peace," in all the ways the word reso-
nates in the souls of the weary populaces engulfed in it, will truly demand of
them in the future.
The article proceeds in several parts. Part I portrays the reigning
spirit of relations between Israelis and Palestinians as one of disengagement
and separation, and describes this as an untenable situation, given that the
forces of economic regionalization and globalization will likely not permit
Israelis and Palestinians-whose lives are already inextricably linked-to
live apart. The natural end of the current "peace process" is a two-state solu-
tion that will be created between political elites as they develop a skeletal
framework of re-drawn borders and cease-fire declarations, while the inevi-
table interconnectivity of ordinary Israelis and Palestinians' lives demands a
true normalization of relations between them. At the same time, the two-
state solution represents, to some, a compromise from the requirements of
absolute justice (a complete reversal of the Palestinian refugee problem).
Consequently, I argue that some process is needed to begin the work on a
"peace beyond the peace process," to both prepare the populations for shar-
ing their intimate living quarters as well as to compensate or bridge the gap
between the compromised justice of the peace process and the more robust
visions of justice of which some dream.'
1 See Omar Barghouti, Palestine's Tell-Tale Heart, in THE NEW INTIFADA: RESISTING
ISRAEL'S APARTHEID 165 (Roane Carey ed., 2001). Barghouti argues that:
As in every other case of colonialism, the only logical, legal and moral reparation
for the native population is embodied in the imperative of decolonization. But if all
we can see of the Jewish presence in Palestine is its negation of our own moral
right to the land, then we will possess only half the truth. The other half is that we
must view the Jews in Palestine qua humans, above and beyond everything else.
Otherwise, only revenge can settle the score. Palestinians have a moral obligation
to make a distinction between "annulling the wrong," as Hegel calls it, and re-
venge. The former aims to negate that which makes the colonist so, not to elimi-
nate the human behind the colonist, for being so. Revenge however, primarily fo-
cuses on venting long-suppressed anger, frustration and humiliation, which leads to
immoral acts, as witnessed in abundant cases of national or ethnic strife.
Id. at 175. Distinguishing between the alternative of coexistence, as occurred in post-
apartheid South Africa, and the alternative solution of expelling colonialists, as occurred in
Algeria, Barghouti claims that South Africa presents an important historical antecedent for
Israel/Palestine because "there is no mother country for the Jews to go back to. Expelling the
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To fully appreciate the need for a "peace beyond the peace process"
it is essential to understand the conflict culture permeating Israeli and Pales-
tinian society. The conflict culture consists of several different segments of
each population-victims, perpetrators, collaborators, and beneficiaries-all
of whom have conflict identities that express their particular relationship to
the conflict. In most cases, there are overarching victim ideologies that in-
form each of these conflict identities, particularly their opinions regarding
those on the other side of the conflict. Indeed, the foundational feature of
the conflict culture is the mutual denial by both sides of the other side's
distinct and oppositional narrative of the conflict. Taking the nature of the
conflict culture, conflict identities, and the mutual denial of narratives into
account, the article prescribes some reckoning with the past as the means of
overturning the conflict culture.
Part II proceeds to discuss potentially appropriate post-conflict tran-
sitional justice mechanisms to facilitate a process of historical justice that
would ideally further broader normalization of relations. The tribunal para-
digm-and the retributive justice model more broadly-so favored by inter-
national lawyers is dismissed both for jurisdictional and political reasons,
and because of the nature of the conflict: there is a vast, complex 'gray
zone' of complicity that involves a diverse set of actors beyond the high-
level perpetrators on whom formal criminal trials generally focus. Beyond
the marginalization of beneficiaries and collaborators and the overshadow-
ing of victims by the intense focus on perpetrators, the paucity of the narra-
tive of the conflict produced by trials is seen as deficient to truly capture the
diffuse 'conflict culture' in which Israelis and Palestinians are enmeshed.
With the trial model deemed unhelpful, but the pressing needs for normali-
zation still unplanned, the article turns to consider the potential contribu-
tions of the truth commission model.
Part III engages in a discussion of the complex regime design ques-
tions that would confront planners of an Israeli-Palestinian Truth Commis-
sion (IPTC), with special focus on the potential challenges presented by the
two-state solution, a novel situation for the implementation of a truth com-
mission. Part IV presents a minimalist appraisal of the potential of truth
commissions to bring about reconciliation between fiercely divided political
colonists is not a moral option in the case of Palestine." Id Barghouti's moral solution is
advocating for a binational state. Id.
Of course, the vast majority of Israelis do not consider themselves colonizers, but rather,
exiles who have returned to their homeland, a return expedited by hundreds of years of Euro-
pean persecution and finally, the Holocaust. Moreover, most Jewish Israelis view the notion
of a binational state as destructive of the concept of Jewish self-determination and the his-
torical necessity of a safe haven for the Jews of the world, which gave rise to Zionist ideol-
ogy. If an unlimited "right of return" for Palestinians would meet the requirements of abso-
lute justice, then, it is apparent that any two-state solution in the framework that has been
discussed in the past will no doubt fall woefully short of this standard.
[Vol. 38:281
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enemies. I highlight the Israeli Jewish public as comprising a large benefici-
ary class that above all other segments of the conflict culture, needs to come
to terms with its role in Palestinian suffering, because it this group that
holds the keys to further attempts at historical justice. Because the results of
any complex socio-political process are difficult to predict, and reconcilia-
tion truly is the work of generations, I do not offer any predictions as to the
outcome of a commission's work, but do highlight current trends in Israeli
and Palestinian society, particularly the ascendance of post-Zionist dis-
course and the "new" Israeli historiography, as potentially significant de-
velopments-although marginalized for the time being-which could affect
the prospects of the establishment of such a commission and the viability of
its work.
II. UNDERSTANDING THE REALITY OF INTERCONNECTIVITY
A. Interconnectivity and the "Peace & Prosperity Paradigm"
Even as they attempt to separate themselves, the Israeli and Pales-
tinian populations are continually being forced together by the powers of
economic regionalization and globalization. Uri Avnery envisions a future
of Israeli-Palestinian relations that seems a natural conclusion of the "peace
and prosperity" paradigm that introduced itself into the region at the start of
the Oslo process:
The idea of an Israeli-Palestinian two-state solution was always based on
the assumption that the border between them would be open and that they
would have a joint capital in Jerusalem. The guiding vision is not "separa-
tion" but partnership, with each nation expressing its identity in a national
home of its own. I am convinced that after living together, side-by-side,
with Jerusalem as their common capital, the State of Israel and the State of
Palestine will grow slowly together, under the pressure of geography and
economics, and form a kind of federation within a general regional organi-
zation-as I wrote fifty-one years ago-a kind of Semitic Union along the
lines of the present European Union.2
2 Uri Avnery, A Binational State? God Forbid!, J. PALESTINE STUD., Summer 1999, at 55,
59 (1999). For a more detailed discussion of the role of globalization in Israeli-Palestinian
relations, see Gershon Shafir, Business in Politics: Globalization and the Search for Peace in
South Africa and Israel/Palestine, in ISRAEL: THE DYNAMICS OF CHANGE AND CONTINUITY
103 (David Levi-Faur et al. eds., 1999). For an in-depth study of the Israeli case, see Gershon
Shafir & Yoav Peled, Peace and Profits: The Globalization of Israeli Business and the Peace
Process, in THE NEW ISRAEL: PEACEMAKING AND LIBERALIZATION 243 (Gershon Shafir &
Yoav Peled eds., 2000) (arguing that the peace process is also clearly part of a much larger
liberalization trend in Israel). For more on the global push for Israeli integration into the
Middle East economy, see Jonathan Paris, Regional Cooperation and the MENA Economic
Summits, in THE NEW ISRAEL: PEACEMAKING AND LIBERALIZATION, supra, at 265 (discussing
the concerted effort by members of the Israeli and Arab business communities to create
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Avnery's forecasts, echoing those of Edward Said,3 do strike the
contemporary observer of Israeli-Palestinian relations as more than a little
idealistic, and yet, there is a core truth to this vision.
Indeed, if the general sentiment among Israelis at the time of the
signing of Declaration of Principles in 1993 was to disentangle themselves
from the Palestinians for security purposes, 4 it would seem that the Oslo
opportunities for trade and collaboration on regional projects). With the chilling of the peace
process in the years of Benjamin Netanyahu's government, however, such experimentation
decreased.
It is important to keep in mind that this intense relationship is skewed-the Israeli and Pales-
tinian economies are currently, and most likely will continue to be, linked asymmetrically.
Unfortunately, this cannot be explored in depth here, but in lieu of an extended discussion, I
offer the following statistic that is quite exemplary of the relationship: according to the UN
Special Co-Coordinator's Office in the Occupied Territories, in 1998, trade with Israel ac-
counted for 79.8 percent of Palestinian commercial transactions. The second highest was
trade with Jordan, its closest neighbor, at 2.39 percent. See Edward Said, Palestinians Under
Siege, LONDON REv. BOOKS, Dec. 14, 2000, http://www.Irb.co.uk/v22/n24/said0l_.html.
For a recent update of the economic crisis in the Palestinian Authority and the impact of
Israeli policies, including border closure, on the economy in Gaza Strip and the West Bank,
see THE WORLD BANK GROUP, WEST BANK AND GAZA UPDATE (2006), available at
http://www-wds.worldbank.org/external/defaulvtWDSContentServer/IW3P/IB/2006/08/29/
000160016_20060829135329/Rendered/PDF/371370ENGLISHOGZOUpdate0 1 Public I .pdf.
For more on the power inequities between Israel and the Palestinian Authority, and how
Israel dictated the success and implementation of Palestinian "fiscal policy" during the Oslo
years, see Jennifer Olmsted, Thwarting Palestinian Development, MIDDLE E. REP., Oct.-Dec.
1996, at 11 (arguing that Israeli restrictions on the mobility of the Palestinian labor force and
on the movement of goods across the Israel-Palestinian border forces Palestinians into an
untenable economic position requiring externally imposed structural adjustment policies);
see also Sharif S. Elmusa & Mahmud El-Jaafari, Power and Trade: The Israeli-Palestinian
Economic Protocol, J. PALESTINE STUD., Winter 1995, at 14 (considering the impact of the
"Paris Protocol" on the Palestinian economy); Sara Roy, Decline and Disfigurement: The
Palestinian Economy After Oslo, in THE NEW INTIFADA: RESISTING ISRAEL'S APARTHEID,
supra note 1, at 91, 92 (arguing that Palestinian economic regression is the result of Israel's
policy of closure, which restricts or bans movement of labor and goods from the West Bank
and the Gaza Strip to Israel).
3 See Edward Said, What Can Separation Mean?, AL-AHRAM WEEKLY, Nov. 11-17,
1999, http://weekly.ahram.org.eg/1999/455/op2.htm ("Neither Palestinians nor Israelis can
be made distant from the other. In the area between Ramallah in the north and Bethlehem in
the south, 800,000 Israelis and Palestinians live on top of each other, and cannot be sepa-
rated.").
4 As Shalom Achshav ("Peace Now," a mainstream peace movement) spokesman
Amiram Goldblum stated it, "The goal is not to fall in love with them [the Palestinians], but
to disengage from them." MERON BENVENISTI, INTIMATE ENEMIES: JEWS AND ARABS IN A
SHARED LAND 23 (1995). A columnist wrote, "What do I care about left or right? ... Inde-
pendent of my opinions on the proper or desirable future political solutions, the current situa-
tion is no longer tolerable. . . . We must create a buffer, restrict contact, separate us from
them for the interim." Id. Indeed, Yitzhak Rabin was elected on the promise "To get Gaza
out of Tel Aviv," and his predecessor, Ehud Barak, in his own campaign, eloquently stated
his intentions: "We are here and they are there." Danny Rubinstein, Luckily, the Plan is Not
[Vol. 38:281
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process was quite ambivalent, for what actually occurred over the interim
period under direction of the Oslo agreements was an intensification of rela-
tions. As Oslo's harshest critics have argued, what really occurred was a
transformation of the situation from the terms of conflict into those of a
"hegemonic peace," in which the consistent element throughout is Israeli
domination and Palestinian supplication, but nonetheless, intense interac-
tion.5
The peace and prosperity paradigm introduced itself into the region
in the early 1990s. Loosely based on the tightening of relations throughout
Europe over a fifty-year period, the notion is simply that peace is the key to
further prosperity, and in turn, prosperity, it was argued, would help foster
peace: "the precedence of economics over politics, and the formation of
partnerships which can be instituted before borders are drawn and peace
treaties signed."6 This hypothesis also assumes that once borders are estab-
lished they will quickly lose their significance, as local, national, and sepa-
ratist desires will bow to the force of regional integration (itself propelled
by global integration).7 The problem, of course, is that the absence of peace
ruins the chances for prosperity, and prosperity cannot begin to take hold
without a basic atmosphere of stability, which is the key element in attract-
ing foreign investment.
Throughout the Oslo years, there were numerous signs that the
peace and prosperity paradigm was, in fact, in full-swing. Mark Tessler
points out that only eight months after the signing of the Declaration of
Principles in 1993, the International Herald Tribune ran an article entitled,
"When Former Enemies Turn Business Partners," that documented the in-
tense contacts between political and financial elites across the Middle East.8
There were also the series of international conferences in 1994, 1995, and
1996 convened to promote development. Tessler writes that King Hassan II
Feasible, HA'ARETZ, Feb. 25, 2002, http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/pages/ShArt.jhtml?item
No= 134217&contrassD=2&subContrasslD=4&sbSubContrassD=0&listSrc=Y&itemNo=1
342175.
5 See Glenn E. Robinson, The Peace of the Powerful, in THE NEW INTIFADA: RESISTING
ISRAEL'S APARTHEID, supra note 1, at I11.
6 Shafir & Peled, supra note 2, at 252. For a representative example of this forecasting,
see the Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs website for documents relating to the "economy of
peace," particularly "The Peace Economy- Possible Scenarios." Israel Ministry of Foreign
Affairs, The Peace Economy-Possible Scenarios (Sept. 6, 1993), http://www.mfa.gov.il/mfa/
go.asp?MFAHOc260.
7 See Guy Mundlak, Labor in a Peaceful Middle East: Regional Prosperity or Social
Dumping?, in THE MIDDLE EAST PEACE PROCESS: INTERDISCIPLINARY PERSPECTIVES 199
(Ilan Peleg ed., 1998) [hereinafter MIDDLE EAST PEACE PROCESS].
8 See Mark Tessler, Narratives and Myths About Arab Intransigence Toward Israel, in
ISRAELI AND PALESTINIAN NARRATIVES OF CONFLICT: HISTORY'S DOUBLE HELIX 174, 182
(Robert I. Rotberg ed., 2006) [hereinafter HISTORY'S DOUBLE HELIX].
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of Morocco set up the initial conference, which was attended by representa-
tives from sixty-one countries and 1,114 business leaders, to "further nor-
maliz[e] Arab-Israeli relations." 9 It is not just the business elites who en-
gage in the peace and prosperity paradigm; Palestinian public opinion
regarding peace with Israel and normalizing relations can also be shown to
be shaped by considerations of political economy (as opposed to being
dominated by religious and cultural considerations).'°
Others insist that economics can only account for so much. As
Donald Will concludes, "unlike South Africa, where it might be said that
the economic benefits of ending apartheid outweighed its preservation, in
Israel, the debate over the nature of the state would most likely not abandon
discussions based in a nationalist discourse for the sake of economic
growth." Thus, Will argues, "[n]ationalism remains the ideological norm for
both sides to the Israeli-Palestinian dispute."" This seems a fair analysis
that finds reinforcement in the continued appeal that "separation" (and its
promises for the survival of the Jewish state) has for Israelis, especially after
the violence of the second intifada.
Still, even though the Oslo process has always been directed at a
two-state solution, and separation or "disengagement" is definitely the cur-
rent overwhelming preference (evinced by the vast cement wall snaking its
way essentially along a path demarcated by the 1967 Green Line), the forces
of economic regionalization and globalization will only be held at bay for so
long before deeper integration will appear a natural conclusion: a 2002
Saudi initiative called for universal recognition among Arab states of Is-
rael's right to exist, normalize relations, and declare an end to the conflict, if
Israel were to withdraw its forces to the 1967 borders, allow the Palestinian
refugees a right of return, and establish a Palestinian state;12 Turkey is up
for admittance to the European Union; U.S.-Libya relations have started a
process of normalization stimulated by weak but potentially promising cur-
9 Id. at 183.
10 Id. at 188. Tessler observes that survey data show that Palestinians who believe that
peace with Israel will bring economic benefits "are more likely than others to favor recon-
ciliation after a Palestinian state has been established." Id.; see also Jodi Nachtwey & Mark
Tessler, The Political Economy of Attitudes Toward Peace Among Palestinians and Israelis,
46 J. CONFLICT RESOL. 260, 261 (2002) (applying the "political economy perspective" to
"assess the degree to which economic evaluations help to explain attitudes toward the Pales-
tinian-Israeli conflict in the years following the 1993 Oslo accords").
11 Donald S. Will, Non-Racialism Versus Nationalism: Contrasting Solutions to Conflict
in South Africa and Israel/Palestine, 25 PEACE & CHANGE 255, 260 (2000).
12 See The Saudi Initiative: Arab League Beirut Declaration of 28 March 2002,
http://www.peacelobby.org/saudi initiative.htm. Hamas was even considering the Saudi
initiative in April 2006. See Rafael D. Frankel, Hamas Weighs Saudi Initiative, JERUSALEM
POST, Apr. 26, 2006, available at hrtp://www.jpost.com/servlet/Satellite?cid=1 1459612306
56&pagename=JPost%2FJPArticle%2FShowFull.
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rents of internal reform in one of the Middle East's longest-running dicta-
torships; and there were fits-and-starts at democratic process in Lebanon
(the so-called "Cedar Revolution" of 2005), all making Shimon Peres' vi-
sion of the "New Middle East"13 appear less crazy than it once did, though
its arrival is still quite distant in time.
This is not to gloss over the turmoil in Iraq, the brewing confronta-
tion between the United States and Europe against Iran, or what appears to
be the start of a new war of attrition between Israel and Hezbollah in south-
ern Lebanon (or other signs of fragmentation in that country). Nor does it
mean to suggest that economic regionalization and the growth of free trade
are the solutions to the woes of Palestinians 14 or the slow process of devel-
opment in many of the countries in the Middle East. Indeed, some analyses
suggest that the effects of economic globalization can be counterproductive
because of its disparate effects on populations of varying socio-economic
backgrounds, leading to the entrenchment of resentment and solidifying
nationalistic tendencies in those communities that benefit least from further
economic integration. 15
It does suggest, however, that the logic of the peace and prosperity
paradigm of the "New Middle East" features a general stabilization of po-
litical relations through the normalization of economic relations, and vice
versa. The trick, then, is to get a nominally politically stable environment,
wherein the economics can proceed the politics and transborder economic
relations become entrenched enough so that political violence simply be-
comes too costly for anyone to consider it as a viable mode of interaction.
13 SHIMON PERES & ARYE NAOR, THE NEW MIDDLE EAST (1993).
14 See THE WORLD BANK, STAGNATION OR REVIVAL? ISRAELI DISENGAGEMENT AND
PALESTINIAN ECONOMIC PROSPECTS 1 (2004), available at http://www-wds.worldbank.org/
extemal/default/WDSContentServer/WDSP/IB/2005/07/19/000160016_20050719120558/Re
ndered/PDF/329720GZOStagnlcember020040lpublicl.pdf ("[Economic] prosperity is no
guarantee of tranquility ... [but] destitution, political instability and violence are constant
companions."). See also Jamal Juma, Cementing Israeli Apartheid: The Role of World Bank,
LEFT TuRN MAG., Oct.-Nov. 2005, available at http://www.leftturn.org/ArticlesNiewer.
aspx?id=766&type=M (explaining the creation of industrial zones around the Wall/Fence).
Juma argues that at the center of the World Bank plan for Palestinian economic development
is the creation of "an export-orientated economy in which Palestinian dispossessed farmers
are exploited as cheap labor and dominated by markets and free trade." Id. According to
Juma, "Israeli and World Bank interests merge to destroy local forms of trade, sustainable
patterns of agricultural production, and existing social structures." Id.
15 Uri Ram observes a similar dynamic all over the world, wherein the new wealth brought
by globalization is not distributed equally, but on the contrary, augments economic inequality
and social desperation. Thus, the forces that would bring peace simultaneously plant the
seeds of its eventual undoing by fueling the resentment of the underprivileged that tend to
gravitate toward more "localist" (as opposed to "globalist") and nationalist politics, which
are generally opposed to peace. See Uri Ram, "The Promised Land of Business Opportuni-
ties: " Liberal Post-Zionism in the Glocal Age, in THE NEW ISRAEL: PEACEMAKING AND
LIBERALIZATION, supra note 2, at 217.
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Nonetheless, the paradigm of peace and prosperity still functions
under the paralysis imposed by the current stalemate in the negotiations,
though its existence these days is proven more by its inverse: war and eco-
nomic depression. While the conflict rages, the Palestinian economy is vul-
nerable for its underdevelopment, with structural problems exacerbated by
harsh Israeli restrictions on movement 16 or the withholding of Palestinian
import tax revenues. 17 While Israel is vulnerable for its increasing integra-
tion into the global economy and consequent dependence on outside inves-
tors, one would not want to overstate the impact of the conflict and Palestin-
ian terrorism on its economy. The Israeli economy has remained relatively
stable throughout the second intifada, after an initial dip at the start of the
uprising, which coincided with the bust of the "dotcom bubble," as well as
the September 1 1 th attacks on the United States, which may have caused
systemtic effects in the global economy that Israel felt as much as other
countries."
16 Since the start of the intifada, Israeli roadblocks and other restrictions have stopped
thousands of Palestinians from working in Israel. Before the intifada, twenty-two percent of
employed Palestinians worked in Israel or Israeli settlements, but by 2005, there were only
ten percent were still employed by Israelis, and this group earned twelve percent of all Pales-
tinian income. Israeli security measures have thus added to the already difficult conditions in
the territories, where twenty-two percent are unemployed, forty-three percent are in poverty
and fifteen percent are in "deep poverty" (i.e., people are at below subsistence levels). Esther
Pan, Hamas and the Shrinking PA Budget, CouNciL ON FOREIGN REL., April 21, 2006, http://
www.cfr.org/publication/10499/#5.
17 Israel collects foreign import taxes on imports going into the Palestinian territories and
charges value added taxes (VAT) on Israeli goods entering the territories. These collections
totaled roughly $75 million per month in 2005, of which Israel withholds money to pay the
Palestinian Authority's water and electricity bills (approximately $15 million per month) that
the Palestinians have refused to pay for years in protest of the occupation. This leaves ap-
proximately $60 million that would normally go to the PA but that Israel has withheld since
Hamas was elected. Id. Israel maintained this policy from February 2006 until January 2007,
collecting a total of $660 million, before releasing $100 million of these funds to Palestinian
President Mahmood Abbas on February 19, 2007. See Israel Releases Palestinian Funds, AL
JAZEERA ENGLISH, February 19, 2007, at http://english.aljazeera.netVNR/exeres/3C2975DA-
5CD3-472F-B7CA-F9159F2D152F.htm.
18 The economic literature on the effects of Palestinian terrorism on the Israeli economy
shows that the causal relationship between increased terrorism and negative economic indi-
cators is attenuated. Though foreign tourist arrivals did sharply decline from an all-time high
of 2.7 million tourists in 2000 to 996,000 in 2001 before hitting a bottom of 718,000 in
2002, the number of tourists recovered in 2003, rising moderately to 886,000, and then in
2004, to 1.25 million. Furthermore, despite the sharp rise in terrorism and worries that Israel
would be a potential target during the Iraq war, domestic tourism, which accounts for 65-70
percent of all tourism revenues, was not harmed. Thus, out of the approximately three to four
percent of Israel's GDP based on the tourism industry, terrorism only substantially affected a
fraction of this (accounting for one to 1.5 percent of Israel's GDP). See Nadav Morag, The
Economic and Social Effects of Intensive Terrorism, Israel 2000-2004, THE MIDDLE EAST
REVIEW OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS, Vol. 10, No. 3 (September 2006), at http://meria.idc.
ac.il/joumal/2006/issue3/jvlOno3a9.html; see also Dotan Persitz, The Economic Effects of
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B. The Current Moment: Paralysis
For the majority of the Israeli population, the Oslo years were rela-
tively calm, albeit interrupted by sporadic bursts of violence in the form of
gruesome suicide attacks in the heart of civilian population centers. This
changed, however, with the collapse of the Camp David II accords in July
2000, as the outbreak of the second intifada brought a sharp increase in Pal-
estinian extremist violence against Israeli civilians. Palestinian society col-
lectively vented its rage over Israeli intransigence in its commitments dur-
ing the Oslo era, principally the continuation of settlement building and
continued restrictions on Palestinian freedom of movement, as well as a
host of other violations of human rights and the Geneva Conventions' pre-
scribed norms for the treatment of a civilian population by an occupying
power. 19
The intensity of the second intifada's violence convinced many Is-
raelis that they had no peace partner among the Palestinian leadership led at
that time by Fatah Chairman Yasir Arafat. Both Israeli public opinion and
military strategic thinking concluded that there were dim prospects for a
negotiated peace agreement in the short term. Given the increased violence
Terrorism: Counterfactual Analysis of the Case of Israel (working paper), at http://www.
aeaweb.org/annual-mtg_papers/2007/0106_1015_1802.pdf Persitz uses a counterfactual
approach, an notes that "had Israel been free of terror in the last decade, the country's per-
capita GDP in 2003:3 would have been 8.6% higher than it was. Id. at 6-7, but that overall
"the evidence for structural change in the Israeli economy due to Palestinian terror is very
weak." Id. at 7.
19 As in many seemingly endless conflicts, statistics can begin to lose meaning amidst
endless violence, but it remains vital, particularly in looking toward the possibilities of tran-
sitional justice, to document and keep track of human rights abuses in as scientific a manner
as possible. The most comprehensive accounting of the abuses of the Israeli occupation are
provided by B'Tselem, a human rights organization that has monitored the occupation since
1989. See generally B'Tselem Publications, http://www.btselem.org/english/publications/Ind
ex.asp (last visited Jan. 12, 2007); B'Tselem Statistics, http://www.btselem.org/english/
statistics/Index.asp (last visited Jan. 12, 2007). The Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs also
tracks acts of violence by Palestinians, including suicide bombings, since the signing of the
Declaration of Principles in 1993, which ushered in the Oslo Peace Process. See Israel Minis-
try of Foreign Affairs, Fatal Terrorist Attacks in Israel Since the Declaration of Principles,
http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/Terrorism-+Obstacle+to+Peace/Palestinian+terror+before+2000
/Fatal+Terrorist+Attacks+in+Israel+Since+the+DOP+-S.htm (last visited Jan. 12, 2007)
[hereinafter Fatal Terrorist Attacks]. The Foreign Ministry tracks separately the violence that
has occurred since the start of the Second Intifada in September 2000. See Israel Ministry of
Foreign Affairs, Victims of Palestinian Violence and Terrorism Since September 2000,
http://www.mfa.gov.ii/MFA/Terrorism-+Obstacle+to+Peace/Palestinian+terror+since+2000/
Victims+of+Palestinian+Violence+and+Terrorism+sinc.htm (Jan. 12, 2007) [hereinafter
Victims of Palestinian Violence]; see also The Intelligence and Terrorism Information Cen-
ter, http://www.terrorism-info.org.il/engsite/home/default.asp (last visited Jan. 12, 2007) (an
Israeli nongovernmental organization created in "memory of the fallen of the Israeli Intelli-
gence Community" and staffed by its former employees).
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and the looming "demographic threat" to the long-term viability of a major-
ity-Jewish state posed by the rapidly growing non-Jewish population be-
tween the Mediterranean and the Jordan River, strategists concluded that the
only pragmatic strategy to pursue was complete disengagement.2 °
This policy has been implemented via the unilateral withdrawal
from the Gaza Strip (and in fact, even before this in 2000 with the with-
drawal of forces in southern Lebanon), and the building of the Security
Fence/Separation Wall (depending on whom you ask to describe it), roughly
along the 1967 Green Line, with some disputed intrusions into Palestinian
territory that have been addressed both by the International Court of Jus-
tice21 and the Israeli Supreme Court.22 Despite the controversy over its
20 See Yossi Alpher, The Future of the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict: Critical Trends Affect-
ing Israel, U.S. INST. PEACE, Sept. 2005, at 1, 3-5. As Alpher notes, the turn to unilateralism
is a fallback to a "classic element in pragmatic Zionist strategic thinking and opting for de-
mography over geography." Id. at 5. Ariel Sharon already acknowledged the primacy of the
"demographic reality on the ground," over his historic preference for occupation of key
tactical territory as a security buffer. In 2004, Sharon went so far as to make comparisons
between Israel's anticipated situation were it not to relinquish territory, to that of apartheid
South Africa, stating: "The alternative of one nation, where one rules over another, would be
a horrible disaster for both peoples." Id. Even before Sharon's resignation to the primacy of
demography over territory, however, Ehud Barak's 2000 election campaign slogan of
"they're there and we're here" already appealed to an Israeli desire for disengagement not yet
buttressed by profound pessimism that such separation could come through a comprehensive
negotiated settlement. Thus, the desire for separation was not new, having existed since the
start of the Oslo accords, see Rubinstein, supra note 4, but the momentum for unilateral
separation was new.
21 See Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian
Territory, Advisory Opinion, 2004 I.C.J. (July 9), available at http://www.icj-
cij.org/icjwww/idocket/imwp/imwpframe.htm. The Israeli government rejected the opinion
because it failed to address "Palestinian terrorism" in a sufficient manner. See Israeli Minis-
try of Foreign Affairs, Statement on ICJ Advisory Opinion on Israel's Security Fence (July 9,
2004), http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/About+the+Ministry/MFA+Spokesman/2004/Statement
+on+ICJ+Advisory+Opinion+9-July-2004.htm, which was the main criticism of the majority
opinion leveled by U.S. Judge Thomas Buergenthal's dissent. See Legal Consequences of the
Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, Advisory Opinion, 2004 I.C.J.
(July 9) (declaration to the Advisory Opinion of the Court), available at http://www.icj-cij.
org/icjwww/idocket/imwp/imwp-advisoryopinion/imwp-advisoryopinion-declaration-bu
ergenthal.htm. Judge Kooijmans of the Netherlands echoed this criticism. See Legal Conse-
quences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, Advisory Opin-
ion, 2004 I.C.J. (July 9) (separate opinion of Judge Kooijmans, available at http://www.icj-
cij.org/icjwww/idocket/imwp/imwp advisoryopinion/imwpadvisoryopinion-separateko
oijmans.htm.
22 Shortly after the ICJ opinion came down, the Israeli Supreme Court released an argua-
bly more measured opinion on the fence, instructing the Israeli government and military to
redirect the fence's route in those locations where it intruded beyond pre-1967 borders. See
HCJ 2056/04 Beit Sourik Village Council v. Government of Israel [2004] IsrSC 46(2) 150,
available at http://elyonl.court.gov.il/files-eng/04/560/020/a28/04020560.a28.pdf. The High
Court recognized Israel's legitimate right to self-defense while finding certain areas of the
barrier's planned route to violate international law.
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route23 and the true intention behind its construction, one thing is certain
about the Fence/Wall: Israel views its completion as an absolute priority.24
At the same time, the outbreak of armed conflict between Israel and Hezbol-
lah in southern Lebanon in the summer of 2006 has also led many Israelis to
conclude that unilateralism cannot solve their problems either.25 The society
finds itself scrambling from one emergency to another, with little stability in
the highest echelons of power to steer the country through some grand strat-
egy for solving its security dilemmas.
In a similar vein, with a post-Gaza disengagement reality sending
clear signs that Israel is now in the driver's seat, Palestinians have become
disengaged with a stalled peace process and have turned inward toward
concerns over state-building, so much so that following the election of
Hamas, the society appears on the brink of civil war. This momentum is
helped along by Israel's attempts to sow dissention and chaos so as to unset-
tle Hamas' relative strength over Fatah following its win in the Palestinian
parliamentary elections in January 2006.26 Contrary to popular conceptions,
23 To many observers, the Fence/Wall is an attempt to create facts on the ground, namely,
the eventual borders of the Israeli state, which in the areas where it intrudes on Palestinian
land, is seen as a land grab. The Israeli Supreme Court ordered the government to dismantle
eight kilometers of the Fence/Wall near the West Bank Jewish settlement of Tzofin after a
petition submitted by the mayors of nearby Palestinian villages of Azun and Nebi Elias pre-
sented the judges with documentation proving that the route of the Fence was plotted so that
Tzofin would have land to expand and build an industrial zone. The decision was a reversal
of an earlier 2002 decision on the matter, and the judges chastised the Israeli government for
having concealed the information in the initial hearing of the case. This was the third major
decision by the court against the route of the fence, including a decision in which the Court
ordered the government to dismantle thirteen kilometers of the Fence/Wall near Alfei Me-
nashe, and the 2004 decision in which the Court ordered the re-routing of thirty kilometers of
the Fence/Wall northwest of Jerusalem. In fact, B 'Tselem, The Israeli Information Center for
Human Rights in the Occupied Territories, claims to have documentation proving that the
route of the Fence is dictated by future expansion of Jewish settlements in eleven other cases.
See Yuval Yoaz, Court Orders Section of Separation Fence Torn Down, HA'ARETZ, June 16,
2006, http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/pages/ShArt.jhtml?itemNo=727626. See generally
B'Tselem, The Separation Barrier, http://www.btselem.org/English/Separation%5FBarrier/
("Even if we accept Israel's claim that the only way to prevent attacks is to erect a barrier, it
must be built along the Green Line or on Israeli territory.").
24 See Sharpening Olmert's Message, HA'ARETZ, June 12, 2006, at Al,
http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/pages/ShArt.jhtm?itemNo=725883 (explaining that Prime
Minister Olmert spent a good portion of June 2006 trying to convince European allies to
support his "convergence" plan).
25 See Naomi Chazan, Critical Currents: Unilateralism is Dead, JERUSALEM POST ONLINE
EDITION, Aug. 10, 2006, http://www.jpost.com/servlet/Satellite?cid=1154525846322&page
naine=JPost%2FJPArticle%2FShowFull.
26 Ariel Sharon's successor and political disciple Ehud Olmert, now head of the ruling
Kadima party and Prime Minister of Israel, has pushed on with Sharon's plans, and in light
of the reality of a Hamas-led Palestinian government, has pursued a coy strategy to ensure
that Israel will be able to implement its unilateral vision for the West Bank. See A Palestin-
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there are those who convincingly argue that Hamas' ascension does not in
fact signify a generalized radicalization of the Palestinian populace with
regard to the peace process, as much as it signals a rejection of the Fatah
party's incompetent and corrupt leadership of the Palestinian Authority.27
Disempowered by Israel's unilateral moves and the continuing repression of
ian View: Israeli Unilateralism is Not New, an Interview with Ali Jarbawi, PALESTINIAN-
ISPAELI CROSSFIRE, May 29, 2006, http://www.bitterlemons.org/search.html (search for
"Palestinian-Israeli Crossfire" and limit date to "May 29, 2006"). In Jarbawi's view, "what
Israel is trying to do now is to evade a quarrel with the Americans over the two-state solution
after Bush endorsed it. Israel is saying it agrees to the roadmap, but it is going to shape that
solution on the ground according to its own requirements." Id. According to Jarbawi, this
means that Israel will continue with plans for "cantonization of the West Bank, the wall and
the closure of the Jordan Valley." Id.
27 The most persuasive evidence for this proposition emerges from opinions expressed by
Hamas' own supporters, who apparently do not share its views on the peace process:
Three quarters of all Palestinians, including more than 60 percent of Hamas sup-
porters, are willing to support reconciliation between Palestinians and Israelis
based on a two-state solution. During the last 10 years, the trend among Palestini-
ans has been to move away from hard-line attitudes and to embrace moderate ones.
Indeed, more than 60 percent of Hamas voters support an immediate return to ne-
gotiations with Israel. Had the issue of peace been the most important considera-
tion in these elections, Fatah would certainly have won. But the peace process was
the least important issue for the voters.
Khalil Shikaki, The Polls: What the Palestinians Really Voted For: A West Bank Pollster
Finds More Moderate Trends Underlying the Hamas Victory, NEWSWEEK INT'L, Feb. 6,
2006, at 1, available at 2006 WL 1719223 [hereinafter Shikaki, The Polls]. As Shikaki noted
after the election, voters "didn't just want to hurt Fatah. They wanted to defeat it," and since
Hamas was the only party capable of defeating Fatah, "they voted for Hamas." Xin Li, Win
Blamed on Voter Anger Against Fatah, WASH. TIMES, Jan. 31, 2006, at A12, available at
http://www.washingtontimes.com/world/20060130-101022-2264r.htm. In fact, notes Shi-
kaki, Hamas brilliantly raised the issues of corruption and law-and-order to the top of their
agenda since they knew that "85 percent of the public believed the PA was corrupt and that
more than eighty percent felt unsafe in their homes and neighborhoods." Shikaki, supra. Not
surprisingly, exit polls showed that almost two-thirds of Palestinians considered these issues
their top two priorities, while only twenty-five percent were most concerned about economic
issues and a shocking fifteen percent felt the peace process was most important. Id. See also
Khalil Shikaki, Willing to Compromise: Palestinian Public Opinion and the Peace Process,
U.S. INST. PEACE, Jan. 2006, at 1 [hereinafter Shikaki, Willing to Compromise] ("Palestinian
public opinion is not an impediment to progress in the peace process; to the contrary, over
time the Palestinian public has become more moderate.").
Another poll taken several months after the elections confirmed this trend even after Hamas
was in government for several months: between May 31, 2006 and June 2, 2006, of a twelve
hundred-person sample of Palestinians, more than seventy-seven percent favored a referen-
dum and planned to vote for Abbas' plan to renew negotiations if a referendum were held.
The poll also showed Hamas losing ground to Fatah since the January elections, with re-
spondents favoring each party equally at thirty-seven percent. The poll was conducted by
Nader Said, a sociologist at Birzeit University in Ramallah who runs the Development Stud-
ies Program there. See Steven Erlanger, Hamas Fires Rockets into Israel, Ending 16-Month
Truce, N.Y. TIMES, June 11, 2006, at 8.
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the occupation and their own leaders' non-responsiveness to the needs of
their people, the Palestinians feel that peace and an end to their struggle is
more distant than ever. Though their election did not apparently signal
overwhelming support for their tactics, Hamas is nonetheless now in power,
which for many Israelis means that resumption of all out conflict is inevita-
ble.2
8
If negotiations resume at some point, the two-state solution remains
the firm goal, though to some it is a necessary evil. Critics of the Oslo peace
process have long contended that the notion of partition itself is so fin de
si~le-a thing of the past,29 a tired idea to be discarded after having failed
the world consistently since it was first proposed in 1937 by the British Peel
Commission in its report on the "irrepressible" conflict.30 Indeed, while
idealists on both sides continue to advocate for a binational solution within
the shared territories of Israel/Palestine, this has always been politically
infeasible, but is even more so now given Israel's renewed sense of being
besieged by jihadist groups in the Arab world (Hamas and Hezbollah and
their backers, among others) and because of the Quartet's strong preference
that any negotiations will culminate in a State of Palestine alongside the
State of Israel. The two-state solution is also no longer exclusively the Is-
raeli public's preference; there is a growing consensus among individual
Palestinians who, while holding strong to the principal and the ability to
28 Indeed, a sixteen-month truce was ended in mid-June 2006 when Hamas militants fired
over 50 Qassam rockets into the Israeli town of Sderot after an errant Israeli shell apparently
exploded accidentally on a Gaza beach near the town of Beit Lahiya, killing eight Palestini-
ans, including seven members of the Ghaliya family (a family that had lost four family mem-
bers less than two years prior when another Israeli shell hit their farm).
Since the beginning of 2006, Hamas militants have launched hundreds of largely inaccurate
missiles toward Israel, while the IDF has fired more than five thousand shells into Gaza. See
id.; see also Amos Harel and Avi Issacharoff, Kadima MA: 'Haniyeh May Be Targeted if
Hamas Resumes Terror', HA'A.ETz, June 12, 2006, http://www.haaretz.com/
hasen/pages/ShArt.jhtml?itemNo=725849.
29 Said, supra note 3. Said described partition both as a "dying ideology of separation,
which has afflicted Zionism and Palestinian nationalism," and as a "legacy of imperialism,"
whose tragic effects could be seen elsewhere throughout the world, calling it at best a "make-
shift measure" that would not bring true resolution of the conflict. In opposition to separa-
tion, Said called for coexistence forged by local communities, not by elite politicians:
We must now begin to think in terms of coexistence, after separation, in spite of
partition. And for this, as I said above, the only solution is a politics of the local,
people on the ground who tackle injustice and inequity on the ground, far away
from the misleading summits with Clinton, and the treacherous secret channels of
Oslo. Those leaders are far from the real long-term interest of their people, but they
do what they have to do. They can do no more.
Id.
30 See BENNY MORRIS, RIGHTEOUS VICTIMS: A HISTORY OF THE ZIONIST-ARAB CONFLICT,
1881-1999, at 138-39 (1999).
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exercise a "right of return" to historic lands inside Israel, would nonetheless
prefer to live in a Palestinian state rather than reside in Israel.3'
Having come so close at Camp David in July 2000 and at Taba in
January of 2001 to reaching a peace forged between elite politicians, the
violence of the last five years demonstrates 32 that the wider populations
need to be sensitized to co-existence for any elite-level negotiated settle-
ment to last.33 The promised intense interconnectivity between Israelis and
Palestinians in the future, as they find themselves having to share land, wa-
ter and other natural resources, collaborate on security, and interact within
the trade of capital and labor, demands that more steps be taken to reconcile
each population with the other. The psychological preparation of the current
peace process, however, seems to be for a "divorce," or rather, a trial sepa-
ration,34 and thus, a discussion is sorely needed regarding how to bridge the
gap between Oslo's minimal peace and justice of elites, and the broader and
deeper preparation that a peace "beyond the peace process" will require as a
foundation.
The following section reinforces the need for a peace "beyond the
peace process" through a discussion of the symbolic violence of the con-
flict's key feature: the mutual denial of national narratives. It is argued that
we must fight fire with fire, and that the solution to the denial of national
31 See Interview by Robert Siegel with Khalil Shikaki, (July 14, 2003), available at
http://www.npr.org/programs/atc/transcripts/2003/jul/030714.shikaki.html (describing the
results of a survey of over 4,000 Palestinian refugees, which asked if whether they were to
exercise a right of return, where they would choose to live); see also Shikaki, Willing to
Compromise, supra note 27, at 11 ("While surveys have consistently shown an overwhelm-
ing demand for an Israeli recognition of the refugees' right of return, surveys among refugees
have shown that only a small minority are interested in exercising that right by returning to
the state of Israel."); infra note 59 (Sari Nusseibeh explains that most Palestinians wish to
hold onto the "right of return" but do not actually want to return if it means living in a Jewish
state).
32 As of mid-summer 2006, over thirty-four hundred Palestinians had been killed during
the second intifada and almost one thousand Israelis had been killed. See Henry Siegman,
Op-Ed., Is 'Moral Equivalency'Really So Wrong?, L.A. TIMES. June 18, 2006, at M3, avail-
able at http://www.cfr.org/publication/10923/is-moral-equivalency really so-wrong.html?
breadcrumb=default. For up to date statistics, see B'Tselem, Statistics - Fatalities,
http://www.btselem.org/english/Statistics/Casualties.asp (last visited Jan. 12, 2007) [herein-
after Statistics - Fatalities].
33 A wide spectrum of Israeli-Palestinian co-existence and reconciliation groups have
sprung up in the last several years. See discussion infra section Ill.B; see also PRIME: Peace
Research Institute in the Middle East and its proposal for a "localized" truth and reconcilia-
tion process based on personal histories and interpersonal encounters. http://www.vispo.com/
PRIME/truthandreconciliation.htm.
34 According to Edward Said, "Oslo set the stage for separation," and in fact had "put off
the real reconciliation that must occur if the 100-year war between Zionism and the Palestin-
ian people is to end." Edward Said, Truth and Reconciliation, AL-AHRAM WEEKLY, Jan. 14-
20, 1999, http://weekly.ahram.org.eg/1999/412/op2.htm.
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narratives is the affirmation of these narratives. It is this truth-telling that
transitional justice may be able to facilitate. As will be discussed in Part III,
a truth commission, rather than prosecutions, is better prepared to address
the particular characteristics of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.
C. The Conflict Culture, Victim Ideologies, and the Needfor
Critical History
Mahmood Mamdani recounts a 1996 visit to Kigali, Rwanda during
which he had requested to speak to a history teacher in a local school. He
was informed that his wish could not be granted because history was no
longer taught in the schools because there was no agreement on what should
be taught as history. "History in Rwanda," Mamdani notes,
comes in two versions: Hutu and Tutsi. Ever since the colonial period, the
cycle of violence has been fed by a victim psychology on both sides.
Every round of perpetrators has justified the use of violence as the only ef-
fective guarantee against being victimized yet again. For the unreconciled
victim of yesterday's violence, the struggle continues. The continuing
tragedy of Rwanda is that each round of violence gives us yet another set
of victims-turned-perpetrators.
35
Thus, Mamdani explains, "the identification of both perpetrator and survi-
vor is contingent on one's historical perspective. This is why it is not possi-
ble to think of reconciliation between Hutu and Tutsi in Rwanda without a
prior reconciliation with history." In order to "break the stranglehold of
Hutu Power and Tutsi Power" on Rwanda's politics, Mamdani proposes, it
is first necessary to "break their stranglehold on Rwanda's history writing,
and thus history making. This exercise requires putting the truth of the
genocide, the truth of mass killings, in a historical context.'
36
The parallels to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict are clear; at its core,
it is a struggle over history, over what Homi K. Bhabha has called the "right
,,37
to narrate. The following discussion will not attempt to encapsulate the
35 MAHMOOD MAMDANI, WHEN VICTIMS BECOME KILLERS: COLONIALISM, NATIVISM, AND
THE GENOCIDE IN RWANDA 267-68 (2001); see also Timothy Longman and Thdonrste
Rutagengwa, Memory, Identity, and Community in Rwanda, in MY NEIGHBOR, MY ENEMY:
JUSTICE AND COMMUNITY IN THE AFTERMATH OF MASS ATROCITY 162 (Eric Stover & Harvey
M. Weinstein eds., 2004) [hereinafter My NEIGHBOR, MY ENEMY] (presenting findings from
research in three communities in Rwanda on popular responses to the government's attempts
to fashion an official narrative of the genocide).
36 Id. Though I do not wish to draw too many parallels between the conflicts, the cases of
post-genocide Rwanda and post-apartheid South Africa will serve as useful precedents for
working through the particular problems of post-conflict identity in the Israeli-Palestinian
post-conflict, particularly because of the widespread diffusion of various forms of account-
ability throughout wide segments of society.
37 HOMI K. BHABHA, THE RIGHT TO NARRATE (forthcoming 2007).
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entire history of enmity between these groups, but merely will touch upon
the core issues structuring the struggle between them. To the extent that the
primary dynamic of the conflict consists of the mutual rejection of national
narratives and legacies of suffering, this is what needs to be overturned for
deeper reconciliation and normalization to occur.38 Though a multiplicity of
subcultures, ideologies, identities, and sub-narratives constitute both Is-
raeli39 and Palestinian society,40 the following will present caricatures of the
grand narratives that largely shape and continue to motivate the conflict.
The Palestinian narrative presents a story of colonization, displace-
ment, and occupation at the hands of the Israelis.4' Many Jews and Israelis
fail to recognize that for Palestinians, the national trauma of Al nakba ("the
catastrophe")-the day when the Zionist yishuv leaders declared the estab-
lishment of the State of Israel--only completed and formalized the loss of
their native land that had already occurred through the Zionist colonization
project stretching back into the late nineteenth century. The 1948 war re-
sulted in the dispersion of between "77 and 83 percent of the Palestinians
who lived in the part of Palestine that later became Israel-i.e., 78 percent
of Mandatory Palestine, ''42 or roughly 750,000 people.
Contrary to dominant Zionist narratives, which view the Palestini-
ans' displacement as an unintentional product of a defensive war forced on
the Jewish population, in Palestinians' eyes, this displacement was no mere
accident produced in the fog of war. Rather, the Palestinians view their ex-
pulsion as an "ethnic cleansing," the implementation of a strategy of "trans-
fer" that had existed in various forms for decades among Zionist thinkers,
by which the Jewish population would solidify their position in Palestine.43
38 See RASHID KHALIDI, PALESTINIAN IDENTITY: THE CONSTRUCTION OF MODERN
NATIONAL CONSCIOUSNESS 204 (1997) (describing the 1993 Declaration of Principles as
ending a "lengthy period of mutual denial, when both sides withheld recognition as if it were
the ultimate weapon in a peculiar version of mutual deterrence.").
39 See Eyai Naveh, The Dynamics of Identity Construction in Israel Through Education in
History, in HISTORY'S DOUBLE HELIX, supra note 8, at 244, 260-61 (describing the six "sub-
cultures" of Israeli society categorized by Baruch Kimmerling).
40 See generally KHALIDI, supra note 39; see also Saleh Abdel Jawad, The Arab and Pal-
estinian Narratives of the 1948 War, in HISTORY'S DOUBLE HELIX, supra note 8, at 72 [here-
inafter Jawad, Arab and Palestinian Narratives] (describing the fragmented nature of the
Palestinian narratives relating to 1948); see also Nathan J. Brown, Contesting National Iden-
tity in Palestinian Education, in HISTORY'S DOUBLE HELIX, supra note 8, at 225 (describing
the complexity of Palestinian national identity, the central questions that shape it, and the
way these issues have been reflected in educational curricula created for Palestinians, and
later by Palestinians, since 1948).
41 See Jawad, Arab and Palestinian Narratives, supra note 41.
42 Ahmad H. Sa'di, Catastrophe, Memory and Identity: Al-Nakbah as a Component of
Palestinian Identity, ISRAEL STUDIES, Vol. 7, No. 2 (Summer 2002),175-198.
43 See Jawad, Arab and Palestinian Narratives, supra note 41, at 75; see also Ilan Pappe,
The Bridging Narrative Concept, in HISTORY'S DOUBLE HELIX, supra note 8, at 200 (noting
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Israeli and Palestinian historians disagree both on the relative intentionality
of the forced removals as well as the extent of the violence.44 What is be-
yond dispute, however, is that following the war, the Israeli government
compounded the original displacement of Palestinians with the destruction
and literal erasure of hundreds of Arab villages from official maps, in order
to clear the way for the continuation of the state-building enterprise.45 For
Palestinians, then, "Al-Nakbah represents, among many other things, the
loss of the homeland, the disintegration of society, the frustration of national
aspirations, and the beginning of a hasty process of destruction of their cul-
ture.'3A6
To Palestinians, the true effort to deny their national narrative began
in earnest with the occupation of the West Bank and Gaza Strip. The con-
tinual administration of the occupation left the Palestinians without political
rights, and the continual expansion of Jewish settlements (often made possi-
ble by the destruction of Palestinian homes) 47 was a constant humiliation
and reminder of their loss of homeland and the denial of the possibility of
their return. This denial of ethno-nationalism has also extended to those
Palestinian refugees who found themselves within Israel after the 1949 ar-
mistice lines were drawn.4 8 Though eventually granted full citizenship, the
Arab community in Israel has been discriminated against in housing and
education spending, kept down within Israeli society because they were
that "the little research that we already have indicates clearly that, contrary to the description
that emerges from the Israeli military archives, in many parts of Palestine, in 1948, there was
no actual war, but rather, widespread operations of ethnic cleansing"); Nadim N. Rouhana,
Zionism 's Encounter with the Palestinians: The Dynamics of Force, Fear and Extremism, in
HISTORY'S DOUBLE HELIX, supra note 8, at 115; W. Khalidi, Plan Dalet Revisited, J.
PALESTINE STUD., Autumn 1988, at 3; NUR MASALHA, EXPULSION OF THE PALESTINIANS: THE
CONCEPT OF "TRANSFER" IN ZIONIST POLITICAL THOUGHT, 1882-1948 (Institute for Palestine
Studies, 1992).
44 See Jawad, Arab and Palestinian Narratives, supra note 41, at 73-76.
45 See MERON BENVENISTI'S SACRED LANDSCAPE: THE BURIED HISTORY OF THE HOLY
LAND SINCE 1948 (2000) (tracing the topographical and linguistic colonization of Palestine
by the Israelis).
46 Sa'di, supra note 43, at 175.
47 For statistics on house demolition for planning purposes, i.e., the destruction of Palestin-
ian homes built without a permit, see B'Tselem, Statistics-Planning and Building,
http://www.btselem.org/english/PlanningandBuilding/Statistics.asp (last visited Jan. 12,
2007). For statistics on homes demolished as an act of collective punishment, see B'tselem,
Statistics - House Demolitions as Punishment http://www.btselem.org/english/Punitive_
Demolitions/Statistics.asp (last visited Jan. 12, 2007) [hereinafter House Demolitions as
Punishment], and for those demolished allegedly for military purposes, see B'tselem, Statis-
tics-Demolition for Alleged Military Purposes, http://www.btselem.org/english/Razing/
Statistics.asp (last visited Jan. 12, 2007) [hereinafter Demolition for Alleged Military Pur-
poses].
48 See Joseph Schechla, The Invisible People Come to Light: Israel's "Internally Dis-
placed and the "Unrecognized Villages, J. PALESTINE STUD., Autumn 2001, at 20.
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always viewed as a "fifth column" that only needed an excuse to rebel
against the Jewish population.49 In short, the Palestinians' collective narra-
tive is one of dispossession and cruelty at the hands of the Israelis.
The Israeli narrative instinctively sets the conflict with the Pales-
tinians within a broader and much older collective history of persecution
and ultimately, extermination, that indicts not just the Arab regimes of the
Middle East but most of the governments of Europe for their disregard for
Jewish life within their borders. Central to this collective Jewish and Israeli
narrative of suffering and victimhood is the tragedy of the Holocaust-what
Amos Elon has called "a basic trauma of Israeli society." 50 The birth of the
State of Israel has always been viewed by most Jews and Israelis as nothing
short of a miracle. It was unbelievable to many in 1948 that the remnants of
a people who were hunted on the European continent wherever they went
and no matter how much they assimilated to placate their host societies,
were able to reestablish themselves with newfound political autonomy in
their ancestral homeland after thousands of years spent in exile. Though the
project of the Jewish state was conceived in the aftermath of the epitome of
European anti-Semitism-the French Dreyfus Affair-and the argument for
its necessity built force over the bloody decades at the end of the nineteenth
century as Russian and other Jews sought refuge in Palestine from pogroms,
the true moral imperative was only cemented in the international commu-
nity in the wake of the Holocaust, as the world finally acknowledged how it
had failed the Jewish people.
This tragic history naturally produced in the Jewish settlers of Pal-
estine and subsequent generations a victim ideology that was only exacer-
bated by Arab-Jewish violence in pre-state Palestine and by the rejectionist
stance of Israel's neighbors once it declared independence in 1948.51 In this
regard, Israeli author Amos Oz describes the Israeli victim ideology suc-
cinctly: "We Israelis often look at Arabs not as fellow victims but as an
incarnation of our past oppressors: Cossaks, pogrom-makers, Nazis who
have grown mustaches and wrapped themselves in kaffiyehs, but who are
still in the usual business of cutting Jewish throats." 52 Through several wars
launched against the Jewish state by its neighbors, who hurled slogans aim-
ing to "push the Jews into the sea," this image has been confirmed again and
again for Jews in Israel and the rest of world.53
49 See RIFT REPORT, infra note 168.
50 Neil Caplan, Victimhood and Identity: Psychological Obstacles to Israeli Reconciliation
with the Palestinians, in ISRAELI AND PALESTINIAN IDENTITIES IN HISTORY AND LITERATURE
63, 73 (Kamal Abdel-Malek & David C. Jacobson eds., 1999).
51 See Bar-On, Conflicting Narratives, infra note 130.
52 Caplan, supra note 51, at 64.
53 But see Tessler, supra note 8, at 174. Tessler argues that although Arab states and their
citizens have often challenged Israel's right to exist, that this narrative is only part of the
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The Israeli psychological condition of feeling adrift amidst a sea of
Arab states has only been heightened by Palestinian attacks against Israelis
and Jews all over the world through spectacular acts of violence. 4 In the
interim period (from the signing of the Declaration of Principles until the
"end" of Oslo in September 2000), 256 civilians and soldiers were killed by
Palestinian terrorist attacks. 55 Since September 2000, this number has grown
four-fold, with a total of 1,124 people killed by Palestinian violence, and
thousands more injured.56 While a suicide bomber may kill only a handful
of civilians and perhaps injure dozens more, the real violence done is psy-
chological. Each injured person has a family, and each family has
neighbors, no less than Palestinians whose homes get demolished. These
attacks have been compounded by the rejection of Israel's right to exist pro-
pounded by mainstream Arab politics since at least the 1948 war,57 and by
Palestinian politics in school curricula 58 and other official communications.
Historical truth exists somewhere in between these stylized collec-
tive memories, but it is nonetheless these national stories that dominate the
conflict, serving as the competing meta-narratives that fuel the cycles of
violence in which Israelis and Palestinians participate. On the whole, Pales-
tinians fail to recognize the centrality of anti-Semitism, the Holocaust, and
Arab rejectionism to Jewish mental life. Similarly, most Jews and Israelis
cannot grasp how Palestinians perceive them as nothing more than coloniz-
historical truth, and most recently, "not the most important part." Id. at 189. Tessler provides
examples that interrupt the "unidimensional" narrative that features "Zionist peace seekers as
heroes and Arab rejectionists as villains." Id. at 189-90. In particular, "developments in the
years following the Oslo Accords strongly suggest that Arab attitudes are indeed contextual
and that for the most part Arabs seek territorial compromise and not the liquidation of the
Jewish state." Id at 185.
"4 Palestinian terrorism has also targeted Jews all over the world, most famously in the
Achille Lauro and Entebbe hijackings, and the murder of Israeli Olympians at the Munich
Games of 1972.
55 See Fatal Terrorist Attacks, supra note 20; see also Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
Suicide and Other Bombing Attacks Inside Israel Since the Declaration of Principles (Apr. 6,
1994), http://www.israel-mfa.gov.ilUMFA/Terrorism-+Obstacle+to+Peace/Palestinian+terror
+since+2000/Suicide+and+Other+Bombing+Attacks+in+Israel+Since.htm; Victims of Pales-
tinian Violence, supra note 20; Statistics - Fatalities, supra note 33 (tracking the violence of
the Second Intifada).
56 Between September 29, 2000 and May 1, 2006, Magen David Adom treated a total of
7,844 casualties as follows: 999 killed, 642 severely injured, 940 moderately, and 5,263
lightly injured, among them eleven MDA staff members (IDF casualties treated by IDF
medical personnel are not included in these figures). See Victims of Palestinian Violence,
supra note 20.
57 See Tessler, supra note 8, at 179 (acknowledging "Arab rejectionism" toward Israel
after the 1948 war).
58 See Brown, supra note 41, at 231 (noting "the maps in Palestinian textbooks that do not
clearly label Israel but mention cities within Israel's pre-1967 borders").
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ers who have unjustly deprived them of their land and historical roots. Ac-
cordingly, they also fail to see that Palestinian violence, far from merely
unmitigated Jew-hatred that has existed uninterrupted and unaltered since
the Middle Ages, is largely a consequence of al nakba and the brutality of
the Occupation. The violence and repression of the Occupation-house
demolitions, restriction of movement, humiliating checkpoints, and extra-
judicial killings that often harm civilian populations-what to Palestinians
is equivalent to state-sponsored terrorism and colonial land-grabbing, to
Israelis are the necessary defensive measures required to secure the safety of
their country from outside attack. And so it continues, with each population
held hostage to a conflict culture and conflict identities forged from their
own fears and mythologies of the other.
As Mamdani proposes for Rwanda, reconciliation between Israelis
and Palestinians demands that there first be reconciliation with history. In
this case, this reconciliation with history will come through exploring two
historical questions. The first, whose land is it? will effectively be answered
and settled (hopefully permanently) with the signing of a final peace accord.
The first steps toward answering this question came in the Declaration of
Principles in 1993, when each side recognized the legitimacy of the other
and its right to its historical claims.
The second question, what did one side do to the other in defense of
its historical claims to the land? will be left unanswered and, to a large ex-
tent, not even posed during the Final Status negotiations. The gravest of the
issues related to this second question is the dilemma of the Palestinian
"right of return." Much of the rage of the Second Intifada no doubt stemmed
from the failure of the Oslo process to address this most primal Palestinian
demand in an acceptable fashion.59
59 One of the central criticisms of the Oslo process was its continual postponement of the
most difficult issues, such as the status of Jerusalem and the refugee question, for so-called
"final status negotiations." The Israelis have preferred this gradual approach, with the excep-
tion of Ehud Barak's full-blown offer (of contested generosity) at the Camp David II ac-
cords. For the debate over what actually transpired around Camp David II and Taba, compare
Robert Malley & Hussein Agha, Camp David: The Tragedy of Errors, N.Y. REv. BOOKS,
Aug. 9, 2001, at 59 ("[T]he Palestinians viewed [the offer] as neither generous, nor Israeli,
nor indeed, as an offer."), with Benny Morris, Camp David and After: An Exchange (1. An
Interview with Ehud Barak), N.Y. REv. BOOKS, June 13, 2002, at 42 (noting President Clin-
ton's statement to Ehud Barak, after the failure of the Camp David II accords, that the offer
was "based on UN Security Council resolutions 242 and 338 [and] very close to the Palestin-
ian demands"). See also Robert Malley & Hussein Agha, Camp David and After: An Ex-
change (2. A Reply to Ehud Barak), N.Y. REv. BOOKS, June 13, 2002, at 46 (calling Ehud
Barak's assessment that Yasser Arafat is incapable of making peace with Israel because he
rejected Israel's "unprecedented offer" a "crude appraisal"); Dennis Ross, Letter to the Edi-
tor, Camp David. An Exchange, N.Y. REv. BOOKS, Sept. 20, 2001, at 90 (faulting Malley and
Agha's Aug. 9. 2001 article for its "glaring... omission of Chairman Arafat's mistakes").
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It is not that Israelis and Palestinians do not deal with these ques-
tions regularly. On the contrary, the question is constantly posed in a self-
referential manner: "what did they do to us?" This stranglehold by history
on identity threatens the present, or as Nietzsche has argued about too much
history-it threatens life itself. History can be made to serve life, however.
One mode, according to Nietzsche, by which history can serve life is by
"critical history," which is essentially the work of a truth commission or
The Palestinians, on the other hand, have always preferred to deal with these more pressing
issues up front, as evidenced by Mahmoud Abbas' attempts to resume negotiations in 2005
following Arafat's death. The refugee question is no doubt at the heart of the conflict and as
such is perhaps the most challenging issue.
According to March 2006 figures, there are nearly 4.4 million Palestinian refugees registered
with the United Nations Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA). See UNRWA in Figures as of
30 June 2006, UNRWA Headquarters (Gaza) (Sept. 2006), http://www.un.org/unrwa/
publications/index.html. It is thus a central, if not the central concern of the Israeli-
Palestinian conflict. The latest attempt to integrate UN Resolution 194 into the negotiations
understands the Palestinian choice of self-determination as equivalent to choosing compensa-
tion rather than return, in the language of the resolution. It is upon this assumption that Israel
has long been prepared to accept the implementation of Resolution 194, which in the last
negotiations at Taba manifested itself in the "largely symbolic" gesture of allowing a few
thousand refugee families from Lebanon to return over a fifteen-year period under the guise
of "family reunification" and the formation of an international fund for refugee compensation
and resettlement in the host countries (also in accordance with 194). The Israelis expect that
in exchange for the implementation of Resolution 194 according to these parameters, the
Palestinians will sign an "end of conflict" statement, freeing Israel from future
claims/responsibility over the refugee issue. See Statement of Principles Signed by Ami
Ayalon & Sari Nusseibeh on July 27, 2003, United Nations Information System on the Ques-
tion of Palestine (UNISPAL) (July 27, 2003), http://domino.un.org/unispal.nsf/5ba47a5c6cef
541b802563e000493b8c/1273b3972da8e47185256dd00055a0cfiOpenDocument.
Sari Nusseibeh, President of al-Quds University, has argued that ever since 1988, when the
Palestinian National Council adopted a constitution calling for a secular democratic state
alongside Israel, the national or collective right of return (a demand for self-determination)
has taken precedence over the individual right (physical return of each individual to his/her
home)--the two choices Nusseibeh claims were presented by UN Resolution 194, which first
established the "right of return." See G.A. Res. 194 (III), at 24, U.N. Doc. A/810 (Nov. 27,
1948).
Despite this reasoning, it is unclear that the "end of conflict" statement to be signed in the
name of the collective can really negate the individual "right" enshrined in Resolution 194.
The basic dilemma here is that perhaps a few generations down the line, descendants of
original refugees will make individual claims to land or property within Israel, or seek resti-
tution for atrocities or property loss affecting their family members during the 1948 war,
claiming that their relatives were not justly compensated. Indeed, it is unclear whether the
"end of conflict" clause-intended ostensibly to grant Israel immunity from further legal
action pursuant to the creation of the refugee problem in 1948-would in fact have that ef-
fect. Jose Alvarez pointed out that the additional blessing of the UN Security Council over
any such "end of conflict" document would probably strengthen its standing.
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criminal tribunal: a close inspection of, as Nietzsche phrases it, "how far
living and being unjust are one."6
The diffusion of the conflict into every aspect of Israeli and Pales-
tinian life long ago caused "normal" culture to mutate into what I call a
"conflict culture." As the charter statement of "21 st Year," an Israeli protest
group formed in the twenty-first year of the Occupation (1987), declares,
"The presence of the occupation [in Israeli life] is total.",61 How much more
so is this the case in Palestinian society-now into its third generation of
refugees-which suffers from the daily humiliations of the Occupation, and
must live with the continual knowledge that their very right to determine
their own political destiny-their "right to narrate"-has been denied in-
definitely. Ironically, this conflict culture is what Israelis and Palestinians
share-both are initiated into it at birth, without choice. It is in a sense, their
shared heritage, and potentially the basis for a common identity.62 Given its
pervasive presence in Israeli and Palestinian life, it is foolish to think that
military redeployments, redrawn borders, and a lasting ceasefire are suffi-
cient to end the conflict and bring "peace"; peace is not the absence of war,
it is the negation of the conflict culture.
The Oslo accords were initially welcomed as the start of a revolu-
tionary movement toward transforming the conflict, beginning in 1993 with
the signing of the Declaration of Principles and the exchange of letters of
60 FRIEDRICH NIETZSCHE, ON THE ADVANTAGE AND DISADVANTAGE OF HISTORY FOR LIFE
22 (Peter Preuss trans., 1980). Nietzsche's account of the benefits and potential pitfalls of too
little or too much history in any given society very presciently predict the tensions confront-
ing transitional societies, but really any society that needs to deal with its past. See generally
id.
61 LAURENCE J. SILBERSTEIN, THE POSTZIONISM DEBATES: KNOWLEDGE AND POWER IN
ISRAELI CULTURE 167-68 (1999) (quoting MORDECHAI BAR-ON, IN PURSUIT OF PEACE: A
HISTORY OF THE ISRAELI PEACE MOVEMENT 196 (1996)); see also Barghouti, supra note 1, at
167 ("Israelis seem to be haunted by ... the curse of the original sin against the native Arabs.
... [T]he dispossession and exclusion of non-Jews... is the most basic fact about Israel, and
no understanding of Israeli reality is possible without it." (quoting BENJAMIN BEIT-
HALLAHMI, ORIGINAL SINS: REFLECTIONS ON THE HISTORY OF ZIONISM AND ISRAEL (1993)).
Beyond the more metaphysical angst, social science research shows that Israelis and Pales-
tinians are profoundly influenced psychologically by the conflict. A study conducted after
the first two years of the Aqsa intifada of thirteen hundred children by a Tel Aviv University
research shows that seventy percent of Palestinians in the West Bank and thirty percent of
children in Jewish settlements are suffering from post-traumatic stress disorder due to the
nearly two years of bloodshed. Between September 2000 and July 2001, Palestinian children
had been exposed to an average of ten incidents of violence, while Israeli children living in
the Gush Katif bloc in the Gaza Strip were exposed to an average of eleven incidents. See
Study: High Trauma Rate Among Palestinian, Settlers' Children, HA'ARETZ, July 2, 2002.
62 See Marc H. Ellis, The Future of Israel/Palestine: Embracing the Broken Middle, J.
PALESTINE STUD., Spring 1997, at 56 (arguing that the disappointments on both sides of the
conflict constitute a shared ground-a "broken middle"-upon which to build a shared future).
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mutual recognition between Yitzhak Rabin and Yasir Arafat.6 3 Despite all
of the taboos broken in the rounds of negotiations since 1993, since the fail-
ure of the Camp David II accords in 2000, Israelis and Palestinians have
regressed to a stage of belligerency that has all but reversed Oslo's revolu-
tionary trajectory.
As discussed above, the new unilateralism begun by Ariel Sharon
and continued by Ehud Olmert, demonstrated the collective Israeli aban-
donment of their hope that they had a peace partner in the Palestinians, and
thus signified a reversion to pre-Declaration of Principles politics. What
other significance could have been ascribed to Sharon's declarations that
Yasir Arafat sits at the head of a terrorist entity then the reversal of Oslo,
whose core purpose was to "decriminalize" the Palestinians and recognize
Arafat's Palestinian Liberation Organization as a legitimate partner for
peace with whom the Israelis could negotiate? Similarly, Arafat's decision
to sponsor violence against Israeli citizens following the failure of the Camp
David II accords is viewed by most Israelis as a rejection of the new path
chosen in 1993. The current relapse in Israeli-Palestinian relations only
makes the argument for a peace "beyond the peace process" even stronger,
since it is overwhelmingly clear that the mutual rejection of narratives per-
sists. 6
4
But the call for a peace beyond the peace process would be just as
strong even if negotiations were now progressing to the Final Status ar-
rangements. If Israel were finally to fulfill Palestinian claims to self-
63 In addition to the Declaration of Principles, the Oslo accords also included Letters of
Mutual Recognition. In Arafat's letter to Rabin, he recognized the right of the State of Israel
to exist in "peace and security," to accept UN Resolutions 242 and 338, and to renounce
those articles of the Palestinian covenant which "deny Israel's right to exist." Arafat's letter
to Norwegian Foreign Minister, Johan Jorgen Holst, states that, "the P.L.O. encourages and
calls upon the Palestinian people in the West Bank and Gaza Strip to take part in the steps
leading to the normalization of life, rejecting violence and terrorism, contributing to peace
and stability and participating actively in shaping reconstruction, economic development and
cooperation." Rabin's letter to Arafat states: "[T]he Government of Israel has decided to
recognize the P.L.O. as the representative of the Palestinian people .... " Special Document
File, The Peace Process, J. PALESTINE STUD., Autumn 1993, at 104, 111-15 (1993).
64 Collaborative work in opinion polling between December 2004 and January 2005 by
Khalil Shikaki and Yaacov Shamir does cloud this oversimplified view, however:
Data from the Palestinian territories show that most Palestinians continue to sup-
port peace and, more specifically, that they accept Israel's existence as a Jewish
state. The survey in Israel showed, however, that most Israelis believe that Pales-
tinians think otherwise-that most Palestinians do not support peace or recognize
Israel's existence as a Jewish state. Interestingly, this misconception is also com-
mon among Palestinians; many respondents told the interviewers, in contrast to
what the surveys show to be the case, that they believe that their own acceptance of
Israel is the position of only a minority of Palestinians.
Tessler, supra note 8, at 189.
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determination through the implementation of UN Resolution 194 by facili-
tating Palestinian resettlement in the state of Palestine with full
compensation, this would seem to be tantamount to what Mahmood Mam-
dani has termed a "diminished truth" within the South African context.
Mamdani criticizes the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission
for (1) having embraced the "legal fetishism" of the apartheid regime in its
fixing an historical limit on the period in which violations would be consid-
ered by the Commission, thus ignoring the grand violation of white coloni-
zation, and (2) for only considering those acts considered gross violations
under apartheid, instead of focusing on the explicit illegality of the apart-
heid regime's laws themselves. It was through these "narrow lenses," Main-
dani argues, that the TRC failed to distinguish between what is "legal and
what is legitimate, between law and right," and in the process created fur-
ther divisions between beneficiaries of apartheid and its victims-the very
two groups between whom reconciliation was required.65
Here we begin to see the links between truth, justice, and reconcilia-
tion. In the Israeli-Palestinian situation, it is clear that mere compensation,
mere resettlement in a Palestinian state, and even mere independence will
fall horribly short in doing justice to the Palestinians, and will be insuffi-
cient to lay the groundwork for true reconciliation between them and the
Israelis. To the extent that a final settlement that includes a solution for the
refugees would be acknowledged by both sides as having implemented
Resolution 194, I would argue that this would achieve a minimal form of
historical justice, at least with respect to the first generation of Palestinian
refugees' claims against Israel.
However, this would be inadequate justice. It would be justice
without reconciliation, which (as we have established) is not an option
given future Israeli-Palestinian interconnectivity, just as it was not an option
in the new South Africa. In addition, a strong case could be made that the
question, what did one side do to the other in pursuit of its historical claims?
would not be answered by a final settlement agreement-not in terms of the
war of 1948, nor in terms of the military Occupation from 1967 until the
present, and certainly not in terms of the broader historical period, which
includes Jewish colonization starting from the last quarter of the nineteenth
century. Nor would there be any discussion of Palestinian violence against
Israelis and Jews, both inside and outside of Israel. Something is needed to
address these broader aspects and larger history of the conflict.
65 Mahmood Mamdani, A Diminished Truth, in AFTER THE TRC: REFLECTIONS ON TRUTH
AND RECONCILIATION IN SOUTH AFRICA 58, 59-60 (Wilmot James & Linda van de Vijver
eds., Ohio Univ. Press 2001) (2000) [hereinafter AFTER THE TRC].
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Thus, in the post-conflict period,66 Israel and the government of the
future Palestinian state will find themselves in the same position of prior
transitional regimes all over the world. The regimes in Israel/Palestine fol-
lowing a final status agreement will face the daunting challenge of distin-
guishing themselves from the policies of the former regimes, of re-
establishing the rule of law, and building a new culture of human rights. As
in other transitional situations, the way forward begins by stepping back
into the past. It begins with the "truth."
III. JUSTICE IN TRANSITION: FROM "TRUTH V. JUSTICE"
TOWARD A SURVIVOR'S JUSTICE
This section will begin to explore the applicability of the transi-
tional paradigm to post-conflict Israel/Palestine. Given some of the short-
comings of the international criminal justice model discussed below, and the
unlikeliness that prosecution will be pursued by Israel, the Palestinian Au-
thority, or by the international community, the need increases for alternative
approaches to deal with the past, such as a truth commission. There are,
nonetheless, fundamental structural characteristics of the Israeli-Palestinian
post-conflict situation that would seem, at least at first, to diverge from the
transitional paradigm as it has unfolded elsewhere. These challenges are by
no means insurmountable, and in some ways may, in fact, enhance the abil-
ity of a truth commission to carry out its work. These structural dynamics,
then, should not be used as reasons for rejecting a truth commission model
out of hand, but rather, merely pose a new challenge to the truth commis-
sion model to demonstrate its utility as a post-conflict tool.
Before discussing the challenges the Israeli-Palestinian post-conflict
would present to a truth commission, 6 however, it is important to elaborate
on why a truth commission is better equipped than tribunals to address the
nature and complexity of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Briefly though, a
66 Siobhan McEvoy-Levy points out that in peace studies, conflict transformation refers to
two related phenomena: (1) the period of conflict resolution in which the "nuts and bolts" of
settlement are worked out; and (2) the larger project of conflict transformation that includes
rehabilitation of victims and the work of reconciliation. See Siobhan McEvoy-Levy, Youth,
Violence and Conflict Transformation, PEACE REV., 89, 89 (2001). My argument places an
Israeli-Palestinian TRC in the second of these two phenomena, making it contingent on a
peace agreement. The primary concern here is stability; a minimal foundation of stability is
the prerequisite for the success of any TRC. This will certainly have an effect on the mandate
of the truth commission, for instance regarding victim reparations, which in the case of the
reparations for the harms suffered by first-generation Palestinian refugees may be dealt with
during Final Status negotiations on a government-to-government basis. Nonetheless, other
individual victim issues, such as reparations for Israeli incursions into the territories post-
Oslo, or for Palestinian terrorist attacks on civilians in Israel, will not have an immediate
forum where they can be addressed in a TRC post-conflict.
67 See infra Part IV.
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word is due regarding the actual political and legal potential for prosecu-
tions at the international level.
A. Legal and Political Obstacles to Prosecutions for Violations of
International Law Arising out of the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict
Sadly, the entrenched battle between Israelis and Palestinians has
raged for most of the past half-century. From this wreckage, there is no
question that an international prosecutor could build a case against either
side for violations of international humanitarian law; against Israel for vio-
lations of the Geneva Conventions for acts carried out against the Palestin-
ian population, beginning with their dispersion from what became the terri-
68tory of the State of Israel in 1948, to the ravages of the Occupation, and
against the Palestinians for violence against Jewish and Israeli civilians both
inside and outside of Israel in the pursuit of their national liberation strug-
gle.69 But from a political and legal standpoint, tribunal justice does not
seem likely in the near future, principally because the ICC is unlikely to
exercise jurisdiction over any claims arising from the conflict. Similarly,
claims by Israel against the Palestinian Authority, its officials, or Palestinian
militants are not a realistic possibility, although domestic claims in the U.S.
have been filed.70 This does not, however, foreclose the possibility of an
68 There have been numerous General Assembly and other UN resolutions from elsewhere
in the UN treaty system condemning the abuses of the Occupation for over forty years. This
breadth of time and the scope of the documentation is far too numerous to catalogue here.
For more detail, see The United Nations Information System on the Question of Palestine,
http://domino.un.org/unispal.nsf/frontpage5!OpenPage; see also The Israeli Center for Hu-
man Rights in the Occupied Territories http://www.btselem.org/englishlstatistics/Index.asp
(cataloguing violations since 1987). Of course, not all of these resolutions speak to alleged
violations over which an international tribunal, such as the International Criminal Court (the
"ICC"), could have subject matter jurisdiction. The ICC only has jurisdiction over genocide,
crimes against humanity, crimes of war (as they are defined in the Geneva Conventions), and
the crime of aggression. See The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court,
A/CONF.183/9, arts. 5, 6, 7, & 8 (Jan. 17 2001), http://www.icc-cpi.int/library/aboutofficial
journal/RomeStatute_1 20704-EN.pdf.
69 Human Rights Watch declared Palestinian suicide bombings to be crimes against hu-
manity and possibly war crimes in 2002. Joe Stork, Erased in a Moment: Suicide Bombing
Attacks inside Israel, Human Rights Watch (Oct. 2002), http://www.hrw.org/reports/2002/
isrl-paISRAELPA1002.pdf (finding that "[t]he scale and systematic nature of these attacks
in 2001 and 2002 meet the definition of a crime against humanity. When these suicide bomb-
ings take place in the context of violence that amounts to armed conflict, they are also war
crimes. Human Rights Watch unreservedly condemns these atrocities."). Palestinians have
launched terrorist attacks against Jews and Israelis both inside and outside Israel for decades,
though there was relative calm following.
70 Both Israeli and Palestinian civilians have in fact sought legal remedies in various juris-
dictions for acts related to the conflict. There was a claim brought against Ariel Sharon,
Israeli Gen. Amos Yaron, and former U.S. President George H.W. Bush in Belgium, based
on its 1993 universal jurisdiction law, granting Belgium courts jurisdiction over genocide,
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indictment arising in Israel, in a Palestinian national court or in the court of
another sovereign against either Israeli or Palestinian defendants, but again,
such claims do not provide meaningful reparations for all of the people af-
fected and should not be seen as any kind of solution for the population writ
large.
First, Israel is not a State party to the Rome Statute establishing the
ICC,7' and so it cannot refer a situation to the court arising from events that
occurred on its territory, or conduct by its nationals.7 2 The alternative, that
the Security Council acting under Chapter VII of the UN Charter would
refer a case arising out of the Israel/Palestine conflict to the ICC 73 is also not
likely, as any such resolution would almost certainly be vetoed by the U.S.
Even if Israel were to ratify the ICC statute and refer a situation herself, the
ICC only has jurisdiction over acts carried out after its official establishment
crimes against humanity and war crimes. The claim was based on the role of Sharon and
others in the Sabra and Shatilla massacres in southern Lebanon in 1982, for which an Israeli
commission of inquiry had found Sharon "indirectly responsible." See http://www.indict
sharon.net/case.shtml. Belgium's highest court eventually dismissed the case for lack of
jurisdiction after the Belgian legislature, facing intense diplomatic pressure, drastically
amended the universal jurisdiction law to apply only to individuals who were Belgian citi-
zens at the time the alleged crimes were committed, thereby effectively stripping the court of
jurisdiction. See Belgium Drops War Crimes Cases, DEUTCHE-WELLE, Aug. 17, 2003,
http://www.dw-world.de/dw/article/0978973,00.html.
There have also been claims in the U.S. against Yasir Arafat and other officers of the Pales-
tinian Authority for terrorist attacks in Israel. These individual civil claims based on the 1990
Antiterrorism Act, however, are not solutions capable of providing meaningful restitution to
large groups of people; they are mainly able to provide declaratory relief for the victims, and
possibly compensate a handful of individuals, when they overcome the jurisdictional compli-
cations and the difficulties in collecting damages on any judgments awarded. See, e.g., Fla-
tow v. Alavi Foundation, et al, 2000 U.S. App. LEXIS 17753 (4th Cir. 2000) (denying plain-
tiffs appeal of the district court's order granting defendant's Motion to Release Properties, to
Quash Writs of Execution, and to Enjoin Plaintiff from issuing Future Writs Against the
Foundation's Property); see also Ungar v. The Palestinian Authority, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
27384 (D.C. District court granting the "turnover order" of the plaintiffs-the estates of
Yaron Ungar, a resident of New York, and his wife, Efrat an Israeli-in 1996, for over $116
million in funds of the defendants deposited in the court's registry by the Wachovia Bank).
71 Israel has resisted signing the Rome Statute because it is concerned about being the
subject of prosecutions generated from the illegal status of the settlements in the Palestinian
territories, which are considered by many to violate the Fourth Geneva convention. See U. N.
Econ. & Soc. Council [ECOSOC], Comm. on Human Rights, Question of the Violation of
Human Rights in the Occupied Arab Territories, Including Palestine, 35, U.N. Doc.
E/CN.4/2001/121 (Mar. 16, 2001).
72 See The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, A/CONF. 183/9, arts. 5, 6, 7,
& 8 (Jan. 17, 2001), art. 11. Israel could hypothetically accept jurisdiction over a specific
alleged crime by lodging a declaration with the ICC's Registrar, but this is unlikely to hap-
pen. Id. art 12.3.
13 See id. art. 13(b).
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on July 1, 2002. 74 Thus, any referral to the ICC at all would fail to address
the vast majority of violations of international law that may have occurred
over the course of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, and would therefore be a
paltry judicial response to the decades-long conflict and its consequences.
Also, the prospects for the creation of an ad hoc tribunal are very slight,
since the purpose behind establishing the ICC was to create a permanent
home for such trials.
In sum, the prospects and benefits of international or national
prosecutions are quite minimal. Beyond the legal and political obstacles to
prosecutions, however, lie the deeper philosophical and pragmatic issues
they raise, which in this situation and others suggest that truth commission
should be pursued if not as an exclusive alternative, then at least as a sup-
plement to prosecutions. The following section explores these issues in
greater depth, elaborating on why the nature of the Israeli-Palestinian con-
flict suggests that a truth commission would be a more appropriate remedy
to pursue.
B. Truth vs. Justice
The recognition of the institutional and political obstacles to domes-
tic prosecutions long-ago led to the exploration of the use of truth commis-
sions.75 Truth commissions as a whole, however, have encountered criticism
by the mainstream human rights movement. Convinced that the fight against
impunity continues to improve, mainstream activists such as Ken Roth of
Human Rights Watch and Aryeh Neier, President of the Open Society Insti-
tute, accuse truth commissions of obstructing justice because their emphasis
on reconciliation and restorative justice lets perpetrators off too easily.76
Critics of truth commissions have also lodged legalistic and formalistic
complaints against perceived inadequacies of the due process of truth com-
missions; their procedures are viewed as inadequate and quasi-judicial, fail-
ing in the exacting standards of more formal criminal justice.77 On the
74 See id art. 126.
75 See generally PRISCILLA B. HAYNER, UNSPEAKABLE TRUTHS: CONFRONTING STATE
TERROR AND ATROCITY (2001) (discussing the design of truth commissions).
76 See Jonathan D. Tepperman, Truth and Consequences, 81 FOREIGN AFF., 128, 129
(2002) (offering a good overview of what could be called the "truth v. tribunalism" debate).
Tepperman points out that Neier once thought of truth commissions as necessary compro-
mises, but now, with the establishment of the ICC and other mechanisms, feels that truth
commissions represent a compromise that is no longer necessary. Id. at 143.
77 For what I would call a "legalistic" or "formalist" critique of the South African Truth
and Reconciliation Commission (SATRC), see Frederik Van Zyl Slabbert, Truth Without
Reconciliation, Reconciliation Without Truth, in AFTER THE TRC, supra note 66, at 62 (find-
ing insufficiencies in the South African Truth & Reconciliation Commission's procedures,
evidentiary standards and legality). For essays defending the procedures and overall work of
the SATRC, see Alex Boraine, The Language of Potential, in AFTER THE TRC, supra note
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whole, however, the debates between the relative merits of retributive jus-
tice and restorative approaches have largely been philosophical and ideo-
logical in nature,78 as it is quite difficult to measure things such as "justice"
and "reconciliation," and few have tried to do so empirically. 79 Instead,
most international lawyers and policymakers have until now settled for
well-meaning, but thoroughly unsupported declarations about the power of
prosecutions and truth commissions.80
There is justification and perhaps even a need to implement both
types of mechanisms in transitional situations, depending on the context.
Indeed, practitioners of transitional justice advocate a holistic approach to
post-conflict reconstruction. As Paul Van Zyl of the International Center for
Transitional Justice notes, "[a]ny one of those five approaches [referring to
criminal prosecutions, truth commissions, reparations, reform of state insti-
tutions, and interpersonal reconciliation groups] will often be insufficient
and it is best to try to do as many of those as is possible in the circum-
stances.' Priscilla Hayner, also from ICTJ, has argued that truth commis-
sions and trials are not mutually exclusive, and that in fact, in the cases of
Argentina and Chad, the truth commissions actually uncovered evidence
later used in prosecutions.82 It is important to note, though, that in these
66, at 73, and Albie Sachs, His Name Was Henry, in AFTER THE TRC, supra note 66, at 94.
For a general review of the literature on social reconciliation in the aftermath of conflict, see
Lysiane van der Knaap, The Achievement of Social (Re)conciliation After a Violent Con-
flict: A Review of the Literature (Feb. 2006), http://www.khulumani.net/component/
optioncomdocman/task,docdownload/gid, 13/Itemid, 113/.
78 For arguments on the imperative to prosecute gross violations of human rights, compare
Diane F. Orentlicher, Settling Accounts: The Duty to Prosecute Human Rights Violations of a
Prior Regime, 100 YALE L.J. 2537, 2606-12 (1991) (claiming that the duty to prosecute
genocide, crimes against humanity, and perhaps war crimes is jus cogens and cannot be
derogated from even through a treaty between states, such as the "end of conflict" clause in a
future Israeli-Palestinian Peace Treaty under consideration here), with Carlos S. Nino, The
Duty to Punish Past Abuses of Human Rights Put Into Context: The Case of Argentina, 100
YALE L.J. 2619 (1991) (commenting and replying to Orentlicher). See also Michael P.
Scharf, Swapping Amnesty for Peace: Was There a Duty to Prosecute International Crimes
in Haiti?, 31 TEX. INT'L L.J. 1, 39 (1996) (noting the attributes of amnesty, but also its limi-
tations in "discouraging future atrocities").
79 See generally MY NEIGHBOR, MY ENEMY, supra note 36.
80 See Eric Stover & Harvey M. Weinstein, Introduction: Conflict, Justice and Reclama-
tion, in My NEIGHBOR, MY ENEMY, supra note 36, at 13-14 (articulating the abstract merits
of trials and truth commissions, such as promoting reconciliation, achieving closure, and
rebuilding society).
S Justice for a Lawless World? Rights and Reconciliation in a New Era of International
Law, http://www.irinnews.org/webspecials/RightsAndReconciliation/54203.asp (last visited
Jan. 12, 2007).
82 HAYNER, supra note 77, at 93-94 ("[T]he National Commission on the Disappeared in
Argentina played a critical role in the trials against members of the former military junta
leadership, serving as a model for the positive relationship that can exist between truth corn-
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instances the truth commissions and prosecutions were separated by some
passage of time.
Though in theory they may be able to complement one another si-
multaneously in the same transitional setting, the only practical knowledge
we have to-date casts doubt on their ability to productively intermix without
impeding one another's work.83 Specifically, the experience of the Special
Court for Sierra Leone and Sierra Leone's Truth and Reconciliation Com-
mission should offer pause for reflection on future attempts to combine tri-
als and truth commissions within one transitional society simultaneously. In
particular, the Sierra Leone experience offers a lesson in how the poor insti-
tutional collaboration between a court and a truth commission can jeopard-
ize the work of one or both institutions, thus limiting the potential of the
transitional period, in addition to potentially having broader impacts on UN
conflict resolution efforts elsewhere.84 Rosalind Shaw notes that "[b]ecause
of administrative delays, the TRC's statement-taking phase and hearings
phase coincided with the Special Court's indictments in the first half of
2003, resulting in widespread ex-combatant fears that the TRC could be a
covert conduit for the Special Court., 85 Among other rationales, these fears
discouraged former combatants from participating as robustly as they might
have in the absence of this unfortunate overlap and the poor sensitization of
the population to the relationship between the two transitional justice
mechanisms.
The above discussion begs the question. which form-if any-of
transitional justice will prove beneficial to the populations of Israel and the
future state of Palestine after the two sides have arrived at a comprehensive
Final Status peace agreement? There may be those who will not be satisfied
unless prosecutions are pursued and individual responsibility is assigned,
but at the end of the day, political realities control. Thus, while the desire
for revenge and retributive justice is extremely powerful, it seems that such
inclinations must be suppressed for the sake of other goals, such as facilitat-
ing a peaceful transition. South African President Thabo Mbeki reflects on
the South African transition:
missions and later prosecutions."); id. at 59 ("While there are significant limitations to the
report... it is the only detailed, published record on the rights crimes under Habrd, and thus
was critical in providing leads to victims and other witnesses who could be used in a trial.").
83 See James Cockayne, The Fraying Shoestring: Rethinking Hybrid War Crimes Tribu-
nals, 28 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 616, 650-54 (2006) (noting the failure to cooperate between the
Sierra Leone Special Court and Truth and Reconciliation Commission).
84 See id at 652-53 (noting that the Special Court's undercutting of the amnesty provision
of the peace agreements could affect how combatants in other conflicts approach peace talks,
undermining their confidence in the guarantees of amnesty offered in peace negotiations).
85 Rosalind Shaw, Rethinking Truth and Reconciliation Commissions: Lessons from Si-
erra Leone (United States Institute of Peace Special Report, Feb. 2005), at 4.
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Within the ANC, the cry was to "catch the bastards and hang them." But
we realized that you could not simultaneously prepare for a peaceful tran-
sition while saying we want to catch and hang people. So we paid a price
for the peaceful transition. If we had not taken this route I don't know
where the country would have been today. Had there been a threat of Nur-
emberg-style trials over members of the apartheid security establishment
we would never have undergone the peaceful change.
86
Despite this political reality, emergent dissenting views in the field of tran-
sitional justice suggest that any investigation into the past might be too risky
for fragile, post-conflict societies.
The reality is that given the political landscape of the Israel-
Palestinian conflict, if anything is to occur, it is more likely to be a truth
commission than prosecutions. The following section will discuss why this
is not only the practical, but also the most desirable path.
C. The "Gray Zone " of Complicity and the Need for Survivor's Justice
Individual criminal justice, whether implemented on an interna-
tional or a national level, seems woefully inadequate to deal with the way
complicity is spread so diffusely throughout Israeli and Palestinian soci-
ety.87 The conflict culture is so overbearing that the concepts of victim and
perpetrator quickly lose meaning. Certainly there is an asymmetric power
relationship between the populations, and the Palestinians have collectively
suffered in many ways on a level incomparable to the grief of the average
Israeli who has not suffered the abuses of the Occupation on a daily basis.
88
Regardless of the quantitative disparities, however, psychologically, it is
clear that both populations espouse a victim ideology affecting their deepest
levels of existence. This victim ideology prevents each group from consid-
ering themselves as anything other than victim, and their political other as
anything but an enemy.
8 9
86 THABO MBEKI, AFRICA: THE TIME HAS COME 29 (Frank Chikane et al. eds., 1998).
87 Former deputy mayor of Jerusalem, Meron Benvenisti has described the Israeli-
Palestinian conflict as "inter-communal," which unlike conventional warfare, has every
single individual join its army on the battlefield in a struggle not so much over a country's
borders, but over the legitimacy of its regime. See BENVENISTI, supra note 4, at 77-78. An
intercommunal conflict is endemic, seemingly endless, but if it does finally end, Benvenisti
writes, it is only "after the opponents find a way of accepting one another at the deepest,
metapolitical levels of their existence, after they have clarified questions of self-identity and
legitimacy for themselves and to their neighbors." Id.
88 See, e.g., HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, WORLD REPORT 2006, at 455 (2006) (noting the "se-
rious humanitarian crisis" of "extreme poverty, unemployment, and food insecurity" in the
Occupied Territories).
89 Just as the Occupation is omnipresent in the daily existence of Palestinians, and their
reality is shaped by their history of dispossession, so too Jews in Israel and the Diaspora are
2006-2007]
CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L.
The fact that both Israelis and Palestinians view themselves as vic-
tims does not alter the facts of actual historical violations perpetrated by
either side. It does help, however, to get a grasp of what is really the more
salient feature of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict that most concretely in-
forms the decision over which transitional justice approach that might be
most appropriate for it. What we find in the Israeli-Palestinian situation, not
unlike other transitional societies, is a complex "gray zone" of complicity,
which is compounded by their continually evolving and intensifying inter-
connectivity. In such a situation, any transitional justice apparatus must
address not just the victims and perpetrators, but also, and perhaps more
importantly, those at the margins of the conflict culture: collaborators and
beneficiaries. Collectively, the perpetrators, victims, collaborators, and
beneficiaries form different classes of people enmeshed in the conflict cul-
ture. The task of any transitional regime is to transform these individual
identities with their idiosyncratic links to the conflict into "survivors"-a
collective identity that transcends the relationships of the conflict and turns
the conflict culture itself on its head.
1. Collaborators and Beneficiaries
Israel has a huge beneficiary class-arguably most of the Jewish Is-
raeli population and to a more limited extent, the Christian Israeli popula-
tion as well. Beneficiaries are those who benefit from the maintenance of
the unjust status quo that persists so long as the Occupation remains in
place. Israeli journalist Amira Hass, who has covered the Gaza Strip for
over a decade, articulates this sense of complicity:
Let us leave aside those Israelis whose ideology supports the dispos-
session of the Palestinian people because "God chose us." Leave aside the
judges who whitewash every military policy of killing and destruction.
Leave aside the military commanders who knowingly jail an entire nation
in pens surrounded by walls, fortified observation towers, machine guns,
barbed wire and blinding projectors. Leave aside the ministers. All of these
are not counted among the collaborators. These are the architects, the plan-
ners, the designers, the executioners.
But there are others. Historians and mathematicians, senior editors,
media stars, psychologists and family doctors, lawyers who do not support
Gush Emunim and Kadima, teachers and educators, lovers of hiking trails
and sing-alongs, high-tech wizards. Where are you? And what about you,
shaped by their historical' experiences. Palestinian terrorism has also targeted Jews all over
the world,,most famously in the Aclille Lauro and Entebbe hijackings, and the murder of
Israeli Olympians at the Munich Games of 1972. The effect such attacks have on the Jewish
psyche cannot be underestimated; they, along with the suicide bombings, continuing existen-
tial threats' posed by Hezbollah, Iran and Syria, are a constant affirmation of the Jewish vic-
tim ideology that has its roots in the two thousand years of persecution that climaxed in the
Shoah, or Nazi holocaust.
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researchers of Nazism, the Holocaust and Soviet gulags? Could you all be
in favor of systematic discriminating laws? ...
As Jews we all enjoy the privilege Israel gives us, what makes us all
collaborators. The question is what does every one of us do in an active
and direct daily manner to minimize cooperation with a dispossessing,
suppressing regime that never has its fill. Signing a petition and tutting
will not do. Israel is a democracy for its Jews. We are not in danger of our
lives, we will not be jailed in concentration camps, our livelihood will not
be damaged and recreation in the countryside or abroad will not be denied
to us. Therefore, the burden of collaboration and direct responsibility is
immeasurably heavy.
90
Thus, these segments of Israeli society benefit from all of the trappings of
statehood and economic prosperity that flow from being Israeli citizens.
Israel also has the additional complexity of a huge collaborator
class: most of the Jewish population over the age of eighteen has served in
the armed forces for two to three years, and men continue with reserve duty
for an aggregate of about another four to five years throughout the rest of
their lives. At any moment a reservist can be transformed from citizen to
soldier if called into action to defend Israel's borders and her citizenry.
Though not all active or reserve soldiers serve or have served in the imme-
diate administration of the Occupation, the performance of their duties
elsewhere is part of the overall national defense effort; their energies ex-
pended in some part of the country allows other to perform their jobs in the
territories. Beyond this, the entire population, merely by its tacit connection
to Israeli democratic procedure, is in some immeasurable way complicit in
the administration of the occupation, if only through paying the taxes that
support the country's massive defense budget, electing officials that con-
tinue to pursue problematic policies such as settlement-building, or merely
by remaining silent in the face of the abuses of its government against the
Palestinian civilian population.
On the Palestinian side, there is also a problem of "collaborators,"
which refers here to two distinct groups of people depending on one's per-
spective. To Palestinians, collaborators are traitors, those who aid the Israeli
occupation in any number of ways.91 The problem of the collaborator has
90 Amira Hass, Can You Really Not See?, HA'ARETZ, Sept. 27, 2006, http://www.haaretz.
com/hasen/spages/756413.html.
91 On collaborators in Palestinian society, see Human Rights Watch, Justice Undermined.-
Balancing Security and Human Rights in the Palestinian Justice System, at 23, E 1304, Nov.
2001, http://www.hrw.org/reports/2001/pa/isrpal101.pdf [hereinafter Justice Undermined]
"Collaborators" in the Palestinian context refer to several kinds of people. Id. For most of the
Israeli Occupation, the "intermediary" (al-wasit) "helped Palestinians do the complex pa-
perwork and security checks the Israelis required before granting most services." Id. A dif-
ferent type, the "armed collaborator" (al-'amil al-musallah), accompanied Israeli Special
Forces to identify the houses of wanted activists." A third type, the so-called "'economic
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been a source of constant tension within Palestinian society, and collabora-
tors have been horribly treated in the past by the PA security forces and
justice system.92
From the Israeli perspective, collaborators refer to those segments
of the civilian population who, though not engaging directly in militant ac-
tivities, nevertheless aided and abetted militants wanted by Israel for their
role in the deaths of Israelis, or for planning attacks that posed a security
threat to Israeli citizens.93 As a mode of deterrence to deal with the increase
in attacks emanating from within the territories during the Second Intifada,
Israel re-initiated a policy of house demolitions as collective punishment, a
policy that ceased again as of February 2005.94 Beyond civilian participa-
tion, the Israeli government also claims to have found evidence sufficient to
collaborator' . tried to promote Israeli products on the Palestinian market, often acting as
representatives of Israeli companies," and finally, the "political collaborators" would "offi-
cially or informally represent[ed] Israeli interests, sometimes taking on positions of authority
in local administrations." Id.
HRW notes that before the PA was established, hundreds of collaborators were "lynched,
tortured or killed, at times with the implied support of the PLO." Id. Such street killings
continued during the second intifada in fewer numbers, but the PA security forces did arrest
hundreds of suspected collaborators, torturing many in order to extract confessions, and put
some on trial and televised their confessions. Security and military courts convicted a hand-
ful of these individuals and, at the time of the authorship of HRW's report, had executed two
of them. Id. at 22-23. "During the current Intifada particular focus has been put on two types
of collaborators. The 'informant' (jasus) provides Israeli security forces with information
about the activities and movements of Palestinian activists, while the 'infiltrator' succeeds in
infiltrating Palestinian organizations and providing information from the inside. The 'land
dealer' (simsar al-aradi) or broker facilitates the purchase of Palestinian land by Israelis,
often by purchasing blocks of land and then reselling it." Id. at 23.
92 See Human Rights Watch, The "Roadmap ": Repeating Oslo's Human Rights Mistakes,
at 8, May 8, 2003, http://www.hrw.org/backgrounder/mena/israelpa050603.pdf [hereinafter
The "Roadmap '.
93 At the height of the second intifada in July 2002, Israel was considering implementing a
policy of deporting family members of suicide bombers in an attempt to deter the attacks by
depriving the terrorists a "supportive environment." Dani Taub, spokesman for the Israeli
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, said the idea was intended to counter the support the families of
suicide bombers receive from groups like Hamas and Islamic Jihad, and from outside gov-
ernments (such as Iraq, which allegedly used to send $25,000 to bombers' families), which
Taub said amount to "bribery to commit mass murder." Such a policy would likely constitute
collective punishment, a violation of the laws of occupation under the Geneva Conventions.
See Amos Harel, US. Slams Plan to Exile Families of Palestinian Militants, HA'ARETZ, July
19, 2002.
94 Between October 2001, when demolitions for the purposes of punishment resumed after
a four-year stoppage, and January 2005, when they stopped again, the Israel Defense Forces
demolished 668 homes as punishment for collaboration. See House Demolitions as Punish-
ment, supra note 48. These figures does not include the number of houses sealed or partially
sealed, nor those demolished for other rationales, such as the purported "military" reasons.
See generally Demolition for Alleged Military Purposes, supra note 48. Between 1987 and
2001, Israel demolished 449 homes. See House Demolitions as Punishment, supra.
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link Yasir Arafat and senior Fatah party officials to the funding and supply-
ing of militants and terrorist groups.95 Thus, the line between even official
and non-official violence became blurred during the second intifada. The
recent election of Hamas-with its continued espousal of violent struggle
against both settlers and the occupation forces in the territories, as well as
against Israeli citizens within Israel proper-also raises difficult questions
as to whom complicity and accountability for violence against Israel ex-
tends.
2. The Problem of Narrative and Complicity
Furthermore, very much like apartheid in South Africa, the occupa-
tion spans thirty-nine years, a period longer than most armed conflicts, and
the larger conflagration between Zionism and the Palestinians has raged for
over a century, since hostilities already began to erupt during the first aliyot
of Jewish immigrants to Palestine as early as the 1880s following anti-
Semitic pogroms in Russia and elsewhere. Thus, the notion that the conflict
could be reduced to the singular actions and decisions of a few individuals
in the higher reaches of military or political command seems to deny the
basic reality and character of the conflict, and as Mamdani suggests, threat-
ens to decontextualize the conflict beyond comprehension.96 Certainly, there
are individuals who took decisive actions that affected large groups of peo-
ple, or even a few people, but overemphasizing their responsibility threatens
to obfuscate the truly societal nature of the conflict. Bluntly put, scapegoat-
ing a few generals or a few militants here and there in the name of justice
will not solve anything. On the contrary, it offers the rest of the population
an excuse to continue denying their complicity in the suffering of the other
side. As Stover and Weinstein observe,
Criminal trials in the wake of mass atrocity are inevitably limited and
symbolic: a few war criminals stand for a much larger group of guilty. Nor
do trials address the responsibility of those who, swept along by group
emotion or solidarity, participated at the margins-looting, taunting, or
profiting from the misfortune of their neighbors-or those who did noth-
ing to stop or mitigate the violence, the so-called "innocent bystanders."
Thus, what is billed as individual justice actually becomes a defacto form
of collective innocence that exonerates the far larger number of individuals
95 See Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Seizing of the Palestinian Weapons Ship Karine
A (Jan. 4, 2002), http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/Govemment/Communiques/2002/Seizing+of+
the+Palestinian+weapons+ship+Karine+A+-.htm.
96 See Mamdani, supra note 66, at 59 ("The TRC's version of truth was established
through narrow lenses, crafted to reflect the experience of a tiny minority: on the one hand,
perpetrators, being state-agents; and, on the other, victims, being political activists.").
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who were indirectly responsible for the physical, social, and psychological
destruction of their communities.
97
To the extent that everyone is somehow complicit in the struggle, caught
within the suffocating "gray zone" of the conflict, too intense a focus on
individual perpetrators threatens to spawn myths of collective innocence
among the beneficiaries. Still more problematic, though, is that the empha-
sis on individual perpetrators within criminal justice, and even within the
workings of the South African TRC,98 can displace other categories of par-
ties to the conflict, such as beneficiaries or collaborators, from the center of
transitional project of recovering what historical processes enabled the con-
flict. An overemphasis on perpetrators also overshadows the suffering of the
victims, though some have suggested that trials concerned with historical
injustice actually provide a platform for the recognition and reincorporation
of victims into the public sphere.99 The logic of the "gray zone" of complic-
ity found in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict suggest far more complex and
ambiguous categories of guilt.'00 Teitel has noted that:
97 Eric Stover & Harvey M. Weinstein, Conclusion: A Common Objective, A Universe of
Alternatives, in MY NEIGHBOR, MY ENEMY, supra note 36, at 335 [hereinafter Stover &
Weinstein, Conclusion]; see also HAYNER, supra note 77, at 101 (quoting Paul van Zyl's
observation that the focus on Eugene "Prime Evil" de Kock, a particularly ruthless member
of the security services who was guilty of countless acts of violence, displaced many white
South African's focus from their personal complicity in maintaining the apartheid regime,
thereby enabling de Kock's actions).
98 See Mamdani, supra note 66. Giorgio Agamben has argued that the Nuremburg Trials
produced a false effect that the Shoah had been "dealt with" adequately: "it has taken more
than half a century to understand that law did not exhaust the problem, but rather that the
very problem was so enormous as to call into question law itself, dragging it to its own ruin."
See Giorgio Agamben, REMNANTS OF AuscHWITz: THE WITNESS AND THE ARCHIVE (Daniel
Heller-Roazen trans., 1999).
99 See generally Shoshana Felman, Theaters of Justice: Arendt in Jerusalem, the
Eichmann Trial, and the Redefinition of Legal Meaning in the Wake of the Holocaust, 27
CRITICAL INQUIRY 201 (2001).
100 One useful framework for beginning to think of the levels of complicity is offered by
Karl Jaspers' The Question of German Guilt, which distinguishes between criminal guilt (for
those guilty of violence), political guilt (for politicians and the people who voted them into
power), moral guilt (for those who did not do enough, who did not resist, who were passive),
and metaphysical guilt (the guilt of existence, of having survived while others perished). See
KARL JASPERS, THE QUESTION OF GERMAN GUILT 31-32 (E.B. Ashton trans., 1947). I am by
no means suggesting that this situation is comparable to the Shoah. It is not. However, Jas-
pers' thoughtful reflections do provide a stepping-off point for both populaces to begin to
comprehend their complicity, which as I have tried to suggest, truly reaches out to everyone.
Scholars focused on international criminal justice have also focused on the problem of com-
plicity. See Mark A. Drumbl, Collective Violence and Individual Punishment: The Criminal-
ity of Mass Atrocity, 99 Nw. U. L. Rev. 539 (2005) (arguing that qualitative differences of
mass atrocities requires distinct theories of punishment for these crimes); Laurel E. Fletcher,
From Indifference to Engagement: Bystanders and International Criminal Justice, 26 MICH.
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The massive and systemic wrongdoing that is particularly characteristic of
modem repression implies a recognition of the mix of individual and col-
lective responsibility. Hence, there is a pronounced overlap of punitive and
administrative institutions and processes. Individualized processes of ac-
countability give way to administrative investigations and commissions of
inquiry, the compilation of public records, and official pronouncements
about past wrongs. 10
It is precisely because of the wide extension of the conflict through-
out society that special notions of justice arise in transitional situations such
as the Israeli-Palestinian post-conflict. Mamdani argues, "[w]here survi-
vors-victims and perpetrators from an earlier round of struggle-must
learn to live together, ways must be found to reconcile the logic of recon-
ciliation with that ofjustice. ' '
Specifically, Mamdani argues for what he calls "survivor's justice,"
which "seeks to transcend the bipolar notions of victim and perpetrator."'
0 3
He explains this concept in distinction to the victor's justice that often ob-
tains in post-conflict situation, where the winners get to judge the losers. To
elaborate, he compares victor's justice and survivor's justice to two post-
war paradigms of justice: de-Nazification and de-Sovietization. The logic of
de-Nazification was to blame the agent, through the Nuremburg trials and
the lustration of party members, while de-Sovietization's main imperative
was blaming the entire system of Soviet rule. Whereas de-Nazification re-
quires the identification of both victims and perpetrators, de-Sovietization
founds itself in the identity of survivors-it "acknowledges victims, but not
perpetrators," because from this perspective, to label someone a perpetrator
is to demonize them. To pursue a path of de-Sovietization, Mamdani argues,
requires putting emphasis on institutions of rule.
Thus, while interpersonal reconciliation is important, and victims
and perpetrators should be given opportunities interact and experience em-
J. INT'L L. 1013 (2005) (observing the inability of international criminal trials to integrate
understandings of bystander accountability and proposing that international justice mecha-
nisms "implement a model of operating as a judicial body while simultaneously attending to
the social impact of their work," which she argues can be achieved by judges leaving their
opinions open to the question of bystander contribution to atrocities and by tribunals engag-
ing bystanders as a target audience through outreach activities); see also Allison Marston
Danner & Jenny S. Martinez, Guilty Associations: Joint Criminal Enterprise, Command
Responsibility, and the Development of International Criminal Law, 93 CAL. L. REV. 75, 82-
85 (2005) (evaluating the jurisprudence of the international criminal tribunals on command
responsibility and joint criminal enterprise). For a contemporary philosophical account of
complicity very applicable to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict culture, see CHRISTOPHER C.
KuTz, COMPLICITY: ETHICS AND LAW FOR A COLLECTIVE AGE (2000).
101 RUTI G. TEITEL, TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE 217 (2000).
102 MAMDANI, supra note 36, at 273.
103 Id.
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pathy for one another, I would follow Mamdani's suggestion of refocusing
attention on the beneficiaries and the institutions of rule from which they
benefited, particularly because in this case, it is the beneficiary class (the
Jewish Israeli public) that will dictate the extent to which the "critical his-
tory" will go, and what should be done about its findings. To the extent that
the Israeli democratic process will determine nearly every concession to the
Palestinians in the post-conflict this is the group of people that most sorely
needs to understand its role in the perpetuation of the conflict over the last
several decades.
Thus, the political situation dictates the transitional justice response.
Just as white power in South Africa was able to shape the nature of post-
apartheid justice by including an amnesty clause in the interim constitution,
so too we must understand the immediate limits upon judicial responses
imposed by the power relations of any given situation.'0 With these politi-
cal realities in mind, Charles Maier has argued that in transitional societies,
where an accounting for the past is so painfully needed, often the choice is
not between what he would term "strong" retributive justice (criminal or
punitive justice) and "weak" retributive justice (shaming or extracting con-
trition)-i.e., between "highly imperfect trials" and truth commissions-but
in fact, it is between "a truth commission and silence."10' Even silence,
however, is not a long-term option; as the cases of Chile, Argentina, 10 6 and
104 Patricia Lundy and Mark McGovern have raised important considerations for why a
truth commission may not be the most appropriate mechanism for truth recovery and justice
in the Irish post-conflict situation, noting that since the Good Friday Agreement has not
produced a "wholesale break with pre-existing structures of power and authority," the needs
of the British state to preserve the "legitimacy" of its institutions into the fiture makes it
"highly unlikely that it would be willing to countenance a wholesale inquiry into the past
actions of its agents and functionaries." Patricia Lundy & Mark McGovern, The Politics of
Memory in Post-Conflict Northern Ireland, 13 PEACE REv. 27, 30 (2001). Furthermore, they
note, none of the participating parties in the Good Friday Agreement suggested or made
demands for a TRC to be included in the negotiations. Id. It seems that the negotiators re-
garded a TRC as a destabilizing factor that could elevate tensions and even threaten the pro-
gress of the peace process as a whole. While it has been argued that in South Africa justice
was sacrificed for truth and peace, in Northern Ireland it seems that "truth and justice were
compromised" for peace. Id.
105 See Charles S. Maier, Doing History, Doing Justice: The Narrative of the Historian and
of the Truth Commission, in TRUTH V. JUSTICE: THE MORALITY OF TRUTH COMMISSIONS 261,
269 (Robert I. Rotberg & Dennis Thompson eds., 2000).
106 A series of developments in Chile and Argentina has led to the further erosion of the
impunity from prosecution held by members of the upper political and military echelons. See
Peter A. Barcroft, The Slow Demise of Impunity in Chile and Argentina, ASIL INSIGHTS, Jan.
2005, http://www.asil.org/insights/2005/01/insight050107.htm; see also Rebecca Lichten-
feld, Accountability in Argentina: 20 Years Later, Transitional Justice Maintains Momen-
tum, INT'L CENTER FOR TRANSITIONAL JUST., Aug. 2005, http://www.ictj.org/images/
content/5/2/525.pdf (outlining transitional justice developments in Argentina and exploring
the history behind these advances). After Argentina's Supreme Court ruled the amnesty law
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elsewhere 0 7 demonstrate, most societies eventually force open the door to
their pasts, even if they were initially sealed shut by the strong arms of cor-
rupt political leadership. Further, it is clear from diverse contexts all over
the world that even in the face of official reluctance by political elites to
delve into the past, survivors feel a universal need for justice and truth'0 8
with respect to loved ones, and survivors act on such impulses by engaging
in unofficial truth recovery, or "memory projects," even when such activi-
ties are not blessed by official sanction.109 It is important that we begin to
explore how Israelis and Palestinians can constructively indulge their im-
pulses for justice and truth about the perceived injustices visited upon them
by their political others.
IV. DESIGNING AN ISRAELI-PALESTINIAN TRUTH COMMISSION (IPTC)
A. Initial Objections
Before engaging in the more involved discussion of the specific de-
sign and mandate of an IPTC, some initial objections must first be over-
come. From the view of transitional justice in every other situation in which
it has been implemented, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict poses unique prob-
lems: (1) it would involve institutional bridging across two sovereign states;
(2) there would be no straightforward regime change as in other transitional
situations where a democratizing successor regime revisits the abuses of
prior regimes; and finally, (3) a Final Status agreement between the parties
would mean that there would be no declared political or moral victor of the
conflict. Despite what would appear to be non-starters to a discussion of a
passed in the 1980s unconstitutional in 2005, individuals who have lived in impunity for the
last thirty years are beginning to be the subjects of re-trials. The first individual to face re-
trial was Miguel Etchecolatz, the former police chief in the city of La Plata, who had previ-
ously served only a few months of his sentence for ninety-one counts of torture before being
released due to the amnesty law. See Daniel Schweimler, Argentina Ex-President Testifies,
BBC NEWS, Aug. 30, 2006, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/5300412.stm.
107 See Publications - International Center for Transitional Justice, http://www.ictj.org/en/
news/pubs/index.html (last visited Jan. 12, 2007) (providing background on transitional
justice in other contexts); see also HAYNER, supra note 77 (discussing transitional justice in
South Africa, El Salvador, Argentina, Chile and Guatemala).
108 See LAURA NADER, THE LIFE OF THE LAW, 14-15 (2002).
109 See Lundy & McGovern, supra note 106, at 28. Lundy and McGovern trace several
attempts at unofficial memory work by several groups in Northern Ireland, many of which
have been joint projects by Catholics and Protestants, who are finding the search for truth to
be a common goal, despite official reluctance to pursue the past. See id. ("Officially sanc-
tioned memories and voices can be contested from within civil society, and these challenges
can help define and redefine the profile of who gets to be heard and what is remembered.").
The authors link these developments elsewhere where civil society groups have fought
against impunity, like the Madres and Hijos in Argentina. See id at 27 (noting that truth
commissions have been a "key mechanism for coping" in Argentina).
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truth commission, however, I would argue that these structural qualities
may even enhance the ability of the truth commission to carry out its work,
and furthermore, these "obstacles" may help illuminate the true dynamic of
transitions that is harder to grasp in more "conventional" transitional situa-
tions.
1. Two-State Solution
Some may argue that a truth commission is inappropriate for inter-
state situations (though the only empirical argument against it is that it has
yet to be tried). However, as Henry Steiner observed, an argument for a
truth commission gains strength in those interstate conflicts where conflict-
ing parties continue to inhabit the same territory, because the proximity of
the conflicting groups makes the interstate situation seem more like an in-
trastate situation, effectively erasing the borders."l0
2. No Regime Change
Another possibly significant divergence from the transitional para-
digm present in the Israeli-Palestinian post-conflict is the fact that there will
not be a regime change; the dominant regime-the Israelis-will remain in
power after the peace agreements. This creates a difficulty for the transi-
tional paradigm, for a significant-if not the dominant-characteristic of
transitional societies is the fledgling new regime that needs to distinguish
itself from prior repressive governments. This is achieved by demonstrating
a respect for human rights and civil liberties, which usually entails estab-
lishing the rule of law, rehabilitating victims either through compensation
and/or the extension/assertion of their equal protection under the law, and
investigating past abuses to demonstrate a new level of accountability and
transparency in the government and civil apparatuses. In other words, the
central task of transitional societies is the work of nation building.
Given these criteria, Israel/Palestine clearly fit within a transitional
paradigm, as they both will find themselves with much work to be done in
the post-conflict to repair civil society and the governmental institutions that
were tarnished by the years of conflict. In addition, one might argue that
there will indeed be a regime change in the sense that a "new regime" will
be created in Palestine. Thus, the new government of the Palestinian state
has the same opportunity to distinguish itself from the prior regime (Israel
and the PA) as other transitional governments have had in the past. With the
new regime actually physically displaced from the old one (whereas they
are usually not co-existent), a new opportunity is also created for the con-
110 See HARVARD LAW SCHOOL HUMAN RIGHTS PROGRAM, TRUTH COMMISSIONS: A
COMPARATIVE ASSESSMENT, 81 (1997) [hereinafter TRUTH COMMISSIONS], (briefly discussing
the topic of an Israeli-Palestinian truth commission).
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tinuing regime, Israel, to reform. In a way, the persisting presence of the old
regime simply reinforces all of the historic justifications of a more "tradi-
tional" transitional situation. Simply put, the absence of a physical change
from the past creates an even greater need to deal honestly with past abuse,
demonstrating that the continuing regime has indeed "turned a new leaf."
3. No Moral Victor
Another distinguishing characteristic of the Israeli-Palestinian post-
conflict is that, unlike other situations in which transitional justice has been
implemented, no clearly identifiable moral victor will have emerged at the
end of the conflict. Certainly, to most observers on both sides of the con-
flict, the violence may appear asymmetric, with their side suffering more
than the other does, but the conflict itself will end in a negotiated, political
compromise-a truce-in which neither side can truly claim absolute politi-
cal, military, or moral victory. The perpetuation of a victim ideology by
both groups indeed creates a situation where neither side is eager to concede
that they may have been "in the wrong." This factor will be shown to have
considerable effects in the actual "performance" of a truth commission and
is quite informative as to the realistic and appropriate aims of "truth telling,"
even in situations when a moral victor is more easily discernable, since offi-
cial apologies or judicial pronouncements of the perpetrators' guilt does not
necessarily trickle down to ordinary individuals who still firmly hold on to
their subjective views of which side is morally wrong."' Nowhere is this
dynamic demonstrated more clearly than in the former Yugoslavia and in
Rwanda, where ethnic and nationalist divisions remain alive and festering,
even though there has been very little violence in either place since the end
of hostilities." 2 Such divisiveness can perhaps be attributed to the fact that
no truth commission had yet been established in either situation, but this is
an historical hypothetical. It is also important to note that in both instances,
the outreach efforts of the tribunals have been woefully inadequate."
3
111 See, e.g., Laurel E. Fletcher & Harvey M. Weinstein, A World unto Itself? The Applica-
tion of International Justice in the Former Yugoslavia, in MY NEIGHBOR, MY ENEMY, supra
note 36, at 45.
112 See Miklos Biro et al., Attitudes Toward Justice and Social Reconstruction in Bosnia
and Herzegovina and Croatia, in MY NEIGHBOR, MY ENEMY, supra note 36, at 183; see also
Timothy Longman et al., Connecting Justice to Human Experience: Attitudes Toward Ac-
countability and Reconciliation in Rwanda, in My NEIGHBOR, MY ENEMY, supra note 36, at
206.
113 See Fletcher & Weinstein, supra note 111, at 33 (asserting that the absence of institu-
tional links between the tribunals and other institutions working toward societal reconstruc-
tion in Yugoslavia caused the ICTY to seem to be a world unto itself, independent from the
world of those effected by the tribunal); see also Laurel E. Fletcher, From Indifference to
Engagement: Bystanders and International Criminal Justice, 26 MICH. J. INT'L L. 1013, 1017
(2005) (examining the limitations international criminal law, and exploring how these limita-
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Josd Zalaquett has noted that in situations in which there is a clear
victor, the winner simply prosecutes the loser.11 4 As Todorov argued, you
must first defeat your enemy in order to judge him. However, in situations
such as the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, where there will be no clear winner,
truth commissions have been established. If both sides negotiate an agree-
ment, publicly declare their wrongdoings, and pledge to refrain from such
actions in the future, Zalaquett argues, then there is no need for a truth
commission. 5 The current paradigm for negotiations between Israel and
the Palestinians would not entail this degree of acknowledgment. Such ac-
knowledgment constitutes the first step in a long journey toward reconcilia-
tion.' 6
B. Architecture of an Israeli-Palestinian Truth Commission
What would this mechanism look like? How would it function in
post-conflict Israel and Palestine? Given the assigned task-namely, to put
the truth about the conflict in historical perspective-it seems that what is
called for is a truth commission along the lines of the comprehensive South
Africa Truth and Reconciliation Commission (SATRC), the most ambitious
project of its kind to date. The Sierra Leone Truth and Reconciliation
Commission, which modeled itself on the SATRC, will also provide some
important insights.
This raises a litany of questions concerning the particulars of the
proposed truth commission's design and mandate, not to mention the neces-
sary, skeptical questions regarding the efficacy of the very idea of a truth
commission, which will be dealt with in Part V. After a discussion of the
most central aspects of designing an IPTC, I will focus on the activity of
'truth-telling' itself, and what it offers to post-conflict societies, particularly
in this unique bi-national situation.
In discussing the design of a truth commission anywhere in the
world, it is helpful to keep in mind several underlying principles. First,
tions constrict the ability of international tribunals to promote their social and political
goals). See also Longman et al., Connecting Justice To Human Experience, in MY
NEIGHBOR, MY ENEMY, supra note 36, at 213 (noting that in Rwanda, 55.9 percent of re-
spondents claimed to be "not well informed," and 31.3 percent to be "not informed at all,"
about the work of the ICTR).
114 See TRUTH COMMISSIONS, supra note 110, at 70.
115 Id. ("If both parties negotiate an agreement, publicly declare their wrongdoings, and
pledge to refrain from such actions in the future, then there is no need for a truth commis-
sion.").
116 See Jodi Halpem & Harvey M. Weinstein, Empathy and Rehumanization After Mass
Violence, in MY NEIGHBOR, MY ENEMY, supra note 36, at 305 (arguing that the first step in
reconciliation is rehurnanization, facilitated by encouraging parties to understand the subjec-
tive perspectives of their former enemies).
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every situation is unique, and demands a unique response. 17 This principle
was demonstrated in the Sierra Leone Truth and Reconciliation Commis-
sion; during the swearing-in of its commissioners, the Chairman, the retired
Rev. Dr. Humper, emphasized that the commission could not rely upon a
prescribed model, but rather, because the conflict was unique, it demanded a
response that is "uniquely Sierra Leonean, at all times guided by what is in
the best interests of the people of Sierra Leone." ' 1 8 Every post-conflict soci-
ety that employs transitional mechanisms has a unique history and cultural
background that must be taken into account when designing transitional
mechanisms. Even though the Sierra Leone TRC emphasized the unique-
ness of its approach, at the same time, its model was heavily indebted to the
South African TRC, which, in turn, based itself on overtones of Christian
forgiveness that conflicted with popular notions of justice and retribution
among some local communities in South Africa.119 Similarly, as Rosalind
Shaw notes, despite an active NGO community embracing this kind of
truth-telling approach, for a variety of practical and cultural reasons, there
was very little popular support for the truth commission, since most people
117 See Rev. Dr. Joseph Humper, Chairman, Truth and Reconciliation Commission, Ad-
dress at the Inauguration of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (July 5, 2002), avail-
able at http://www.sierra-leone.org/josephhumper07O5O2.html (last visited Jan. 12, 2007).
Though it would be most beneficial for Israelis and Palestinians to come to their own conclu-
sions as to the best way to construct a truth and reconciliation commission, we may still look
to the SATRC as a possible model upon which to construct an IPTC for two reasons. First,
many parallels have been drawn between the nature of the two conflicts, and thus, if the
problems are similar, perhaps the model used for the solution should be similar as well. The
systematic nature of Israeli oppression in the territories and its institutionalized discrimina-
tory practices against Arab citizens of Israel suggest comparisons to South Africa, as does
the significant human rights violations perpetrated by the opposition forces, which in this
case would be the various Palestinian militant groups. The second reason for looking to the
SATRC is that in the evolution of truth commissions, the SATRC set new benchmarks in the
scope of its ambition and work. A similarly substantial mechanism, not a more limited one
like the truth commissions in Guatemala or elsewhere, seems appropriate to deal with the
complex problems involved with reconciling Israelis and Palestinians.
118 Id. More specifically, Rev. Dr. Humper said that the Commission will be "victim-
driven" and "pay special attention to the needs of women and children.... People need to
have their experiences validated and recognized," he said, "[t]here is no family, village,
community, chiefdom or district that has not been affected by the conflict one way or the
other. To that extent, we are all victims of the conflict." Id. Indeed, the TRC in Sierra Leone
will have to contend with a widespread conflict (over forty-seven thousand combatants re-
cently disarmed) that produced several distinct categories of victims: two million people
were displaced; twenty thousand people suffered mutilations, over five thousand children
were forced into combat, forced labor or sexual slavery, and an unknown number of women
were raped. These diverse classes of post-conflict citizens demand specific attention by
trauma specialists of different varieties, and the commission cannot treat each group as if
they had suffered in the same way as others.
119 RICHARD A. WILSON, THE POLITICS OF TRUTH AND RECONCILIATION IN SOUTH AFRICA:
LEGITIMIZING THE POST-APARTHEID STATE 227 (2001).
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favored instead a "forgive and forget" approach. 120 In addition, the Sierra
Leone TRC began its work in a wider social environment in which "alterna-
tive practices of reintegration, reconciliation, and social recovery were al-
ready established in many locations," thereby undermining the TRC's grip
on the popular imagination. Thus, for the top-down model of a national-
scale truth commission to have localized significance, designers of a truth
commission must pay special attention to, and try to harmonize their work
with, existent cultural preferences and informal processes.
The second principle to remember is that the very decision to insti-
tute a truth commission must be seen as revolutionary within the context of
whatever injustice preceded it, whether it was mass political repression, a
civil war, or worse. This cannot be emphasized enough; the decision to ini-
tiate transitional justice mechanisms is a decision to continue an engage-
ment with a political other that seeks to transcend the sickly relationship of
the past. Therefore, while we can begin to discuss the basic outlines of an
IPTC, the most important decision is not in the details (though certain fac-
tors will certainly bear heavily on the effectiveness and success of the
commission) 122 but in the spirit of the work itself: the commitment to con-
tinue building a post-conflict reality. Working out the details and the con-
flicts that are bound to arise is in fact an excuse for both sides to engage a
political other, thereby building the trust required for the survival of a post-
conflict culture.123 Naturally a post-conflict culture will build itself on inter-
120 Shaw, supra note 87, at 4.
121 Id. at 11.
122 See generally HAYNER, supra note 77 (discussing the design of truth commissions);
TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE: How EMERGING DEMOCRACIES RECKON WITH FORMER REGIMES (Neil
J. Kritz ed., 1995). TruthCommission.org, www.truthcommission.org (last visited Jan. 12,
2007) (offering an in-depth, interactive study of design factors to consider in creating a truth
commission; HAYNER, supra note 77, app. 1 (suggesting several ideal parameters for most
circumstances, including: a $5-35 million budget; one hundred or more staff members; a
duration of one to two years (commissions, she writes, should have deadlines, even if ex-
tendable); powers of subpoena, search and seizure and witness protection; powers of report-
ing, i.e., naming perpetrators, and making mandatory recommendations to executive
branches). This last power cannot be emphasized enough. If a truth commission is unable to
see its work actualized, there can be little hope for any measurable changes, let alone recon-
ciliation.
123 The International Center for Transitional Justice has seized upon a notion of reconcilia-
tion that is not so much interpersonal as societal, describing a "civic trust" model of recon-
ciliation where it is defined as:
[T]he condition under which citizens can once again trust one another as citizens.
That means that they are sufficiently committed to the norms and values that moti-
vate their ruling institutions; sufficiently confident that those who operate those in-
stitutions do so also on this basis; and sufficiently secure about their fellow citi-
zens' commitment to abide by these basic norms and values.
Reconciliation-International Center for Transitional Justice, http://www.ictj.org/en/tj/784.
html (last visited Jan. 12, 2007).
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personal reconciliation as well, but this form of reconciliation is more diffi-
cult to engineer in official, top-down institutionalized forums, though a truth
commission should attempt to create a space for this as well to the extent
that this is possible.
The South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission was es-
tablished by an act of parliament called the National Unity and Reconcilia-
tion Act, which called for seventeen commissioners to serve full-time, and
provided for the establishment of three separate committees within the
SATRC: (1) the Human Rights Committee, which conducted public hearing
for victims and survivors; (2) the Reparation and Rehabilitation Committee,
charged with developing a policy for long-term reparations as well as urgent
interim relief (responsible only for making recommendations to the Presi-
dent, and not capable of enacting policy or awarding reparations itself); and
(3) the Amnesty Committee, which reviewed and held hearings for amnesty
applications. The commission held separate hearings on institutions, such as
political parties; the legal system; the business, labor, and health sectors; the
faith communities; and the armed forces. Special hearings were also held to
examine the experiences of particular groups, such as women and children,
during apartheid. The TRC had powers of subpoena, search, and seizure,
which greatly facilitated access to the files of political parties and govern-
ment and security institutions.
12 4
The Sierra Leone Truth and Reconciliation Commission also offers
a useful model upon which to base an IPTC's structure. The Sierra Leone
commission had four different types of hearings: (1) witness hearings (for
individual witness testimony); (2) thematic hearings (aimed at producing a
"social analysis that describes and explains the past in relation to a number
of identified themes," enabling the Commission to "address patterns of
abuse and broader social analysis regarding the enabling background condi-
tions" of the conflict); (3) institutional hearings (which consider "whether
there were specific civil society institutions (such as the media) or state ac-
tors (like the military) that warrant particular scrutiny for their role in in-
flicting, legitimizing or ignoring abuses," and further, whether there were
"sectors of the society (such as certain corporations) who benefited from
abusive structures," or "institutions that were targeted unfairly"); and (4)
event hearings (aimed at "establish[ing] whether particular events served an
especially catalytic role in the history of human rights abuse in Sierra
Leone").
124 For a detailed discussion of the structure, processes and philosophical underpinnings of
the TRC, see Truth and Reconciliation Commission, Final Report Presented to President
Nelson Mandela on October 29, 1998, available at http://www.news24.com/Content Disp
lay/TRCReport/VOLUME1.HTM (last visited Jan. 12, 2007) [hereinafter TRC Final Re-
port].
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Some combination of these models should prove helpful as a start-
ing point for designing an IPTC. The exact shape of the IPTC and its spe-
cific structure will flow from decisions regarding the commission's man-
date, the scope of its inquiry, the resources available for its operating
budget, and the length of time that the governments will allow it to com-
plete its work. Though the SATRC provides a good model, it also serves as
a cautionary tale; much criticism of the SATRC followed its work, mainly
out of a sense of unfulfilled expectations, which in retrospect, were simply
set too high. As the Human Rights Committee of the SATRC warned in
2000:
[T]he situation facing us is an unwelcome cocktail. The blend of a great
number of rights institutions together with wide mandates may instead of
providing for an effective and efficient system of promoting rights... ac-
tually result in a flailing around... We have the suspicion that too many
institutions are trying to be too much to too many with the result that they
are doing too little for too few.1 25
Thus, while it is necessary to endow a truth commission with robust
powers and to give it enough time to complete its work, it is equally essen-
tial that a commission, the commissioners, and the public writ large have
realistic expectations for what it can and cannot do. With these useful over-
arching lessons in mind, I now turn to consider the specific design questions
that will structure the work of an IPTC.
C. Mandate-History, Violations, and Reparations
1. Scope of Historical Inquiry
First and foremost of concern to architects of an IPTC would be
what historical period the commission would investigate. The history in-
volved is daunting; Meron Benvenisti has described the conflict as an "in-
ter-communal" one lasting approximately a century, with the violence of the
second intifada representing the fifth inter-communal flare-up. 26 Palestini-
ans do not think that their troubles began with their displacement and dis-
possession in 1948, but rather, in 1882, with the initial expansion of the
Jewish yishuv, and similarly, for Israelis the issue is not as simple as how to
125 WILSON, supra note 121, at 226.
126 The previous flare-ups include the guerilla fighting of the British Mandatory period, in
1936 and 1947-48; the Lebanon War of 1982, and the first intifada launched in 1987. Ben-
venisti does not include the interstate wars of 1948-49, 1956, 1967, and 1973 because they
were between states, and resembled more conventional warfare (besides the fact that the
Palestinians had relatively little political agency in those conflicts). See BENVENISTI, supra
note 4, at 78-79. Others, such as Edward Said, have described the conflict as lasting one
hundred years. See Said, supra note 34.
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resolve the immediate conflict with the Palestinians. Rather, they view their
predicament within a regional dynamic of Arab rejectionism127 and a his-
torical mission to guarantee the survival of the Jewish people; the same im-
pulse, which spurred by centuries of European anti-Semitism, first led to
political Zionism and the Jewish colonial project in Palestine at the end of
the nineteenth century.
It is indeed tempting to take a very wide view of the history of the
conflict and the diverse contributing causes to what Benvenisti calls the
"intimate enmity" between Israelis and Palestinians. Beyond the more dra-
matic conflagrations of the various wars, there are other historical causes
that leave a direct imprint on the current situation, including European anti-
Semitic violence and the Shoah, the nature of Ottoman and then British rule
during the pre-mandate and mandate periods; Jewish colonization (and Pal-
estinian dispossession) of Palestine leading up to Israeli independence, and
Palestinian responses, including anti-Jewish violence in 1920, 1921, 1929,
and the Great Arab Revolt of 1936-1939;28 and the expulsion of Jews from
Arab countries in reaction to the conflict in Palestine (leading to further
emigration to Israel). One would think, then, that for the successful imple-
mentation of the commission, the inclination would be to narrow the man-
date, perhaps to focus on contemporary violence (perhaps the Oslo period
and onward), or maybe violations that have occurred during the occupation
(since 1967). Conventional wisdom would suggest avoiding these more
difficult and controversial issues because they are certain to re-enact the
central arguments of the conflict, and perhaps would ultimately prevent the
parties from establishing a common historical ground.1
29
127 It has been suggested, however, that this story (of Arab intransigence), which plays a
significant role in the larger Zionist narrative and continued justifications over the years for
the proliferation of the Israeli settlements and various security-minded strategies, is "in sub-
stantial measure a myth." Tessler, supra note 8, at 177. Tessler argues that "accounts which
stress abiding Arab intransigence and a militant commitment to the annihilation of the Jewish
state are incomplete, simplistic, and in many ways false." Id. at 179. Tessler also points to
opinion polls and other historical data that supports his view that Arab opinions, and more
specifically Palestinian public opinion, on Israel have not been consistently hostile, as the
Zionist narrative claims, but have been contextual and have varied with other developments
and historical moments. Id. at 185.
128 Mordechai Bar-On, Conflicting Narratives or Narratives of Conflict: Can the Zionist
and Palestinian Narratives of the 1948 War be Bridged?, in HISTORY'S DOUBLE HELIX,
supra note 8, at 158 [hereinafter Bar-On, Conflicting Narratives] (describing these "repeti-
tive violent attempts of the Palestinians to disrupt the Zionist project" as a "central feature of
the socialization of young Israelis and new immigrants alike").
129 Indeed, many historians flatly reject the possibility of the two sides ever arriving at
actual agreement on a variety of issues within the conflict and the conflict as a whole. See
Pappe, supra note 44, at 194 (discussing the views of several historians on the possibility of
constructing shared or mutually reinforcing narratives of the conflict, and arguing that Israeli
and Palestinian historians can construct "bridging narratives" on several issues, particularly
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Despite this concern, however, we must keep in mind the potent cri-
tique of the SATRC leveled by Mahmood Mamdani and others. Mamdani
argues that the TRC erred both in limiting the historical scope of its inquiry
and in limiting the types of violations it investigated. He argues that restrict-
ing its investigation to the period between 1960-1994, the TRC looked at
history through overly legalistic "narrow lenses," missing the bigger picture
of apartheid, i.e., its historical foundations in colonization. 30 Consequently,
he claims, the TRC failed to distinguish between what is "legal and what is
legitimate, between law and right," and in the process created further divi-
sions between beneficiaries of apartheid and its victims-the very two
groups between whom reconciliation was required. 131 One could easily see
similar criticisms emerging if the Israeli-Palestinian commission ignored the
broader historical movements that serve as backdrop to the current conflict.
History, after all, is at the center of the conflict, a failure to consider all of it
would reflect poorly on the credibility of the commission, and more impor-
tantly, would not truly reflect the reality of the conflict, as it has existed in
history.
Still, too wide a mandate would no doubt drown the commission in
a sea of history, potentially impeding the more forward-looking aspects of
its work in the process. One way of avoiding the pitfall of decontextualizing
the more specific instances of violence and abuse to be explored in the vic-
tim and perpetrator hearings while not simultaneously inhibiting their work
is to follow the model of the Sierra Leone Truth and Reconciliation Com-
mission's thematic hearings, which explored deep social and historical
causes of the conflict, as well as the event hearings, which focused on par-
ticularly significant events.
Rather than focus on the themes, or in addition to a thematic-based
focus, a separate "historical clarification" committee could be set up whose
sole function would be to perform an historical analysis of the deep causes
and history of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. The aim of this committee
would be to address the more systematic and deeper historical movements
that have fueled the conflict. 132 Having this "historical clarification" com-
mittee meet separately from the Human Rights and Amnesty (perpetrator
and victim) hearings and other institutional hearings would allow those
from the perspective of non-elites (workers, peasants, etc.) in both communities, who at
various points in time may have had a great deal more common ground than they realized).
130 See Mamdani, supra note 66, at 58, 59.
131 Id.
132 See Edward W. Said, Palestinians Under Siege, in THE NEW INTIFADA, supra note 1, at
27, 41 (Roane Carey ed., 2001) (proposing a historical clarification committee to help move
past the impasse of the second intifada, and pointing out that it may be premature for a truth
and reconciliation commission). Israeli new historian Illan Pappe has called for similar work,
at least within Israeli and Palestinian historiography. See Pappe, supra note 44.
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other hearings to focus directly on individual cases of gross human rights
abuse as well as those perpetrated by specific industries and sectors of soci-
ety. This would allow these hearings to concentrate all of their attention on
the primacy of violated individuals, without grander historical arguments
interfering and confusing what is at issue, namely, the suffering of human
beings. I would also expect that this historical clarification committee, per-
haps to consist of Israeli, Palestinian, and other international academics and
intellectuals, would be highly contentious, and thus, if it were to fall short of
expectations-and not manage to write "bridging narratives" as Israeli his-
torian Ilan Pappe proposesm -its lackluster performance would not disrupt
the important work of the testimonials in the other committees.
2. Types of Violations to Consider
Another pillar of the commission's mandate is the decision over
what kinds of human rights violations the commission will consider. In
South Africa, 21,400 victims gave testimony on only gross violations of
human rights, including murder, torture, and kidnapping, whereas an esti-
mated 3.5 million blacks suffered under apartheid legislation. Mamdani
claims that this over-individualization of the apartheid story missed the
more disturbing systematic violations-the social and economic violence
committed against the blacks of South Africa-and allowed the totality of
the machinery of this illegal regime to escape comprehension.
Just as it is not easy to encapsulate the breadth of the historical
causes and developments of the conflict, it is similarly challenging, if not
impossible, to give an accounting for the variety of violations that have kept
its momentum going for decades. Mamdani's precautionary note, however,
is very relevant to the Israeli-Palestinian context, particularly given the sys-
temic nature of the human rights abuses of the Israeli Occupation. If an
IPTC focused solely on gross violations of human rights, such as murder,
kidnapping, or torture, it would miss the real story of the Occupation, with
its pervasive presence in Palestinian life, and the daily symbolic, systemic
violence it visits upon Palestinians on an individual and societal level.
34
This concern, however, comes into conflict with other practical
considerations, such as realistic expectations for the commission's work
capacity and the length of time the commission should remain in opera-
tion.135 The Sierra Leone Commission's additional "event hearings" provide
133 See Pappe, supra note 44.
134 See THE HANDBOOK OF REPARATIONS 8 (Pablo De Grieff ed., 2006). De Grieff takes
Mamdani's point and notes that the way repressive systems tend to make "victims of virtu-
ally all those [subjected] to [them]" suggests that "distributive justice policies leading to the
redress of structural imbalances" are best suited to address such widespread violation. Id.
135 See HAYNER, supra note 77, at 222 (suggesting that Commissions should not remain in
operation for too long a period); See WILSON, supra note 121, at 226 ("Truth commissions do
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a model that could be adopted to help deal with this challenge. In addition to
addressing specific events that impacted large numbers of people, a separate
committee could focus on repetitive violations occurring throughout the
conflict. 36 Daily recurring violations, such as house demolitions, restric-
tions on the freedom of movement, destruction of personal property, dis-
criminatory laws, unlawful detentions, suicide bombings, and other anti-
Jewish or anti-Israeli attacks, were perpetrated by Israeli forces in the
administration of the occupation, but do not rise to the level of gross viola-
tions of human rights. Victims who suffered particular abuses could be
grouped by the nature of the violation incurred, and rather than holding in-
dividual hearings for every house demolition or suicide attack, similarly-
affected individuals could testify or participate in some way at a collective
hearing addressing the shared violation.
3. Reparations: "Vertical Reconciliation"
a. Lessons Learned
Practitioners of transitional justice continue to wrestle with arriving
at pragmatic conceptions of justice, reconciliation, and social repair. One
formulation-the "civic trust" model of reconciliation-has posited that
reconciliation is a societal, rather than an interpersonal phenomenon, and it
describes the situation that obtains when post-conflict citizens can once
again (or for the first time) trust one another as citizens.1 37 This "civic trust"
occurs in two dimensions: horizontal (between citizens) and vertical (be-
tween citizens and institutions of rule).138 As Mamdani suggests, when co-
not function well if they are overloaded, as the South African TRC was, with a variety of
tasks including holding public hearings, writing a report on the past, recommending repara-
tions policy and granting amnesty.").
136 De Grieff argues that the South African Commission left out important categories of
victims:
[T]here were discussions within the TRC about whether to make reparations on
behalf of combatants who died during military actions in situations that did not
constitute clear violations of international humanitarian law; or victims of the rou-
tine violence that accompanied the operation of the social engineering aspects of
apartheid, such as people who died not in political demonstrations but, for exam-
ple, in forced removals; or people who were detained under provisions of the state
of emergency. None of them were eligible for reparations as a class, and arguments
can be made that they should have been.
THE HANDBOOK OF REPARATIONS, supra note 136, at 8.
137 See Reconciliation - International Center for Transitional Justice, supra note 125.
138 According the practitioners of the ICTJ, "civic trust" is more than
relying on a person to do or refrain from doing certain things; it also involves the
expectation of a commitment to shared norms and values. The sense of trust at is-
sue here is not the profound sense of trust characteristic of relations between inti-
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existence is required it is essential to focus on beneficiaries and the institu-
tions of rule from which they have gained advantages over other segments
of society. Accordingly, a major focus of post-conflict reconstruction has to
be on reforming institutions of rule, as they embody a society's values and
perpetuate them through their organization of social life. South African ju-
rist and TRC Commissioner Albie Sachs highlights the deeper importance
of institutional reform as a means of reparation beyond the immediate de-
mands of punishing perpetrators and exposing the truth:
The real reparation we want ties in with the constitution, the vote, with
dignity, land, jobs, and education. If we get all those things and there is a
sense of forward movement and the creation of a nation and a real, shared
dignity in this country, then I think the pressure simply to punish, to penal-
ise and have commissions of truth becomes much less. Although I strongly
support a commission of truth.... the danger is that it should never be a
substitute for ... real dignity and the real overcoming of apartheid. 139
Without lasting reforms to institutions of rule, society cannot stabilize itself
enough to give peace an opportunity to take root and reconciliation to de-
velop between former political enemies.
Pablo De Grieff of the International Center for Transitional Justice
echoes Sachs' sentiments in part, but also makes a compelling argument for
the special place of monetary reparations among the various transitional
measures employed by governments. This special role of monetary repara-
tions is only heightened in many post-conflict societies, which in addition to
overcoming legacies of political violence, must also reconstruct economies,
social services, infrastructure, etc., or create them from scratch. Beyond
mates, but rather, 'civic' trust, which can develop among citizens who are mem-
bers of the same political community but are nonetheless strangers to one another.
Civic trust includes 'horizontal' trust among citizens and also 'vertical' trust be-
tween citizens and their institutions. How is the latter to be understood if trust in-
volves something that is possible only among individuals? To trust an institution
amounts to knowing that its constitutive rules, values, and norms are shared by par-
ticipants and that they regard them as binding.
Id.
139 Elizabeth Kiss, Moral Ambition Within and Beyond Political Constraints: Reflections
on Restorative Justice, in TRUTH V. JUSTICE: THE MORALITY OF TRUTH CONFESSIONS, supra
note 107, at 68, 89; see also Azmi Bishara, Reflections on October 2000: A Landmark in
Jewish-Arab Relations in Israel, J. PALESTINE STUD., Spring 2001, at 54 (offering an elo-
quent exploration of the status of the Palestinian Arabs, an exploration in which Bishara
warns against Israeli attempts at placating the Arab community and at co-opting them, essen-
tially robbing them of their own distinct Arab identity, but more importantly, of true equal-
ity); NADIM N. ROUHANA, PALESTINIAN CITIZENS IN AN ETHNIC JEWISH STATE: IDENTITIES IN
CONFLICT (1997) (exploring the conflicted status of Palestinian Israelis and arguing for a new
civic supra-identity of "Israeli" referring not to the dominant ethnic class, Israeli Jews, but to
all Israeli citizens).
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economic necessity, however, De Grieff makes more philosophical and
pragmatic arguments for the special role of reparations, noting in particular
its victim-centered focus in contrast to other mechanisms that do not really
attend to the needs of victims.
For example, De Grieff argues that criminal justice, even in an ide-
alized situation where it is completely successful (which is virtually impos-
sible due to the numbers of perpetrators and the difficulties with evidence
and other procedural issues), is "in the end, a struggle against perpetrators
rather than an effort on behalf of victims. '' 140 The same can be said, De
Grieff claims, for truth telling. Though potentially providing victims with
closure and the satisfaction of having official acknowledgment of a loved
ones' fate, "in the absence of other positive and tangible manifestations
truth, by itself, can easily be considered as an empty gesture, as cheap and
inconsequential talk."' 4 1 Indeed, Rosalind Shaw notes that nearly all of the
chiefs and local government officials in Sierra Leone to appear before the
truth commission there "ended their testimony with appeals for economic
assistance, suggesting that many of them had testified in the belief that this
would give them access to such assistance.' 42 Similarly, institutional re-
form is by necessity a long-term project that affects victims only indirectly,
whereas monetary compensation can have a more immediate impact:
"[h]ence," De Grieff writes, "it makes sense to think that at least in terms of
potential direct impact on victims, reparations do occupy a special place
among transitional measures."'' 43 De Grieff's research shows that monetary
compensation schemes in several different contexts (he notes Chile and
Germany in particular) have gotten progressively more comprehensive and
complicated in design, and vary significantly based on the context of the
conflicts they are meant to address. 144 As in other areas of truth commission
design, then, this very complex discussion, which will certainly involve
many political power plays, must be something decided among the parties.
We can still learn, however, from South Africa's experiences, as well as
those of other countries.
45
140 THE HANDBOOK OF REPARATIONS, supra note 136, at 2.
141 id.
142 Shaw, supra note 87, at 8.
143 THE HANDBOOK OF REPARATIONS, supra note 136, at 2.
144 De Grieff points to the emerging trend of including the provision of mental health care
in reparations benefits, various proposals to address victims of sexual violence, and ideas
about linking reparations benefits and microfinancing plans "so as to increase the impact of
even modest benefits and to give them some sustainability particularly in economically de-
prived contexts." Id. at 14. This would certainly be applicable in the economically depressed
Palestinian territories, which in recent years have at times teetered on humanitarian disaster-
like economic conditions. Id.
145 Id. at 9; For more on reparations, symbolic and otherwise, in the South African context,
see Ciraj Rassool et al., Burying and Memorialising the Body of Truth: The TRC and Na-
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The SATRC contained a Committee on Reparation and Rehabilita-
tion and held institutional hearings on various sectors of society. Committee
on Reparation and Rehabilitation was charged with the task of developing a
cohesive policy on reparation and restitution in five categories: urgent in-
terim reparation, individual reparation grants, community rehabilitation,
institutional reform, and symbolic reparation. 146 What emerged was a fasci-
nating discussion regarding the tension between the conflicting interests of,
on the one hand, individual compensation and rights, and on the other, reha-
bilitation and collective community empowerment. De Grieff highlights
several principles that should guide designers of truth commissions and
reparations schemes. 147 One such principle worth discussing in depth is
what De Grieff refers to as coherence-both internal and external.
148
Internal coherence describes the internal consistency and support
between various internal aspects of a reparations program. 149 De Grieff sug-
gests that U.S. reparations to Japanese Americans for their treatment during
WWII were more internally coherent than Brazil's reparations; U.S. repara-
tions included both payments and an official apology, whereas Brazil dis-
tributed money without any official acknowledgment of wrongdoing. 50 The
U.S. program, with its close relationship and mutual support between the
various forms of reparations, is preferable, in De Grieff's view, to the Bra-
zilian program, which had less internal consistency.151
External coherence describes the relationship between the repara-
tions programs and other transitional mechanisms, such as criminal justice,
truth telling and institutional reform. 5 2 De Grieff argues that complementar-
ity between the different transitional mechanisms creates the perception that
transitional efforts, "on the whole, satisfy the expectations of citizens.
For example, truth telling without reparations efforts can be seen as an
empty gesture, just as reparations without introspection and inquiry in the
tional Heritage, in AFTER THE TRC, supra note 66, at 115; see also Naomi Roht-Arriaza,
Reparations in the Aftermath of Repression and Mass Violence, in MY NEIGHBOR, MY
ENEMY, supra note 36, at 121.
146 TRUTH AND RECONCILIATION COMMISSION OF SOUTH AFRICA REPORT 180-81 (Susan de
Villiers ed., Bath Press 1999) (1998); see also Warren Buford & Hugo van der Merwe,
Reparations in Southern Africa, 44 CAHIERS D'ETUDES AFRICAINES 263 (2004).
147 See THE HANDBOOK OF REPARATIONS, supra note 136, at 6-13.
148 Id. at 10-11.
149 ld.
"0 Id. at 11.
151 Id.
152 Id.
153 THE HANDBOOK OF REPARATIONS, supra note 136, at 11.
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form of truth telling could be perceived as the state attempting to buy vic-
tims' and their families' "silence or acquiescence."'
' 54
A similar "bidirectional relationship" exists between institutional
reform and reparations efforts, since "democratic reform that is not accom-
panied by any attempt to dignify citizens who were victimized can hardly be
understood."' 55 It also stands to reason that reparative payments will seem
unhelpful and perhaps less legitimate when they are made in the absence of
deeper institutional reforms that address the structural inequities that en-
abled the violence in the first place, and presumably would work against the
repetition of violations.
Finally, De Grieff notes, reparations and criminal justice are also
linked; from the victims' perspective, "especially once a possible moment
of satisfaction derived from the punishment of perpetrators has passed, the
condemnation of a few perpetrators, without any effective effort to posi-
tively redress victims, could be easily seen by victims as a form of more or
less inconsequential revanchism."'' 56 On the other hand, "[r]eparations with-
out any effort to achieve criminal justice may appear to them as nothing
more than blood money."' 57 It should be clear, then, that the transitional
mechanisms must be carefully coordinated with one another so that each
supports the others and together they create the appearance of momentum
toward revolutionary change in the society.
In South Africa's deliberations over the contours of its own repara-
tions programs, several specific questions came straight to the forefront of
national discussions. First, should reparations be symbolic or financial, and
if financial, should there be a monetary package or a service package? They
decided on a well-structured monetary grant, based on indications by vic-
tims surveyed that they preferred monetary to other forms of compensa-
tion. 58 Second, where would they get the money? There were controversial
suggestions that beneficiaries of the apartheid regime (businesses and pri-
vate persons) be obligated to contribute to reparations funds via a one-time
wealth tax.159 Eventually President Mbeki squashed these recommendations,
instead encouraging all South Africans to contribute voluntarily to a Presi-
dent's Fund established to distribute the reparations checks.
Another issue was the power of the TRC to implement its own rec-
ommendations. At the end of the day, it was not granted this broader power,
which lead to great frustration among victims' groups, since beside the ini-
154 Id.
15' Id.
156 Id.
157 Id.
158 Buford & van der Merwe, supra note 149.
159 r-
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tial urgent relief funds paid out, further reparations checks have not been
forthcoming, and victims have been frustrated by their exlusion from the
governance of the President's Fund and the transparency of the management
of the fund. As of April 2006, billions of rand in payments had yet to be
made.160 Further, dissatisfied with holding governmental actors responsible
for their role in the violations of the apartheid regime, victims also launched
an unprecedented lawsuit in the United States under the Alien Tort Claims
Act for compensation for the damages resulting from the collaboration of
twenty-three multinational corporations with the apartheid government.'
16
The case, however, was dismissed in 2004.162
b. Applying the Lessons to an IPTC
In adopting this model for the Israeli-Palestinian situation, I would
propose something unique to accommodate the two-state structure of the
Israeli-Palestinian post-conflict. Perhaps there should be an umbrella com-
mittee including both states, and then two sub-committees, each operating
within the framework of each country, with an expanded mandate concern-
ing institutional reform.
There are several reasons for this proposal. First, because political
stability necessitates that the truth commission would occur after the Final
Status negotiations, it is important to realize that a key component of victim
rehabilitation-compensation-would likely have taken place, but only
partially. This compensation would most likely be limited, in accordance
with U.N. Resolution 194, to reparations paid to refugees and descendants
from the 1948 war. These payments, however, would exclude those inter-
nally displaced by the war, who have since become members of the Arab
sector in Israel (and likely those most affected by the long-standing system-
atic discrimination against Arab citizens in Israel). Even if the Israeli gov-
ernment extended reparations to the rest of the Arab sector in Israel, it
would be restricted to estimated costs incurred by the 1948 displacement
160 According to the Khulumani Support Group, a membership organization representing
over fifty thousand victims of apartheid, the reparations process has been tragically frustrat-
ing for victims. See Dr. Marjorie Jobson, Acting Director, Khulumani Support Group, The
TRC: Ten Years On (Apr. 21, 2006), available at http://www.khulumani.net/component/
optioncomdocman/task,cat view/gid,97/ltemid, 113/.
161 Id.
162 See In re S. African Apartheid Litig., 346 F. Supp. 2d 538 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) (granting
defendant corporations' motions to dismiss on finding, inter alia, that none of plaintiffs'
theories supported jurisdiction under the ATCA, specifically that no facts had been pleaded
that would allow the court to find the corporations engaged in state action by acting under
color of law with the apartheid regime in South Africa, because merely defending their prem-
ises from uprisings did not alone constitute joint action with the apartheid regime).
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and would not cover the systematic injustices suffered by the Arab sector as
Israeli citizens over the last half century.
Furthermore, Israeli military operations in the Occupied Territories
since the start of the second intifada have significantly damaged public in-
stitutions and infrastructure-such costs would also not be included in an
initial calculation of compensation for Palestinian refugees, nor would those
damages resulting from the first intifada, the Palestinian nationalist revolt
that raged from 1987 until the Oslo process began.163 There would also not
likely be discussion on reparations for Jewish Israeli victims of attacks car-
ried out by Palestinian militant organizations.
The umbrella committee could carry out these further calculations
and negotiations. The umbrella committee would also be responsible for
establishing joint Israeli-Palestinian peace initiatives, specifically focusing
on educational curricula and cultural projects, or perhaps for creating an
international foundation that can support coexistence initiatives in the fu-
ture. It may also be the appropriate place to carry out much of the "coopera-
163 The Knesset has tried to legislate impunity for Israel regarding Palestinian civil claims
for damages arising out of the Occupation. It passed a bill to curb the ability of Palestinians
hurt by the first intifada from getting compensation from Israel. Up to now, six thousand
claims have been filled by Palestinians against Israel, with nine hundred cases still pending.
Israel has already paid three hundred million shekels to compensate for physical injuries and
property damage sustained during the first intifada. The proposed bill, which is called the
"Law for Handling of Claims Related to IDF Activity in Judea and Samaria," has been in the
works since 1992. One motivation for the bill, which some view as superfluous because most
claims are rejected anyway (in 1997, 82% were rejected), is to curb fraudulent claims. See
Gideon Alon, The Cost of the First Intifada Still Mounts, HA'ARETZ, June 24, 2002.
Other legislation has passed in relation to the current intifada, but it is constitutionality under
review by the Israeli Supreme Court. In July 2005, the Knesset passed the fifth amendment
(dubbed the "intifada law") to the Civil Torts (Liability of the State) Law, designed to exon-
erate Israel from any responsibility for injury caused to any citizen of an enemy state or
resident of hostile territory. As of 2002, over six hundred claims had been filed for the
amounts of hundreds of millions of shekels. Whereas the earlier bill simply limits the ability
of Palestinians to file claims (particularly the statute of limitations), the new bill intends to
deprive Palestinians of any right to claim compensation for damages caused by the IDF. The
amended law grants the Minister of Defense the authority to proclaim any area outside of the
state of Israel a "Conflict Zone," even if no war-related activity has occurred there. This
proclamation denies those who sustain injury within the area the right to seek compensation
from Israeli courts. The Law operates retroactively in cases of damages sustained since Sep-
tember 29, 2000, the date of the outbreak of the Second Intifada, and for claims already
pending before the courts. In September 2005, nine human rights organizations collectively
brought suit challenging the law as in contravention not only of international humanitarian
law and international human rights law, but also of Israel's Basic Law: Human Dignity and
Liberty, and therefore unconstitutional. See Nine Human Rights Organizations Petition the
High Court of Justice: Law Preventing Palestinians from Claiming Compensation from the
State of Israel is Unconstitutional and Thus Void, ASS'N C.R. ISRAEL, Sept. 1, 2005, http://
www.acri.org.il/english-acri/engine/story.asp?id=223.
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tive" work proposed in the Oslo accords. 64 If backed by international funds
to support its continued work, the establishment of this committee would
serve to address a great deal of the criticism of the South African TRC,
namely, that its following up, especially in regard to reparations, has been
poor. This is primarily due to the fact that the South African TRC did not
have the power to implement reparations, but rather, only to make recom-
mendations for their implementation to the President.
Given the likely two-state resolution of the conflict, it is necessary
to address other questions of institutional reform in the distinct national
contexts, since after the creation of a separate Palestinian state, it is Pales-
tinians and their institutions of rule that must inculcate a culture of rule of
law and human rights within Palestinian society, just as Israeli institutions
have a similar function in Israeli society. The two national subcommittees
would operate individually within each country and would concentrate on
institutional reform and rehabilitation of citizens within state boundaries.
c. Reforming Israeli Institutions: Addressing Systemic Discrimination
Against Arab Israelis/Palestinian Israelis
Unlike the blacks of South Africa during apartheid, Arabs in Israel
(or as some prefer to be called, Palestinian Israelis or Israeli Palestinians),
have enjoyed full citizenship for a good portion of the historic duration of
the conflict. However, despite their de jure status as full citizens, they have
nonetheless been systematically discriminated against (mainly through un-
equal budget allocations), and thus, are not de facto equal citizens of the
State of Israel like their Jewish counterparts. Though it is long overdue, the
Israeli government has recently started to address these historic inequalities.
A report, After the Rift: New Directions for Government Policies
Towards the Arabs in Israel, submitted to then Israeli Prime Minister Ehud
Barak on November 28, 2000, directed itself at addressing long-term Arab
dissatisfaction within Israel in order to make recommendations for how
policy changes may improve the Arabs' situation. 165 Among its many im-
164 See Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Declaration of Principles on Interim Self-
Government Arrangements, arts. 10, 11, apps. 3, 4 (Sept. 13, 1993), http://www.mfa.gov.il/
MFA/Peace+Process/Guide+to+the+Peace+Process/Declaration+of+Principles.htm.
165 See DAN RABINOWITZ ET AL., AFTER THE RIFT: NEW DIRECTIONS FOR GOVERNMENT
POLICY TOWARDS THE ARAB POPULATION IN ISRAEL (2000) [hereinafter RIFT REPORT]. The
report, a product of a collective effort of twenty-five Israeli academics (fourteen Jewish,
eleven Arab), was authored in the immediate aftermath of the deaths of thirteen Arab Israelis
who were shot by Israeli policemen during riots in October of 2000 (subsequently, the Or
Commission of Inquiry was initiated to investigate the deaths and is currently in the process
of handing out "warnings" to certain state officials, including former Prime Minister Barak,
informing them that damaging information about them has been uncovered by the inquiry).
The report consists of six papers addressing the following issues: (1) land and planning; (2)
local authorities and welfare services; (3) identity and civic-cultural inclusion; (4) schooling
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portant recommendations, is the recognition of the tension between individ-
ual and collective rights, and the importance of developing a "constitutional
and legislative agenda" that recognize a group's "expectations as a collec-
tive." Noting Israel's "almost principled refusal to address the historical
sources of present discontent," the paper recommends the establishment of
"laws and jurisprudence of reconciliation" (similar to Australia's 'jurispru-
dence of regret" aimed at acknowledging abuses suffered by the Aboriginal
population there). In addition to reparations for individuals, and comprehen-
sive institutional reform for the betterment of the community, there is also a
need for symbolic reparation. 166 All of these instruments and these "affirma-
tive actions" are intended to repair an essential power imbalance, to reverse
the inequities of the past-to stop the lies from circulating and make it so
Israelis can no longer say, "I didn't know." These steps are in fact already
underway, as is evident not only by the Or Commission 167 and the After the
Rift report in 2000-2001, but also by a recent resolution by the World Zion-
ist Congress, which recognizes that "[t]here is no dispute on the major gap
between Israeli Arab, Druse and Circassian citizens, and Jewish Israeli citi-
zens in a wide range of measurements of quality of life, economy, public
sector resources, integration within governmental and public institutions,"
and calls upon the Israeli government "to act urgently to implement its deci-
and further education; (5) employment and economic development; and (6) law and society.
Each section is co-authored by a team of Jewish and Arab specialists. For a review of the
report, see Elia Zureik, Review Essay: Being Palestinian in Israel, J. PALESTINE STUD.,
Spring 2001, at 88. Subsequently, in 2006, a coalition of Palestinian Israeli politicians, intel-
lectuals, and civil society organizations released a report detailing its vision for the future of
the state. The coalition argued that
Defining the Israeli State as a Jewish State and exploiting democracy in the service
of its Jewishness excludes us, and creates tension between us and the nature and
essence of the State. Therefore, we call for a Consensual Democratic system that
enables us to be fully active in the decision-making process and guarantee our in-
dividual and collective, civil, historic, and national rights.
See The National Committee for the Heads of the Local Arab Councils in Israel, The Future
Vision of the Palestinian Arabs in Israel (2006), at 3, at http://www.mossawacenter.org/file
s/files/File/Reports/2006/Future%2OVision%20(English).pdf.
For more on Israeli discriminatory policies and a particularly philosophical view, see Bis-
hara, supra note 142; see also Major Findings of Adalah's Report to the UN Committee on
the Elimination of Racial Discrimination (Mar. 1998), http://www.adalah.org/eng/
publications/violations.htm.
166 The symbolic community reparation proposed in South Africa consisted of renaming
buildings and streets, constructing monuments and museums, and instituting "National Day
of Remembrance" to further reconciliation.
167 See infra note 173.
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sions to reduce the gaps between the Arab citizens and the Jewish citizens in
the State of Israel in all areas of life."
' 168
Other than its discriminatory practices against its Arab population
(and similar but not nearly as harsh practices against Druze, Mizrahim
[Jews of Middle Eastern descent], immigrants, and migrant workers), the
state of Israeli democracy is in relative good health; there exists a strong
civil society, transparent democratic institutions, and freedom of the press.
There is a highly developed respect for the rule of law, 169 and evolved
mechanisms to ensure transparency and accountability, 70 though when it
168 Resolutions of the Thirty-Fifth Zionist Congress, Res. 53 (Jun. 19-22, 2006), http://
www.jewishagency.org/NR/rdonlyres/F7D58228-2B 1E-4D71-91F3-B9C40E612CD2/29961
/Resolutions35thZionistCongress.doc.
169 The Israeli Supreme Court has made several bold and respected decisions in recent
years as it attempts to engage the conflict. Beyond its ruling on the Security
Fence/Separation Barrier, which was arguably much more measured and careful in applying
international law than the International Court of Justice's ruling, the Court also produced a
firm ruling on the use of Palestinians as "human shields," effectively sticking its neck deep
within military affairs. See Supreme Court Prohibits the Use of Palestinians as Human
Shields During IDF Military Operations, ASS'N C.R. ISRAEL, Dec. 22, 2005,
http://www.acri.org.il/english-acri/engine/story.asp?id=250. Further, the definition of respect
for the rule of law should include not simply the review of illegal government actions, but
also, the implementation of a court's review of those acts. On this front, the Supreme Court
has set strong precedent. Following a subsequent decision on the Fence/Wall's impact on the
Palestinian town of Tzofin, Israeli Defense Minister Amir Peretz ordered a thorough review
of the Fence's/Wall's route, demanding that his legal team report on any other cases like
Tzofin where the planned expansion of settlements dictates the route of the Fence/Wall. See
Americans for Peace Now, Middle East Peace Reports, http://www.peacenow.org/mepr.asp?r
id=&cid=2686.
170 Several elected officials have been investigated in the last decade for electoral violations
in fundraising, embezzlement of public funds, and sexual harassment, etc. The politics can be
as dirty as they are elsewhere, but there are certainly instruments to monitor and check over-
sight. While the Israeli judiciary is structurally in good shape, and the Israeli Supreme Court
has been generally progressive, it continues to exhibit its political ties to the ethnic Jewish
majority, tending to define dangers to Jewish hegemony as dangers to "national security,"
again, citing the prolonged state of emergency induced by the Arab-Israeli conflict as justifi-
cation. See Gad Barzilai, Political Institutions and Conflict Resolution: The Israeli Supreme
Court and the Peace Process, in MIDDLE EAST PEACE PROCESS, supra note 7, at 87, 90. In
addition, there have been several Official Commissions of Inquiry used to investigate par-
ticularly important events and incidents of government oversight or abuse. Most notable was
The Kahan Commission, established to investigate claims of Israeli negligence in preventing
the massacre of Palestinian refugees by Christian Phalangists in the Sabra and Shatilla camps
in Lebanon. The Commission found then Defense Minister Ariel Sharon "indirectly respon-
sible" for the massacres, and banned him from ever holding military office again (although
he was elected to the Premiership in 2000). A more recent commission, the Or Commission,
investigated the deaths of thirteen Arab Israeli citizens following the outbreak of the Second
Intifada. For background on the Or commission, see online coverage, Ha'aretz Daily News-
paper Israel, http://www.haaretz.com; see also ADALAH: THE LEGAL CENTER FOR ARAB
MINORITY RIGHTS IN ISRAEL, ADALAH: COMMISSION OF INQUIRY, http://www.adalah.org/
eng/commission.php (last visited Jan. 12, 2007).
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comes to Palestinian claims against Israeli military forces, investigations are
less frequent and less thorough. 171 The same cannot be said, however, for
the Palestinian Authority.
d. Reforming Palestinian Institutions: Overcoming Legacies of
Corruption and Internal Division
Since its inception, the Palestinian Liberation Organization's char-
ter has declared its intention to establish a secular democratic state for the
Palestinian people. In practice, however, the PA has been anything but de-
mocratic. Sara Roy notes that "the PA's disrespect for its own people, as
seen in its consistent disregard for human rights and the rule of law, and its
authoritarianism and repression, have had a pernicious effect on the econ-
omy and society alike.' 72 With the eventual withdrawal of Israeli forces
and settlements from the West Bank, perhaps the most dangerous threat to
future Israeli-Palestinian political settlement and to long-term reconciliation
and regional stability is the prospect that the future Palestinian state will not
realize its democratic aspirations.
Though Hamas' commitment to negotiation and compromise with
Israel is questionable, 173 the fact that they were elected through democratic
elections should be taken as a token of hope given the PA's authoritarian
history. 174 However, holding free elections is only the barest minimum of
171 See, e.g., The "Roadmap, "supra note 94, at 6. ("According to statistics of the Associa-
tion of Civil Rights in Israel (ACRI), from September 2000 to December 29, 2002, only
thirty cases involving the unlawful use of lethal force have been fully investigated by the
Israel Defense Forces (IDF), and only five resulted in prosecutions before military courts.").
HRW points to several sources for these figures, and notes that the Israeli military did not
respond to requests for updating them. Id.
172 Roy, supra note 2, at 93. As discussed above, some analysts consider Hamas meteoric
rise to power to be a reaction to Fatah's years of mismanagement and corruption at the head
of the PA. See supra note 27. The Palestinian "street's" evaluation of the status of democ-
racy, PA performance and the levels of corruption did drastically decrease over time, particu-
larly once the second intifada began. While in 1996, at the peak of the peace process, 43% of
Palestinians surveyed evaluated the status of Palestinian democracy and human rights posi-
tively, by 2000-2001, this percentage more than halved itself to roughly 21%. Evaluation of
PA institutional performance similarly plummeted from 64% in 1996 to 44% in 2000. See
generally Khalil Shikaki, PALESTINIAN CENTER FOR POLICY AND SURVEY RESEARCH (PSR),
http://www.pcpsr.org/survey/survey.htm (last visited Jan. 12, 2007).
173 As of this writing, Hamas had rejected explicitly recognizing Israel, a possibility ad-
vanced as part of the national unity government proposed by Palestinian Authority President
Mahmoud Abbas. See Palestinians Split on Unity Plan, BBC NEWS, Sept. 22, 2006,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middleeast/5369496.stnr
174 For more on the autocratic rule of the Palestinian Authority, see Yezid Sayigh & Khalil
Shikaki, Independent Task Force Report: Strengthening Palestinian Public Institutions (June
28, 1999) (working paper, Council on Foreign Relations), available at http://www.ciaonet.
org/conf/cfrl9; see also Rema Hamniami & Salim Tamari, The Second Uprising: End or
New Beginning?, J. PALESTINE STUD., Winter 2001, at 19 (noting that "the ongoing elision of
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what is required for a stable democracy, and while Hamas rose to power
based on its track record for transparent and accountable provision of social
services, it remains to be seen (as in other countries in the Middle East)
whether Islamist political movements can be comfortably reconciled with
democratic institutions of rule.
75
Thus, the future Palestinian state has a great deal of work ahead of
itself, and once the Israeli occupation ends, the PA must seize the opportu-
nity to reform itself and improve the life of its people. 76 Arguably, this
should have already happened, and need not wait for the end of the con-
flict.1 77 The institutional committee within Palestine could focus on these
questions of reform, and in the process, present the Palestinian public with a
record of the abuses perpetrated against it by its own leaders during the Oslo
period, most notably, the embezzlement of international aid, 178 the repres-
sive judicial system. 179
D. Other Design Issues
The other important design decisions for an IPTC include what kind
of amnesty will be offered; the procedural operation of the commission in-
cluding the integration of both Israeli and Palestinian judiciaries; the degree
political and civil institutions" under PA rule has resulted in "the dilution of the rule of law
and democratically elected institutions").
175 See Nathan J. Brown et al., Islamist Movements and the Democratic Process in the Arab
World. Exploring the Gray Zones, CARNEGIE ENDOWMENT FOR INT'L PEACE PAPER, Mar.
2006, at 3, available at http://www.carnegieendowment.org/files/cp_67_grayzonesfinal.pdf.
Though they do not give an extensive treatment to Hamas, the overall conclusion drawn from
other contexts of Islamists' interactions with political systems elsewhere in the region sug-
gests that profound ambiguities persist in the embrace by these groups of democratic habits
of mind, and it remains unclear whether the rise of Islamist movements will lead "the coun-
tries of the Arab world, finally, toward democracy or, conversely, to a new form of authori-
tarianism with an Islamic character." Id. at 17.
176 For an analysis of Palestinian reform efforts prior to Hamas' election, see Nathan J.
Brown, Evaluating Palestinian Reform, The Carnegie Endowment for International Peace,
Carnegie Paper No. 59, May 2005, available at http://www.carnegieendowment.org/public
ations/index.cfm?fa=view&id= 6974.
177 See NATAN SHARANSKY & RON DERMER, THE CASE FOR DEMOCRACY: THE POWER OF
FREEDOM TO OVERCOME TYRANNY AND TERROR 277 (Public Affairs, 2004). The difficulty
with Sharansky's approach, however, is that he does not recognize the tremendous difficulty
in inculcating democratic habits of mind in a society that lives in a state of siege, though this
rebuttal does not excuse the complete failure of the Palestinian leadership in creating viable
democratic institutions in the Palestinian Authority.
178 The scope of this issue is too vast to summarize. For a comprehensive discussion, see
EU Funding of the Palestinian Authority, http://www.eufunding.org/accountability/default.
html (last visited Jan. 12, 2007).
179 See, e.g., Justice Undermined, supra note 93 (noting the general arbitrary arrest and
detention as well as other criticisms of the judicial system).
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of publicity of the commission's work; and other considerations that will
reflect upon the commission's legitimacy, such as who will serve as the
commissioners. These detailed regime design choices are best dealt with by
the parties themselves and lie beyond the scope of this article. A few words,
however, will be offered on the important elements of amnesty, transpar-
ency, and outreach.
1. Amnesty and Naming Names
The amnesty decision, and the more general decision to "name
names," is not a simple nor easy one and in many ways lies at the crux of
the dilemmas of pursuing transitional justice.1 80 As Priscilla Hayner notes,
many truth commissions' terms of reference have not specifically addressed
this question, thereby effectively leaving the decision to the commissioners
themselves. Despite the fact that "most commissions have had the power to
name perpetrators," only a handful of commissions have chosen to do so,
including "El Salvador, Chad, the second commission of the African Na-
tional Congress [in South Africa], and the South African Truth and Recon-
ciliation Commission.' ', 8' As Hayner points out, the fight over naming
names lies at the junction of competing rights: one the one hand, due proc-
ess concerns that those accused of crimes have a full hearing with proper
evidentiary standards and other protective measures in which they can de-
fend themselves before being pronounced guilty, and on the other, the im-
pulse for justice and revealing the truth when there is clear evidence of an
individuals' guilt.1 82 There is also the larger philosophical debate between
those who see "justice" (retributive justice) as necessary for any society to
move forward and, therefore, disparage granting amnesty and the "truth as
justice" paradigm of which it plays a central role as a woeful compromise of
the rights of victims, and those who embrace amnesties because of their
utility as truth-acquiring tools. 183 In South Africa, individualized amnesties
were extended to motivate perpetrators to step forward and tell the truth,
thereby contributing to the historical record of the truth commission and the
narrative history of the abuses of the apartheid regime. Amnesties were
granted upon an applicant's willingness to testify and only upon a showing
that the acts were politically motivated.
180 See HAYNER, supra note 77, at 107 (discussing the controversy over whether to name
publicly those "responsible for human rights crimes").
181 Id. at 107-08.
182 See id. at 107.
183 See supra notes 77-78 and accompanying text.
[Vol. 38:281
TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE
It is perhaps quixotic to criticize amnesties from the perspective of
legalistic, formalized justice, 184 since this is really to compare two different
forms of justice (retributive and restorative). 185 Once transitional regimes
have placed the recovery of the truth about past abuses over the prerogative
to punish perpetrators, it does not make sense to then criticize commissions
for not reaching the standards of formalized justice, in terms of due process
protections and evidentiary standards, as would be obtained in formal
criminal courts, because the accused is not going to be punished.
However, it is also important to bear in mind that truth commissions
compete with popular conceptions of justice. Anthropologists observing
these commissions conclude that so long as they attempt to substitute recon-
ciliation efforts, or "reconciliation talk" in the place of criminal prosecu-
tions, such gestures will unfailingly be "resisted by some victims and de-
nounced as a 'sell-out' by informal justice institutions.' 86 Similarly,
privileging this form of "truth-telling" on a national scale may also find
resistance by those who wish to "forgive and forget," as was the case in
Sierra Leone. Rosalind Shaw observes that the Sierra Leone TRC "set itself
in opposition to widespread local practices of social reconstruction as for-
getting by valorizing verbally discursive remembering as the only road to
reconciliation and peace.' 87 This exclusionary approach backfired, accord-
ing to Shaw, who concludes that the Sierra Leone case demonstrates that
even when a truth commission is demanded and embraced by local NGOs,
its failure to take seriously and to build upon local practices of healing and
184 For such a critique, see Van Zyl Slabbert, supra note 79, at 71 (questioning whether
reconciliatory truth can be attained solely through legal processes and without personal con-
fession).
185 For essays defending the theoretical foundations of the TRC's work, see Boraine, supra
note 79, at 73; see also Albie Sachs, His Name was Henry, in AFTER THE TRC, supra note
66, at 94.
186 WILSON, supra note 121. Wilson argues that the "reconciliation talk" of the SATRC
undermined the very human rights culture that the commissioners were attempting to create,
because at the foundation of a human rights culture is the notion of accountability, and here
the TRC was letting perpetrators off the hook for their apartheid crimes. See id. at 228
("[I]ntemational human rights treaties [hold] that those responsible for gross human rights
violations must be brought before a court of law and held accountable."). These overtones of
forgiveness were not readily accepted in the townships, because it conflicted with local con-
ceptions of retribution and also because there were insufficient efforts to engage individuals
in communities in constructive reconciliation work. See id. at 227 ("TRC hearings were often
little more than a symbolic and ritualized performance with a weak impact on vengeance in
urban townships. The transfer of values from an elite to the masses was uneven and equivo-
cal .... [There was no] attempt to facilitate victim-offender mediation between individuals,
either by the TRC itself, or through the many conflict resolution non-governmental organiza-
tions available.").
187 Shaw, supra note 87, at 11.
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reintegration can undermine its effectiveness.188 Thus, as Wilson concludes,
"human rights institutions ignore popular conceptualizations of justice at
their own peril."'
8 9
At the end of the day, the decision over whether to name names or
to offer any form of amnesty will be an intensely political one. As noted
above, the choice in South Africa was between offering the individualized
amnesty or not having a democratic transition, and instead, heading for
war.' 90 Still, in Sierra Leone the preference expressed was to keep discus-
sion of the war and its effects within households and to not bring it out into
the street, for fear that such public invocation of the past would lead to more
violence in the future.' 9' As this discussion shows, the decision to encour-
age truth-telling and to provide amnesties to encourage this behavior is
shaped by context and politics.
2. Transparency
Though it might seem to make perfect sense for an IPTC's work to
be open and transparent to the public, not all truth commissions have, in
fact, met this standard in their operation. Beyond widely distributing its
findings to make the largest possible segment of the post-conflict citizenry
aware of its work, transparency is essential because it is a performance of
the better governance to follow in the post-conflict period. In other words,
the manner in which a truth commission carries out its work can serve as a
model for future institutions, thereby reversing the prior pattern of behavior.
Ruti Teitel notes that in the case of Chile, the president reviewed
the findings of the truth commission in the same large stadium where much
of the killings and repression took place. 192 The symbolic power of the
president, embodying the nation to apologize to those who had been marked
as "enemies of the state" 196 and subverting the meaning of the site of former
state violence, is truly powerful. The SATRC had public hearings devoted
to victims' testimony and broadcast these hearings, which were often held at
places formerly symbolic of white power. Because hearings were open,
survivors, with the assistance of lawyers, could challenge the amnesty ap-
plications by questioning the amnesty applicant's version of the events. In
addition, an Investigative Unit provided limited research into the cases prior
to the hearing, enabling Committee members and lawyers representing sur-
vivors to cross-examine the applicants to ensure for accuracy. The exact
scope of the survivors' rights to challenge were not clearly demarcated in
' See id. at 7.
189 WILSON, supra note 121.
190 See MBEKI supra note 88.
191 Shaw, supra note 87, at 9.
192 RuTI G. TEITEL, TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE 84 (2000).
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the Truth and Reconciliation Act, and an IPTC should clarify explicitly in
its mandate what role can be made for survivors and other participants in the
perpetrator and victim hearings. 1
93
3. Outreach
Transparent proceedings and publication of the commission's work
are only first steps, however. As Richard Wilson argues, "for all their media
coverage, TRC hearings were often little more than a symbolic and ritual-
ized performance with a weak impact on vengeance in urban townships.
The transfer of values from an elite to the masses was uneven and equivo-
cal."'194 Thus, while the TRC was ever-present in the public's attention,
thanks to the extensive media coverage,' 95 Wilson's chief criticism is that
there was not enough follow-up with concrete mechanisms to pursue con-
flict resolution on the community level. Thus, even in an age of intense me-
dia coverage, transparency is only a necessary, but far from sufficient
element in making a commission's work have broader effects in society.
With this in mind, architects of an IPTC would need to think crea-
tively about engaging the populations beyond the ritualistic displays of em-
pathy and compassion that might ensue at the victim-perpetrator hearings.
The lack of appropriate outreach mechanisms may have permanently tar-
nished the lasting legacy of the ICTY and ICTR. 196 But outreach properly
should consist of far more than merely updating citizens of recent develop-
ments in the truth commission. Ideally, outreach would consist of affirma-
193 Therese Abrahamsen & Hugo van der Merwe, Reconciliation Through Amnesty? Am-
nesty Applicants' Views of the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission, CENTRE
FOR STUDY OF VIOLENCE & RECONCILIATION, n.5, http://www.csvr.org.za/papers/paptahv.
htm#note5.
194 WILSON, supra note 121, at 227.
195 James Gibson attributes part of the TRC's success to this media saturation in which the
African Broadcast Corporation aired special reports on the TRC every Sunday from April
1996 until March 1998, often scoring among the highest ratings on South African television.
This exposure, furthermore, was "miniscule in comparison to radio exposure, which is cru-
cial since radio is the most widely available information medium for most South Africans."
See James L. Gibson, The Contributions of Truth to Reconciliation: Lessons from South
Africa, 50 J. CONFLICT RESOL. 409, 416 (2006) [hereinafter Contributions of Truth to Recon-
ciliation]; see also JAMES GIBSON, OVERCOMING APARTHEID: CAN TRUTH AND RECONCILE A
DIVIDED NATION? (2004).
196 See supra note 113. As a means of repairing the damage done, or rather, the lack of
positive effects, Laurel Fletcher has proposed that international tribunals implement correc-
tive practices. First, she proposes, judges should write opinions in such a way as to give
greater attention to the role of bystanders in crimes against humanity. Second, tribunals
should enhance their outreach programs to not only inform local populations about the work-
ings of international liberal legalistic justice as they currently do, but also to "correct any
misperceptions that tribunal opinions exonerate the unindicted or that only those who com-
mitted criminal acts contributed to the cataclysm." See Fletcher, supra note 100, at 1090-92.
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tive steps to filter the lessons learned from the hearings down to the institu-
tions and social actors for whom they are most relevant. This would include
changes to educational curricula and the textbooks used in Israeli and Pales-
tinian schools,' 97 to public media campaigns informing and sensitizing peo-
ple to the mission and goals of the truth commission. Outreach efforts
should also tap into the grassroots peace and reconciliation movement that
has started in the absence of more official processes; 98 these activists and
ordinary citizens comprise the vanguard of social change around the issue of
the conflict and could contribute significantly to helping make the commis-
sion's work resonate with average Israelis and Palestinians who may have
been shielded from the worst effects of the conflict.' 99
Another important element that should be considered under the ru-
bric of outreach is follow-up. Both in its failure to engage local populations
and its lack of a mandate to actually implement its own recommendations,
particularly regarding the reparations schema it devised, the South African
TRC fell short of its bold ambitions. The Sierra Leone Truth Commission,
perhaps mindful of this shortfall, has been empowered to do more.
As Priscilla Hayner notes, the Truth and Reconciliation Act in Si-
erra Leone "sets out specific follow-up procedures that are stronger than
those of previous truth commissions, and it commits the government to ful-
197 For discussion of the way Israeli and Palestinian textbooks and curricula have helped
shape Israeli and Palestinian national and civic identity, see Brown, supra note 41. Brown
deals with the international controversy over the charges that the Palestinian textbooks in-
cited hatred of Israel and Jews, which he claims "stemmed largely from an attempt to hold
Palestinians responsible for the content of Egyptian and Jordanian books that were used
while the [Palestinian National Authority] authored its own." Id. at 228 (footnote omitted).
Regarding the treatment of Jews in the textbooks, Brown writes, "the [Palestinian National
Authority] textbooks are more remarkable for their omissions than for their content. Palestin-
ian schools do not teach hate through their books .... ." Id. at 240-41. See also NATHAN
BROWN, PALESTINIAN POLITIcS AFTER THE OSLo ACCORDS: RESUMING ARAB PALESTINE 240
(2003) (noting that Palestinian textbooks are commonly "a politically attractive target" in the
United States for "wildly inaccurate charges"). On Israel, see Naveh, supra note 40. As
Naveh points out, a new history curriculum was introduced in Israel in 1995 that sought to
expose students to new historiography, to deter dogmatism, imbue critical thinking skills and
promote tolerance, but still failed to fully recognize the plight of Arab Israelis (Palestinian
Israelis) or the particular narratives of Israel's over one million Russian immigrants. See id.
at 265-66.
198 See infra Part IV.B.2.
199 See Fletcher, supra note 100, at 1091-92 (noting that the Special Court for Sierra
Leone's Outreach Program has a very broad approach to public engagement, including
awareness building among legal professionals, but also among the armed forces and the
police, in schools, and colleges, and has "[t]hrough a series of Victim Commemoration Con-
ferences ... brought together members of government and civil society from the local, na-
tional, and international level to discuss and address concerns about the court").
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filling the TRC's recommendations." 200 Specifically, the Act calls upon the
President to appoint a follow-up committee comprised of national and inter-
national members who will write quarterly public reports on the status of
implementation of the TRC's recommendations. In addition, the govern-
ment itself is required to submit quarterly reports on the steps it has taken to
fulfill the commission's recommendations. All of these reports will be made
available to the public.
In short, it is difficult to imagine an IPTC being successful unless it
comes to occupy a permanent place in each society's collective psyche for
at least the duration of its work, if not longer. This can only be accom-
plished with affirmative outreach efforts and constant engagement with civil
society and the media.
V. REASSESSING THE POWER OF TRUTH COMMISSIONS
A. Legal Stagecraft and the Uncertainties of Collective Memory
The above discussion touched upon what an IPTC might look like
and how it might function, but it is still unclear what the nature of its exis-
tence would be within the nation (or between nations). I have thus far rested
on the unspoken assumption that a truth commission actually can lead to
reconciliation, to the "peace beyond the peace process" that I claim is re-
quired for Israelis and Palestinians to co-exist in the post-conflict reality.
But it is far from proven that truth commissions always contribute to recon-
ciliation.0 l So we must ask challenging questions about how truth commis-
200 See PRISCILLA HAYNER, THE SIERRA LEONE TRUTH AND RECONCILIATION COMMISSION:
REVIEWING THE FIRST YEAR 6 (2004), http://www.ictj.org/images/content/1/0/100.pdf.
201 The research from South Africa in this regard is cautiously optimistic. See Contribu-
tions of Truth to Reconciliation, supra note 199, at 410. Gibson claims:
Based on an analysis of a representative sample of ordinary South Africans, that
inquiry concludes that truth and reconciliation are connected, that truth (as prom-
ulgated by the TRC) did not undermine reconciliation within any of the groups in
South Africa, and that for whites, Coloured people, and those of Asian origin, truth
may actually have caused reconciliation. And among at least some blacks-those
who are not religious-truth also seemed to facilitate reconciliation. The truth and
reconciliation process was certainly costly, in terms of both money and in the fail-
ure to produce retributive justice. But the clear conclusion of that research is that
the truth and reconciliation process was worth its considerable price because it con-
tributed positively to the initiation of democratic reform in South Africa.
Id. (citations omitted). Gibson also contends, albeit with less certainty, that "those subscrib-
ing to the TRC's truth are more likely to be reconciled." Id. at 414. Gibson also notes, how-
ever, that it may be that the TRC itself was merely an effect of the existing cultural and po-
litical institutions present in South Africa (political pluralism and a rule of law culture) which
suggests that the reconciliation process would have occurred with or without the TRC's
work. Id. at 411. As a reviewer of Gibson's book-length work notes, however, these causal
arguments are extremely complicated and the proper methodology and evidence needed to
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sions are experienced by those involved and whether they aid in the project
of reconciliation between political others, allowing them to evolve into post-
conflict citizens.
As mentioned above, scholars of transitional justice have started re-
visiting earlier assumptions about the nature of political transitions and the
possibilities for social reconstruction in the aftermath of mass atrocity.
20 2
The most current scholarship suggests that we must not take anything for
granted in a transitional situation, as backsliding into conflict always offers
an easy way of deferring more difficult but necessary political compro-
mises. The ultimate question of reconciliation is inextricably tied to interre-
lated questions of identity, collective memory, and the meta-narrative of
nations.2 °3 As such, the work is always messy, contingent, and hopelessly
fragile, and so there can be no hard science to constructing a post-conflict
future wherein true reconciliation can take root, as different segments of
different communities will process the history of the conflict in vastly dif-
ferent ways.2°4
accurately support these claims are elusive, though Gibson does an admirable job at mitigat-
ing some of the difficulties. See David Backer, Book Review: Gibson, J.L. (2005). Overcom-
ing Apartheid: Can Truth Reconcile a Divided Nation?, 39 CoMP. POL. STuD. 9, 1157-68
(2006).
202 See generally My NEIGHBOR, MY ENEMY, supra note 36; Shaw, supra note 87; WILSON,
supra note 121; Contributions of Truth to Reconciliation, supra note 199.
203 See Ernest Renan, What Is a Nation?, Lecture at the Sorbonne (Mar. 11, 1882), in
BECOMING NATIONAL: A READER 42, 45 (Geoff Eley & Ronald Grigor Suny eds., 1996),
available at http://www.nationalismproject.org/what/renan.htm (discussing the role of mem-
ory in nation-making, specifically how exploring original acts of violence can be a danger to
nationalist projects); see also Jacques Derrida, Interpretations at War: Kant, the Jew, the
German, in ACTS OF RELIGION 135, 184-85 (Gil Anidjar ed., 2002).
204 See Stover & Weinstein, Conclusion, supra note 99, at 326. Stover and Weinstein argue
that:
[S]ocial reconstruction commences at varying times for different sectors of society.
An individual's receptivity to social change, for example, may vary or be wholly
absent depending on his or her experiences of war, exposure to trauma, and eco-
nomic status, as well as whether he or she was a perpetrator, accomplice, victim, or
bystander. Similarly, some segments of communities, hardwired to their nationalist
ideologies, may never be receptive to change, while others may begin to go down
the path to cross-ethnic engagement once a small factory or new school is opened
in their neighborhood."
Id.
Indeed, the notion that trials and truth commissions, by offering a national ritual or perform-
ance of truth-telling, can be a cathartic process creating empathy in former political enemies,
leading to the quick "healing" of a society must be viewed with skepticism. Analogies to
individual healing are perhaps informative: psychotherapists have taken a critical view of the
prospects for a quick, effective catharsis, and warn of the potential negative effects arising
from "injudicious catharsis"--defined as a catharsis that comes prematurely, too hastily, or
without the proper context in which to explore overly powerful and traumatic memories. Id.
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Indeed, many scholars have concluded that it is extremely difficult
to impose a history of any conflict on its participants; such narratives will
always remain contested in the post-conflict as the survivors to the conflict
struggle to process their experiences. As other scholars have shown, it is
similarly challenging and perhaps unwise to impose a form of transitional
justice on societies, as these contested forms will at best be marginalized
and lack effectiveness and, at worst, carry the potential to provoke social
unrest, and possibly a return to the violence of the past.20 5 Mark Osiel has
written a great deal on twentieth century attempts to use the law to create
social cohesion in the wake of administrative massacre.20 6 As Osiel points
out, this strategy has been attempted in countless settings, such as in Argen-
tina after the "Dirty War" and during the trial of Adolf Eichmann in Is-
rael.2 °7 But as Israeli Prime Minister Ben Gurion learned after the trial, he
could not impose an historical meaning on Eichmann's significance or
neatly tie up the entire history of the Holocaust in one trial. The trial became
an "event," in the sense described by on of the first theorists of collective
memory, Pierre Nora:
Like truth, the event is always revolutionary, the grain of sand in the ma-
chine, the accident that shakes us up and takes us by surprise .. . there is
no event without critical consciousness, there is an event only when, of-
fered to everybody, it is not the same for all.
As the Eichmann trial ably demonstrates, it is necessary to understand the
sheer unpredictability of collective memory and the way that a performative
truth-telling's effects are extremely unpredictable.2 8 Osiel concludes from
205 See WILSON, supra note 121; see also Shaw, supra note 87.
206 See generally MARK OSIEL, MASS ATROCITY, COLLECTIVE MEMORY, AND THE LAW
(1997).
207 As Hannah Arendt complains, the very purpose of the trial-not so clearly second in
priority to bringing Eichmann to justice-was a pedagogic one. Israeli Prime Minister David
Ben-Gurion saw it as an opportunity to teach Israelis and the world a lesson (in fact, several),
the most important of which was the creation of a "national saga that would echo through the
generations." Id. at 15-16.. Ben-Gurion sought this saga because he felt that "something was
required to unite Israeli society-some collective experience . . . that would be gripping,
purifying .... a national catharsis." Id. at 16 n. 15.
208 It is this unpredictability that causes Shoshana Felman to write about the Eichman trial
as an "event," which she defines as the "capacity of happenings to shock and to surprise-in
excess of their own deliberateness," this following Pierre Nora's description. Felman, supra
note 101, at 210 n.16. The Eichmann trial was truly an event because besides creating the
historical record, it unintentionally established the counter-narrative of Jewish collaboration
in aspects of Nazi persecution both in the ghettos and the camps, and created space for Ar-
endt's "critical consciousness," of the trial, namely, her perception of the "banality" of
Eichmann's (and by extension the Nazis) evil, a perspective that served to undermine the
monumental elevation of the victim to the center of the trial. Though this critical conscious-
ness only emerged in Arendt's reportage, it did eventually find its way into public Israeli
discourse of the trial. See Felman, supra note 99, at 225.
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his study of deliberate attempts to forge post-conflict history that "[t]he least
we might fairly expect from courts, at such trying times, is a stimulus to
democratic dialogue between those who wish us to remember very different
things. '209 As Michael Ignatieff has argued,
All that a truth commission can achieve is to reduce the number of lies that
can be circulated unchallenged in public discourse. In Argentina, its work
has made it impossible to claim, for example, that the military did not
throw half-dead victims in the sea from helicopters. In Chile, it is no
longer permissible to assert in public that the Pinochet regime did not dis-
patch thousands of entirely innocent people.
210
As in any other transitional situation, it would be foolish to think that an
Israeli-Palestinian truth commission could instantaneously impose a new
historical understanding on either side of the conflict. Such an attempt, ar-
gues Charles Maier, is not even necessary.
Maier notes that truth commissions reveal that both perpetrators and
victims have a history, but questions to what extent they come to "share a
narrative." 211 To conceptualize this complex relationship to history, Maier
offers a musical analogy. He explains that history must aspire not to be
"harmonic," but rather, "contrapuntal. 212 The "shared" narrative must allow
the particular histories of the national groups to be woven together "linearly
alongside each other so that the careful listener can follow them distinctly,
but simultaneously, hearing the whole together with the parts." These dif-
ferent communities with distinct histories can be seen in the 'Two Nations'
living in South Africa post-apartheid that are divided along socio-economic
lines and continue to be separated in many ways by the legacies of apartheid
even as official truth-telling and reconciliation have been pursued.21 3
It would seem that the Israeli-Palestinian situation would facilitate
this kind of contrapuntal history precisely because what is required is not
one coherent national narrative, but rather, two disparate national narratives
that concur and overlap beyond question on certain fundamental truths,
most significantly, the fact of suffering on both sides of the conflict.214 No
209 OSIEL, supra note 210, at 282.
2 10 Boraine, supra note 79, at 151-52.
211 For similar conclusions, see Bar-On, Conflicting Narratives, supra note 130; Jawad,
Arab and Palestinian Narratives, supra note 41.
212 Maier, supra note 107, at 274-75.
213 See Statement of Deputy President Thabo Mbeki at the Opening of the Debate in the
National Assembly, on Reconciliation and Nation Building, National Assembly Cape Town,
29 May 1998, http://www.dfa.gov.za/docs/speeches/1998/mbek0529.htr.
214 See Dan Bar-On & Sami Adwan, The Psychology of Better Dialogue Between Separate
but Independent Narratives, in HISTORY'S DOUBLE HELIX, supra note 8, at 205, 216
("[W]here a single-state political solution emerge[s], one could think in terms of developing
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more than historians strike some perfect balance between collective memory
and history, can everyday citizens of the conflict come to acknowledge this
very basic fact. It is such acknowledgment of basic human dignity that en-
ables the kind of peaceful relations needed in carrying out all the many col-
laborated activities that will begin in full force once a minimum peace is
established. As Halpern and Weinstein argue, this rehumanization process,
fueled by empathic encounters, is central to any basic conception of recon-
ciliation.215
B. The Responsibility of the Beneficiary
Once the final permanent borders of the two-states are established,
Israelis will be in a more comfortable position to begin to proceed toward
this acknowledgement. This group of people-at once collaborators and
beneficiaries-continue to reap the benefits of Palestinian dispossession:
citizenship, economic prosperity, and the enjoyment of the basic rights Pal-
estinians see denied on a daily basis. The continued, imbalanced power dy-
namic between Jewish Israelis, on the one hand, and Arab Israelis and Pal-
estinians on the other, dictates that it is precisely this class of people who
seem to hold the power for real change in the post-conflict era.
The South African TRC's Commissioners learned this lesson (of the
responsibility of the beneficiary) only later:
In this process of bridge building, those who have benefited and are still
benefiting from a range of unearned privileges under apartheid have a cru-
cial role to play. Although this was not part of the Commission's mandate,
it was recognized as a vital dimension of national reconciliation. This
means that a great deal of attention must be given to an altered sense of re-
sponsibility; namely the duty or obligation of those who have benefited so
much (through racially privileged education, unfair access to land, busi-
ness opportunities and so on) to contribute to the present and future recon-
struction of our society. 216
The question remains, of course, as to whether either side of the conflict,
but particularly the Israeli population, will be willing to engage this altered
sense of responsibility in the future.
a bridging narrative; but when there are two societies that want to live separately, side by
side, a two-narrative solution seems more suitable.").
215 See Jodi Halpem & Harvey Weinstein, Empathy and Rehumanization After Mass Vio-
lence, in My NEIGHBOR, MY ENEMY, supra note 36, at 303.
216 TRC Final Report, supra note 126, ch. 5, para. Ill.
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1. Post-Zionism and Palestinian Self-Critical Historiography
The current kulturcampf raging in Israel brought on by the rise of
post-Zionism suggests that Israeli society is on its way to critically evaluat-
ing the history of the conflict but is still very much in the beginning of this
process.217 Post-Zionism stands for a variety of things and has different
meanings for different groups of people, but at its core, post-Zionism is a
struggle over Israeli collective and national identity and the ideological and
political underpinnings of the State of Israel.218 At the center of the post-
Zionist question, along with larger questions of the Jewish character of the
state, is the ongoing debate about the security of the Jews in the Middle
East, which affects Jewish Israeli relations with Arab Israelis, with Pales-
tinians, and with their other Arab neighbors. Sammy Smooha asserts that
the resolution of the peace negotiations with the Palestinians will "usher in a
217 For more on the Israeli kulturcampf and the rise of post-Zionism, see BARUCH
KIMMERLING, THE INVENTION AND DECLINE OF ISRAELINESS: STATE, SOCIETY, AND THE
MILITARY (2001) (offering an overview and analysis of the construction and deconstruction
of hegemonic, secular Zionist Israeli national identity from the early years of the Zionist
movement to the present); Stuart A. Cohen, The Peace Process and Societal-Military Rela-
tions in Israel, in MIDDLE EAST PEACE PROCESS, supra note 7, at 107. For an excellent over-
view of the post-Zionism debates, see SILBERSTEIN, supra note 62; see also Myron J. Aronoff
& Pierre M. Atlas, The Peace Process and Competing Challenges to the Dominant Zionist
Discourse, in MIDDLE EAST PEACE PROCESS, supra, at 41; Ilan Pappe, Post-Zionist Critique
on Israel and the Palestinians: Part I: The Academic Debate, J. PALESTINE STUD., Winter
1997, at 29; Ilan Pappe, Post-Zionist Critique on Israel and the Palestinians: Part II. The
Media, J. PALESTINE STUD., Spring 1997, at 37; Ilan Pappe, Post-Zionist Critique on Israel
and the Palestinians: Part III: Popular Culture, J. PALESTINE STUD., (Summer 1997), at 60;
BAR-ON, supra note 62, at 150-68; Eyal Naveh, The Dynamics of Israeli Identity Construc-
tion Through Education in History, in HISTORY'S DOUBLE HELIX, supra note 8, at 260 (re-
viewing the impact of post-Zionist discourse on the Israeli educational curriculum, particu-
larly in the teaching of history).
218 The philosopher YosefDan offers the following definition of post-Zionism:
Post-Zionism means Israeli nationalism based on territorial minimalism, without
any specific social or moral aspirations, without any significant religious dimen-
sion, without the adoption of a traditional culture, without eschatological founda-
tions, without a deep-rooted Hebrew language that draws upon its origins, and
based on a desire to achieve both a fuller normalization of Israel's status among the
nations and spiritual integration, from a position of equality with other cultures.
Quoted in Naveh, supra note 40, at 262. Naveh also notes the definition offered by anthro-
pologist Uri Ram, who explains that post-Zionist ideology "talks about what comes or might
come after Zionism in the historical sense." Id. It acknowledges both the "reality created by
the Zionist movement in Israel/Palestine," and "the wrong that was done to the Palestini-
ans--dispossession and oppression." Ram emphasizes, notes Naveh, that this acknowledg-
ment does not "negate the State of Israel," but merely strives to "reform it, in the direction of
de-Zionization." Id. In this way, post-Zionism represents a struggle to shape Israeli collective
identity and "an aspiration to begin distinguishing between nation and state in Israel-in
other words, to create a universal democratic framework in Israel in which no particular
national tradition or ethnic group is given special status." Id.
[Vol. 38:281
TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE
quiet revolution in Israeli society and will recast Arab-Jewish relations. 219
This trend is perhaps most evident in the growing numbers of Israeli youth
and reservists conscientiously objecting to serve in the occupied territo-
ries.220 As Nadim Rouhana observes:
The weakening of the security preoccupation will have a dramatic impact
on the internal dynamics of the three guidelines of Israeli policy. The con-
tradiction between democracy and the Jewish state that was concealed be-
hind the security concerns will emerge as the cardinal contradiction, not
only in Israel's policy toward its Arab population but also in the very
structure of the state. The weakening of the security rationale will put
pressure on Israeli society to face the contradiction between equality and
constitutional exclusivity because many of the political and psychological
mechanisms that were developed to maintain this contradiction relied on
the security concerns.221
Thus, while until recently, it has been possible for the State of Israel and
much of the Jewish public to attribute inequality, discrimination, and differ-
ent treatment of the Arab citizens to "security considerations," this will no
longer be true in the post-conflict, as the security rational argument will lose
much of its force. Still, it is difficult to predict how resolution of the Israeli-
Palestinian conflict will affect the positions of jihadist organizations like
Hamas, Hezbollah, or the governments that back them, such as Iran and
Syria.
As Israeli historian Mordechai Bar-On describes it, the post-Zionist
debates have not been confined to stuffy academic discussions but are play-
ing out within the larger setting of Israeli society,22 though it is hard to
measure what percentage of Israelis beyond the academic and artistic elites
embraces post-Zionist discourse and to what extent. Eyal Naveh has also
noted the extension of post-Zionist discourse beyond the university to the
cultural realm, influencing "theatre, filmmaking, journalism, art, literature,
219 Myron J. Aronoff & Pierre M. Atlas, The Peace Process and Competing Challenges to
the Dominant Zionist Discourse, in MIDDLE EAST PEACE PROCESS, supra note 7, at 41, 57
(quoting Sammy Smooha).
220 See Lily Galili, Every Man Has a Red Line, HA'ARETZ, Mar. 31, 2002, http://www.bin
tjbeil.com/articles/en/02033 lgalili.html. Another group of soldiers have formed an organi-
zation called Shovrim Shtika ("Breaking the Silence"), which serves as a forum for them to
disseminate their testimony of their own abuse of Palestinian civilians while serving in the
Occupied Territories. See http://www.shovrimshtika.org/about-e.asp.
221 ROUHANA, supra note 142, at 222.
222 See Mordechai Bar-On, Historiography as an Educational Project: The Historians'
Debate in Israel and the Middle East Peace Process, in MIDDLE EAST PEACE PROCESS, supra
note 7, at 21. Elsewhere Bar-On describes the revisionist historians-the so-called "new
historians"-as engaged in "an ambitious project of reeducating Israelis .... The goal of the
project is nothing less than to change the parameters and reformulate Israel's perception of
its own collective identity." Bar-On, Conflicting Narratives, supra note 130, at 155-56.
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and law," but points out the "conspicuous" paucity of "social movements
and political bodies committed to the post-Zionist agenda.' 223 As Naveh
rightly observes, the post-Zionist agenda has few backers in mainstream
Israeli politics (the Arab political parties and "a few members of the ex-
treme leftist factions" in the Knesset), and indeed, establishment politicians
consider post-Zionism "loathsome," and portray it as a project to "under-
min[e] the foundations of the Jewish state" and replace its iconography with
that of "a state for all its citizens. 224 There is good reason to suspect that
official introspection and government sanctioned inquiries will not com-
mence before a fimal status agreement is signed, if ever. Still, of the con-
temporary draft peace agreements in circulation that are sponsored by a mix
of high-profile Israelis and Palestinians (none of whom are empowered by
electoral politics to reach a peace settlement), all three propose some form
of historical inquiry into the causes and consequences of the creation of the
Palestinian refugee problem. None go further, though, and propose inquiry
into the abuses of four decades of occupation, or the attacks of Palestinian
terrorists on Israelis and Jews.225
For similar reasons, Bar-On has suggested that Palestinian histori-
ography, let alone Palestinian society, is not yet prepared to enter a truly
self-critical mode.226 Palestinian historian Saleh Abdel Jawad concurs in this
judgment, noting in particular that the fact that "this Palestinian narrative
will have to be forged in the context of an unfavorable balance of power, in
the absence of a Palestinian state, and in the absence of democratic tradi-
223 Eyal Naveh, The Dynamics of Israeli Identity Construction Through Education in His-
tory, in.HISTORY's DOUBLE HELIX, supra note 7, at 244, 262.
224 Id.
225 See Adam Keller, A Comparison of Three Drafts for an Israeli-Palestinian Peace
Agreement (2003), http://zope.gush-shalom.org/home/en/channels/archive/1 155051488/
(comparing the Gush Shalom, a left-wing Israeli peace movement, Proposal of 2001, The
Ayalon-Nusseibeh Statement of Principles of 2002 and the Geneva Initiative of 2003).
226 Bar-On concludes his analysis by noting:
The lesson Palestinians should learn from Israel's revisionist historiography is not
how correct they are in their own narratives but rather how self-critical they, too,
must become.... One should not forget that we, the Israelis, are still the occupiers,
and they, the Palestinians, remain the occupied, uprooted, and dispersed people.
The deep and in many ways justified sense of injustice and suffering that Palestini-
ans must confront every day and everywhere in their land makes it very difficult
for Palestinian historians to be more impassioned when they investigate the roots
of their humiliations. The Jews of Palestine have already achieved and established
their national sovereignty and collective identity. But the Arabs of Palestine are
still in the middle of their uphill struggle to realize those goals. Nevertheless, writ-
ing in this context, I believe that my Palestinian colleagues will soon attain the
self-confidence that will allow them to feel totally free to develop their work as
historians.
Bar-On, Conflicting Narratives, supra note 130, at 168.
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tions of free inquiry makes the work more difficult but no less urgent., 227
Perhaps once Palestinians are secure within the borders of their own state,
they too will be prepared as a society to explore their past with a more criti-
cal eye.
2. Grassroots Reconciliation Efforts
There are groups of Israelis and Palestinians, however, who do not
want to wait for such explorations of their complicity and connectivity to
the conflict to be politically correct or even officially condoned. Several
Israeli-Palestinian reconciliation groups have sprouted up in the last dec-
ade.228 Many of these organizations view their missions as conducting inter-
personal and inter-group peace-building irrespective of progress achieved
by the political elites in the peace process itself or broader social or political
movements.
One such organization, whose members were recently featured in
the award-winning 2006 documentary, Encounter Point,229 is the Parents
Circle Families Forum. The Parents Circle consists of over five hundred
members, all of whom lost an immediate family member to the violence of
the conflict, who come together to share their stories of loss in an attempt
initiate a process of reconciliation between the peoples.23°
Another innovative organization, OneVoice, has embarked on an
ambitious project of trying to "amplify the voice of the overwhelming but
heretofore silent majority of moderates who wish for peace and prosper-
ity."'231 In addition to training youth in community leadership and conflict
227 Jawad, Arab and Palestinian Narratives, supra note 41, at 103-04.
228 The Alliance for Middle East Peace, a U.S.-based umbrella organization that helps
organize and advocate on behalf of thirty-eight reconciliation and peacebuilding projects, has
information on various groups. See The Alliance for Middle East Peace, About ALLMEP,
http://www.allmep.org/documents/aboutallmep.pdf (last visited Jan. 12, 2007); see also
Middle East Peace Dialogue Network, Inc., Mission Statement, http://mpdn.org (last visited
Jan. 12, 2007) (listing links to organizations involved in Jewish-Arab coexistence and Israeli-
Palestinian reconciliation efforts).
229 See Just Vision, About the Film: Encounter Point, http://www.justvisions.org/about
the film.php (last visited Jan. 12, 2007).
230 The Parents Circle claims that:
Palestinians and Israelis have so far avoided recognizing the pain of the other side.
A reconciliation process initiated by the Families Forum can put victims, who re-
fuse to revenge their loss and choose to reconcile at the forefront of public aware-
ness. In doing so it will humanize both sides and will act as an example to the Is-
raeli and Palestinian people.
The Parents Circle-Families Forum, Long Term Goals, http://www.theparentscircle.com/
Pages.asp?pageid=7 (last visited Jan. 12, 2007).
231 OneVoice-About Us, http://www.onevoicemovement.org/wps/portal (follow "About
OneVoice" hyperlink). OneVoice "deploys cutting edge technology, electronic democracy, a
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resolution skills, supporting pro-peace political candidates, and other activi-
ties,232 OneVoice has also launched a series of referenda-the Citizen Ne-
gotiation Platform--on the key issues of the peace process with the aim of
demonstrating by population survey that there is a broad mandate for mak-
ing particular concessions on both sides. Over 110,000 Israelis and Pales-
tinians voted on the issues through several rounds of weighted voting, com-
ing to some common ground on many of the most difficult of the conflict's
various issues.233
Other initiatives come on a smaller scale, such as the collaboration
between Israeli conductor Daniel Barenboim and the late Edward Said to
create a joint Israeli-Palestinian orchestra, the West-Eastern Divan, or at-
tempts by educators to create "double narrative" teaching guides addressing
various historical events in the conflict for use in Israeli and Palestinian
schools.234 The work of many of these organizations has been supported by
the Alliance for Middle East Peace, a U.S.-based umbrella organization
consisting of twenty-eight NGOs helping to raise awareness about recon-
ciliation groups as well as increase federal appropriations to support these
groups' important work.235
network of activists and member organizations, and a broad cadre of experts, dignitaries,
celebrities, business leaders and spiritual authorities." Id.
232 See OneVoice by Numbers, http://www.onevoicemovement.org/wps/wcm/resources/
file/eb02a5088e43e48/OVBYNUMBERS.pdf (describing the scope and impact of One-
Voice's activities).
233 The Citizen Negotiation Platform was created by an Israeli-Palestinian panel of com-
munity, religious, and other leaders who collaboratively broke the conflict down its "10 most
seemingly intractable areas of dispute" (the end of the conflict, education and reconciliation,
holy sites, Jerusalem, security, the end of the occupation and terrorism, settlements, borders,
and a two-state solution). OneVoice Movement FAQ, http://www.onevoicemovement.
org/wps/portal (follow "FAQs" hyperlink). They then presented potential resolutions to these
problems to Israelis and Palestinians through several rounds of voting. As their website de-
scribes the project, "[w]here there was no consensus between Israelis and Palestinians, the
council of experts was asked to come up with new solutions, based on feedback from the
average Israeli and an average Palestinian. Thus a negotiation system was created to engage
citizens on both sides and build a popular mandate for peace." Id.
234 Bar-On & Adwan, supra note 218.
235 In an attempt to build upon the "Wye River People-to-People Exchange Programs" of
2000, which made a one-time grant of ten million dollars to help fund seventeen Israeli-
Palestinian coexistence initiatives, the Alliance for Middle East Peace (ALLMEP) is cur-
rently involved in a campaign to create a special "Middle East People-to-People Coexistence
Program" that would earmark ten million dollars in funds exclusively for Middle East coex-
istence projects. A special Middle East-focused fund is needed because, though ALLMEP
helped increase global funding of coexistence projects from eight million dollars in 2004, to
twelve million dollars in 2005 and fifteen million dollars in 2006, USAID has since imposed
a cap of five grants per region on coexistence funding. The Middle East NGOs submit forty
to fifty grant applications themselves, ten times as many as any other region, and thus, a
separate fund would be required to augment Middle East funding without detracting from
coexistence initiatives elsewhere. See ALLIANCE FOR MIDDLE EAST PEACE, SUPPORT MIDDLE
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To be sure, these are positive signs in an otherwise perennially
bleak spot in the world. It will also be vital for an IPTC's outreach efforts to
tap into these movements and organizations to build support not only for its
own work, but to further the overall project of reconciliation. This lack of
coordination and follow-through hampered the overall impact of the South
African TRC's work,236 just as the geographical distance and lack of out-
reach efforts by the international criminal tribunals has diminished the im-
pact of their work on those societies.237 If Israelis and Palestinians decide to
embark on this path, it will require a great deal of partnerships to be forged
not only across borders, but within them, as government actors and civil
society groups must work to complement each other's efforts.238
VI. CONCLUSION AND THE UNWRITTEN EPILOGUE
This article aims to present a realistic picture of the real prospects
for a "peace beyond the peace process"--particularly in the form of an Is-
raeli-Palestinian Truth Commission-as well as to portray a sober depiction
of the true powers of truth commissions to facilitate reconciliation in the
aftermath of political violence. At this stage there is no conclusion; the con-
flict continues to rage with misunderstandings and resentment as deep as
ever before, even as both Israeli and Palestinian societies recognize the in-
evitable resolution of the conflict in a negotiated compromise resulting in a
two-state solution. Similarly, transitional justice, though past its infancy,
remains in a stage of development and a process of maturation that will only
be furthered by more empirical work on the effects of transitional mecha-
nisms on post-conflict reconstruction. But at this point, research conclusions
must remain tentative, particularly because reconciliation-however it is
defined-is the work of generations, and the causal mechanisms from which
it originates cannot be measured with true precision.239
But we do know a great deal from other instances of intense con-
flict. We know that people, as individuals and collectively, have an impulse
for justice and for recognition of their rights when they have been trampled.
EAST PEACE-BUILDING NGOs IN FY '07 (unpublished, promotional material on file with
author). As of September 2006, the House of Representatives' FY 2007 Foreign Operations
appropriations bill included six million dollars for a special Middle East fund, but ALLMEP
had met resistance for similar provisions in the Senate (email interchange with Avi Meyer-
stein, founder of ALLMEP) (on file with author).
236 See Humper, supra note 119.
237 See Fletcher & Weinstein, supra note 11, at 33.
238 See Kirsten McConnachie et al., Truth Commissions and NGOs: The Essential Rela-
tionship (The "Frati Guidelines" for NGOs Engaging with Truth Commissions, INT'L
CENTER FOR TRANSITIONAL JUST., Apr. 2004, http://www.ictj.org/images/content/l/0/106.pdf.
239 See Contributions of Truth to Reconciliation, supra note 197, at 409; see also Stover &
Weinstein, Conclusion, supra note 99, at 323.
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We also know that true social change cannot take place in the absence of
institutional reform. To the extent that a truth commission can facilitate both
processes-recognizing the suffering of individual victims and casting a
critical gaze at the institutions of rule that enabled such violations-it seems
not only worthwhile, but imperative, to pursue the establishment of such an
institution in the post-conflict. Though I have sketched the outlines for how
an IPTC might function best, all questions of mandate and design will nec-
essarily be tempered by the power relations of the post-conflict and the pre-
paredness of the two peoples for engaging one another and history.
As idealistic as this all may seem, to justify establishing an IPTC
we need not view it as a panacea or a vehicle for salvation and redemption
for whole societies. A truth commission may have a limited, inherent
value-what we can call a "procedural value"-without satisfying the ex-
pectations pronounced by the platitudes that remain the dominant discourse
in transitional justice. 4° On the contrary, perhaps all that can be anticipated
from a truth commission is merely the instantiation of a new dynamic be-
tween former political enemies; the content of the historical narrative it will
produce, the transformative potential of the interpersonal encounters to be
had during the victim and perpetrator hearings, and the way the entire pro-
ject will be received and integrated into Israeli and Palestinian life is wholly
contingent. But even with these uncertainties and minimal assessments, a
truth commission seems indispensable to the future coexistence of Israelis
and Palestinians.
Nonetheless, detracting voices rightly observe that in some in-
stances, "truth-telling" on so grand a scale, is not prudent. It may conflict
with localized popular conceptions of what justice and reconciliation entail,
diminishing the legitimacy needed to encourage robust participation in a
commission's work and limiting its ability to carry out its mission effec-
tively and have a real impact on society.2 4' Others question the power of
both retributive and restorative justice to bring about reconciliation and
even warn that truth and justice seeking can reanimate traumas, inflict new
ones, and possibly work against reconciliation because it reminds partici-
pants of their sufferings and reaffirms their victim ideologies and hatred of
their political others.242 Integrating these criticisms, and mindful of the po-
240 See generally Stover & Weinstein, supra note 82, at 4-5 (challenging the "vague asser-
tion" that international criminal trials should produce reconciliation).
241 See Shaw, supra note 87; see also WILSON, supra note 121, at 227.
242 See Shaw, supra note 87, at 7 (noting a 1997 study by the Trauma Center for Victims of
Violence and Torture in Cape Town, which found approximately sixty percent of those who
testified in the South Africa's TRC felt worse after testifying); Stover & Weinstein, Conclu-
sion, supra note 99, at 323 (finding no connection between criminal trials, at any level-
international, national, and local/traditional-and reconciliation, and in particular, that crimi-
nal trials of local perpetrators often divided small, multi-ethnic communities because of their
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tentially overstated powers attested by truth commission advocates, the ul-
timate question for Israelis and Palestinians is whether a truth commission
has the ability to do more good than harm for their respective societies. In
forwarding a procedural conception of the power of truth commissions, I
would argue that, at a minimum, an IPTC should be able to do just this.
In establishing a truth commission, Israelis and Palestinians will
embark on a structural shift, radically altering the calculus of the conflict
from one of violence and the mutual denial of conflicting narratives, to one
of peaceful negotiation and recognition of the other's narrative of suffering.
This minimal achievement-continuing the process of negotiation, com-
promise, and rehumanization-is not something to be taken for granted
given the duration and intensity of this conflict over the last century. Even
from this minimalist account of the power of truth commissions to "heal"
societies, it seems that without such a commission, Israelis and Palestinians
may never achieve peaceful coexistence.
tendency to reignite emotions of suspicion and fear). Stover and Weinstein note, however,
that this could change over time. Id.
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